The subject under discussion is no longer to be treated as a mere hypothesis. The flying of heavier than air machines over land and water has been demonstrated to be not only possible, but practicable. Aviation, though still fraught with dangers, is no longer the occult science that for years baffled Langley, Dumont and Wright, nor is it merely an aerial acrobatic feat performed for exploitation. The theory of aerodynamics is now within the layman's grasp; aeroplane construction is becoming a familiar occupation; and the high development of gas engines is allowing such additional weight of material that the factor of safety is appreciable and flying machines are no longer mere man-killing devices. The stresses, sudden and violent, brought upon the flying machine in exhibition flights nowadays demonstrate both their strength and efficiency, and the wonderful performances of Pegoud, Beachey and Garros, although of no practical value per se, are ample proofs of the possibilities of the aeroplane in the hands of men who have taken the hazards of learning how. Aviation has taken a definite status as an element of maritime warfare.
Those who doubt the possibilities of the aeroplane in war have based their views upon what might be called the performance of the aeroplane rather than upon its adaptability to martial purposes. How greatly such views are in error may be estimated by a cursory glance upon the performances of last year. The attainment to altitudes of 7000 feet is a daily occurrence; not a few have reached 18,000 feet, the record being over 20,000 feet. Speeds between 80 and 90 miles per hour are quite common, coming well inside the record-124 miles per hour. As many as 17 occupants have been carried to an altitude of 2000 feet, while the carrying of 5 to 7 occupants to an altitude of 3500 feet for a period of 1 hour is becoming more and more common. Aeroplane engines are now developed to an efficient delivery of from 40 to 200 horsepower—and this with an endurance that compares well with that of automobile engines. The records for uninterrupted flights have recently progressed from 10 to 16 to 18 to 21 to 24 hours, leaving flights of 5 to 8 hours among the commonplace.
The performance of the aeroplane being therefore no longer an assumption, the next point is that of adaptability. The aeroplane has been both armed and armored. It can mount successfully a rapid-fire rifle. Bomb dropping has been effected with fair precision.
Given then that the hydroaeroplane can attain to and maintain high speed and altitude for 6 or more hours and that it is capable of offensive action, this machine cannot but become an important instrument of war.
The effects of offensive action on the part of hydroaeroplanes are real. The momentum of a bomb dropped from a high altitude is too well known to be discussed, but the effects of a continuous bomb-dropping from a squadron of aeroplanes upon a fleet, undefended by a similar squadron, would be of such a nature, both moral and real, that a discussion of the subject might well have extensive bounds. An analogous, yet stronger, instance of the offensive power of the hydroaeroplane would be seen in operations of a fleet against coast defenses or of a fleet in the blockade of a city and the contiguous shore. The observation work on the part of the hydroaeroplane would be unlimited and its offensive work from the altitudes now attainable could be opposed only by similar craft.
For naval work, however, the principal function of the hydroaeroplane appears to be that of a scout. With speed, altitude and endurance, such ability can only be a natural consequence. To illustrate that ability, both defensive and offensive, the accompanying diagrams are given, since graphically they present the case more clearly than a long description.
Diagram I. The premises are:
Clear air.
Speed of hydroaeroplane 8o m. p. h.
Speed of fleet 15 k. p. h.
Speed of scout cruiser 25 k. p. h.
Altitude of hydroaeroplane 4000 ft.
Visibility from 4000 ft.= 70 miles. (Theoretically, 72.5 miles.)
The plotted position of the flagship represents the position of the fleet at 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 p. m., respectively.
Position of hydroaeroplane plotted at times indicated.
Nightfall at 6 p. m.
Fleet is without scout cruisers.
In order to make a reconnaissance and have all hydros on board at nightfall, assume that the fleet at 2 p. m. put over six machines, which scouted at the given speed and altitude over the plotted courses. The limit of the scouted area is an ellipse whose foci are at the 2 p. m. and 6 p. m. positions, respectively; and whose major and minor axes are 460 miles and 453 miles, respectively; but on account of the number of aeroplanes and the radius of visibility from them, the limits of the scouted area are plotted in intersecting arcs of the circle of visibility from the machines.
Assuming that there was an enemy scout ahead steaming toward the fleet, their rate of approach would be 40 m. p. h. In this event it will be seen from the diagram that any enemy undiscovered in the reconnaissance of hydro A could not make a surprise attack upon the fleet sooner than II p. m. An undiscovered attack from astern would be impossible, since the rate of approach would be only 10 m. p. h., over an interval of 260 miles. An approach from abeam would be at 25 m. p. h., over an interval of 220 miles: therefore an undiscovered attack from this direction could not take place before 2.48 a. m.
It is thus seen that danger from an undiscovered attack from astern or the quarter is practically eliminated, while the danger period of attack from other points is reduced by amounts varying from 5 to 10 hours.
In this diagram no consideration was taken of the scouts and screen that would ordinarily accompany a fleet. It is seen therefore that in conjunction with those latter, the hydroaeroplane would be the unit to make the combination complete. To equip the scout cruiser with aeroplanes would not only greatly increase her scouting zone, but would afford a minute scrutiny thereof. Whether in offensive or defensive action, the fleet's information of the enemy would be definite and quick. At the crucial instant before joining battle, in fact before the fleet had actually sighted the enemy, the latter's speed, course and strength could be given to the flagship in ample time for her to assume the superior position. To a normal fleet the addition of aeroplanes would bring its operation to a thorough and detailed completeness; to a fleet without scouts or screens, such addition would be indispensable.
The Russian fleet at Tsushima, unfortunately without scouts or screen, would never have emerged from the straits in such pitiable formation, had there been, as is now, the means of aerial scouting, and the result of the crisis of the Russo- Japanese war might have read another way.
Diagram II is designed to illustrate the increased efficiency of the scout cruiser when equipped with two fast hydroaeroplanes, and its ability, when so equipped, to do the work of several cruisers.
Given the following:
Speed of scout cruisers 25 k. p. h.
Speed of enemy .12 10 20 k. p. h.
Speed of hydroaeroplane 80 m. p. h.
Altitude to give a visibility of 60 miles in clear air.
Scout cruiser at A, enemy at B.
Distance between A and B = 200 piles.
The scout has information that the enemy is leaving B at midnight, approximate speed 15 knots, on course somewhere between BK' and BA. The scout leaving A at midnight, speed 25 knots, follows search curve indicated in diagram. If the scout's assumptions are correct, the enemy will be intercepted by nightfall on any course she may follow between BK' and BA. The diagram will indicate the additional possibilities of the cruiser equipped with hydroaeroplanes, even if her assumptions are incorrect. At 5 a. m. the scout cruiser puts over an aeroplane on the port side which follows the course indicated and returns to the scout after the expiration of one hour, i. e., at 6 a. m. At 6 a. m. the second aeroplane, put over on the starboard hand, follows the course indicated and returns at 7 a. m. From this on, the two machines alternate in flights of 1 hour duration, until nightfall, which is assumed at 6 p. m. It is thus seen that each machine has a total of only 6 ½ hours of flying per day, allowing a period of r hour between flights for any repairs that may become necessary.
By the above method the limits of visibility for their scouting tour are defined by the broken lines NN' and MM'.
Assume that the enemy took a course BK.
The scout alone would then make contact at the point C, between noon and r p. m. Equipped with aeroplanes the scout would have discovered the enemy not later than, 7.30 a. In., 5 hours sooner than otherwise.
If the enemy had left B 4 hours later than assumed, it would have crossed the course of the scout 80 miles in the rear of the latter. The use of aeroplanes would have brought the enemy into visibility from 5.30 a. m.
If the enemy had left B 4 hours earlier than assumed, it would have crossed the scout's course ahead between 8 and 9 a. m,., distant over 90 miles.
The use of aeroplanes would have brought the enemy within visibility between noon and 12.30 p. m.
Within the limits of the angle ABK' it is impossible for an enemy to leave B within 4 hours on either side of midnight, at a speed not greater than 15 knots per hour, and fail to come within the visibility of the scout's hydroaeroplanes.
Furthermore, within the limits of the. angle ABL it is impossible for an enemy, .whose speed is 20 knots or less, leaving B not earlier than midnight, to escape discovery. The only feasible plan by which an enemy leaving B could avoid a scout would be in a similar employment of flying machines to keep an eye upon the scout's movements.
It is therefore obvious not only that the hydroaeroplane is an important and Valuable asset to a fleet and its accessories, but also that when placed at the disposal of one party to a conflict, it becomes indispensable to the other. With the addition of radio telegraphy, which was not taken into account in the above instances, the radius of operations of the aeroplane and the consequent effectiveness are vastly increased:
The Navy Departments throughout the powers of Europe are alive to the importance of the above facts. The same is quite true with our own department, but foreign powers have the great advantage of having public opinion, as well, keenly awake to the issue. It is with no effort that France or Germany or England obtain the funds essential to the building and maintenance of aircraft; public opinion demands such action. In France and Germany popular subscriptions have been little short of half the legal appropriations; and not until the subscription for 1913 is cited—an average of $1,000,000 for each country—do we realize the magnitude of their programs.
These powers do not stop at offering great inducements to naval aviators; their bounties extend even to the aeroplane companies. England's policy, slightly different from that of Germany, has recently developed the Sopwith hydroaeroplane, which, in point of speed, efficiency and stability both upon rough sea and in air, "literally galloped away," to use the French critics' expression, from all competitors in the international meet at Monaco. The policy of Germany has been such that for 1913 the number of her aeroplane companies increased by 30 and the number of brevetted pilots by 600. Aiming at the basic essential of military aeronautics, the Germans hold the endurance records.
The French are not only the pioneers of aeronautics, but are also still its leaders. Within the last year the great naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean were the world's first to bring the hydroaeroplane into an active important part of the joint exercises with battleships, scouts and submarines. Nor were these maneuvers of a mere experimental nature. Over-sea flights and scouting tours had, for a number of months, been an assured development of the various aeronautic stations at French ports. Three bases had been established on the Mediterranean, Toulon, Ajaccio (Corsica) and Bizerte (French Africa), at which points complete aerial squadrons had been mobilized. In addition to these stations ashore, the hangar ship Foudre had been fitted with two hydroaeroplanes, a Caudron and a Voisin, spare parts, etc., and the necessary equipage for making repairs. The Caudroii was able to launch from a runway, while the Voisin was hoisted out similarly to a ship's boat. After flights, both machines were hoisted in by a crane.
The general plan of the French maneuvers, executed under the direction of Vice Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, was as follows:
One enemy fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Tracou, coming from the direction of the Bolearic Islands, was to blockade some of the ports of South France and Bizerte, and was to attack one of them—Bizerte.
The fleet under Rear Admiral Lacaze was to oppose this blockade. Obliged at once to defend the coast of Provence and that of Algiers, Admiral Lacaze divided his aeroplanes into two groups with bases at Toulon and Bizerte, respectively.
At Bizerte the squadron was composed entirely of Nieuport hydroaeroplanes piloted by Lieutenants de Vaisseau Delage, l'Escaille, Destrem and the reservist Levasseur, using the Rhone and Gnome motors of 80 and 100 h. p. These monoplanes, of the most recent type for the speed-scout, carried fuel to last from 5 to 6 hours at a minimum speed of 8o m. p. h.
The squadron at Toulon was composed of five machines, principally biplanes of the Breguet and Voisin type, with Gnome and Salmson motors of horsepowers varying between wo and 200. The pilots were Lieutenants de Vaisseau.
The two Breguet biplanes carried interesting and important equipment. Lieut. Dutertre's machine carried a lighting system specially designed for night work, and the Means system of smoke signals. Moineau's machine carried a radio set capable of sending 125 miles.
The cruiser Foudre was sent by Rear Admiral Lacaze to Ajaccio with the purpose of keeping an eye upon the coasts of Corsica, but in the course of the maneuvers she received even additional duties.
Many details of the official reports of the maneuvers have been held strictly secret by the French Minister of Marine. But it could not be concealed that the first real collaboration of hydroaeroplanes with naval maneuvers gave such important results as to demonstrate, even to the doubtful, the necessity of these new instruments of maritime war.
The squadron of Toulon, though not assigned the most active role, performed brilliantly all that was required, making excellent reconnaissances as far as 8o miles from the coast.
The hydroaeroplanes of the Foudre played a very important part, especially in their thorough reconnaissances of the Corsican coast.
It was, however, the squadron of Bizerte that performed the hardest and most useful service. The Nieuport hydros and the excellent pilots of that squadron, compelled, in the consummation of a heavy task, the admiration of the entire French fleet. It was upon the heels of the instruction of the Commandant of Bizerte that Lieutenants de Vaisseau Delage and Destrem received the order to make an extensive reconnaissance. Putting out from the coast 125 miles, upon a circle of this radius, they fulfilled their theme in all points. One of the hydros made a forced landing upon the high sea, 65 miles from land, but the officer piloting was able to effect his own repairs in spite of the rough sea, and, on account of the excellent qualities of his machine, succeeded in getting off the water, and finished his scouting tour.
The morning of the fight off Bizerte, the four Nieuport hydros discovered and reconnoitred the enemy in a splendid tour of two hours. Lieutenant de Vaisseau Delage scouted back and forth between the scene of the combat and the Squadron, of ships from Bizerte until the arrival of the latter.
On the sixth day of the maneuvers, all the machines from Bizerte made separate distance scouting tours. Lieutenants de Vaisseau l'Escaille and Delage made reconnaissances of 2 hours each, fulfilling, without accident, the missions assigned to them.
According to the French critics of these exercises, "the feats of hydroaeroplanes: completely demonstrated the wisdom of the Minister of Marine in giving to naval aviation every necessary extension. This new service brilliantly won its cause; both officers and machines proving worthy in the most difficult circumstances. It only remains to increase their number: and to establish the Complete organization of a new corps—an act which France cannot afford to delay."
It can well be added that the French Minister of Marine is no more deeply imbued with the need of aeronautics in navies than the, First Lord of the British, Admiralty... Mr. Churchill's determination to advance aviation in His Majesty's Navy conies. from both study and experience. As a result of his efforts and encouragement, England to-day has, among others, the excellent Sopwith hydro and officer pilots such as Lieutenant Pixton. Fortunately for the British Admiralty, public opinion is equally cognizant of the fact that England's safety depends upon her naval supremacy and that this supremacy cannot remain intact without the hydroaeroplane. The dicta of Sir Percy Scott is most pertinent upon this subject according to this genius "Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar, well equipped with aeroplanes to observe the enemy's movements and submarines to attack them, would make egress from the Mediterranean very difficult. Submarines and aeroplanes have entirely revolutionized naval warfare—no fleet can hide from the aeroplane's eye…In War time the scouting aeroplane will be always high on the lookout and the submarines in constant readiness to respond. What we require is MI enormous fleet of submarines and aeroplanes."
More. than one critic upon maritime war is of the opinion that the very practical side of an underwater attack is due to the advent of the aeroplane. "Metaphorically speaking, the mechanical gull may now lead the: mechanical sword fish to rip, the belly of the mechanical whale. If uninterrupted communication may be maintained between the seaplane and the submarine, then surely that which lies between them afloat, however armored and armed, must succumb. Sir Percy Scott has correctly read the sign of the times."
As a Matter of fact every foreign nation, regarded as a power, is directing a strong effort toward naval aviation. England, Germany and France have been cited as specific examples, since they are close to the United States, Italy, Austria, japan and Russia are in no way lagging behind.
When all this is said and done, the only laggard among nations is the United States. Public education, opinion and sentiment all point to a gross ignorance of aeronautics. The word "airship" is the only word in the vocabulary of the average American to apply to all manner of balloon, dirigible, biplane, and monoplane. The people, as a whole, are five years behind those of Europe, and the subject of aeroplanes is discussed in a chimerical way with little thought of their capabilities, either civil or military. And, to be candid, neither branch of the service is very far ahead of the people.
The question is, What are we going to do about it? A detailed answer is difficult. But, at any rate, the burden is upon the service. It is incumbent upon those charged with the national defense not only to arouse themselves to the issue, but also to show to them whose missions we do, the best method by which this mission can be served. Congress, through the public, may be made to realize the necessity of a strong national defense—which means a strong fleet. But a fleet means more than dreadnoughts, and the commissioned personnel of the navy would be remiss in its duty should it allow our development to proceed upon limited lines until, with a blinded strategic eye, We are forced into action with a modern aggressive opponent.
Meanwhile the United States Navy Aeronautic Station is going ahead with its work, endeavoring to produce naval aviators and to place aviation where it belongs—with the fleet. Limited both in material and personnel, aviation in our navy has had, nevertheless, in a qualitative sense, extensive operations. The cruise to Mexico in which the Mississippi carried five hydros and flying boats was but a transposition of the flying school and is the longest tour that any man-o'-war has ever made upon a similar errand. The methods used in stowing the machines and hoisting in and out was improvised and possibly crude, but the principle was sound and the results good. The machines flew—flew every day for 43 consecutive days, at all times of the day, over both water and land, and in such variations of weather as the climate presented. They were constantly exposed to the elements during this interval, in which there were two summer "northers." And in keeping with the spirit that is fostering aeronautics in the navy, the officers detailed to aviation duty are striving to fit themselves and the material under their charge for any duty the fleet may need in time of war.