TACTICS AND GUNNERY
By Commander T. T. Craven, U. S. Navy
Foreword.—Strategy associates itself so intimately with national policy, public opinion, economics and the other important governmental interests that it is difficult to write comprehensively of the strategy of nations, other than that to which one belongs, because of insufficiency of knowledge regarding the local importance and application of these details.
Although it is not necessary to view naval tactics in the light of the multitudinous circumstances and events about which national strategy centers nevertheless, when discussing tactics and gunnery, one should have in mind the conditions applying particularly to the naval service of his own country. In what follows effort has been made to indicate briefly, details that appear as deserving of particular attention on our part, of deficiencies and defects which might have profound influences on our tactics and gunnery at sea or on the tactics and gunnery of possible antagonists.
Historical:—The study of the changes in weapons and in the complex methods of battle is absorbingly interesting, but there is little technical information, applicable at the present time to be gleaned from the close investigation of conflicts of the past. The augur with which, from a small boat, to drill into the hull of the enemy below the water line, has long since disappeared together with the wedge, once supplied to jam his rudder. The ram has gone after a brief reappearance following shortly after the advent of steam as a means for propulsion. The fire ship, at one time a formidable tactical unit, has sailed into oblivion with her valiant crew, and we find that the mobility of ships together with the power of modern ordnance have placed boarding in the category of being to-day almost an impossibility. Though artillery is strongly supplemented by other arms, the tremendous destructive force of the gun now ensures, to him having a better ability to hit rapidly with shell, the power to overcome surely every material characteristic in which the enemy may be the superior.
During the centuries in which reliance upon sails was had for locomotion at sea changes in the direction or velocity of the wind had a vital bearing on the issue of naval combat. These changes sometimes upset well-laid plans and the most careful calculations; frequently they permitted one side to avoid action or to escape after the conflict had opened. Ships with self-contained motive power, now with fair precision, measure opportunity for conflict through their superiority in speed, the ability to see the enemy, and the limitations of time and space.
Principles of Tactics.—The scientific development of the various arms and of the means for conveying them into battle has been particularly wonderful during the past two decades and has revolutionized the tactical employment of weapons. To-day many of the maxims of quite recent masters of the art of war are almost meaningless, but the study of the history of maritime operations discloses the truth of certain old and lasting tactical principles which may be stated briefly as follows:
(a) Tactics is solely for the purpose of promoting the effective employment of the armament and is based on efficient and confident use of the major weapon.
(b) Uncertainty, always a prominent factor in sea life, has made misleading and surprising the foe dominating features of naval tactics.
(c) The greatest tactical strength lies in dispositions which bring promptly a preponderance of aggressive force at the point of contact with the enemy.
(d) Good leadership with co-ordination of effort and tenacity of purpose on the part of all concerned in wide spread operations are requisites to success.
Principles of Gunnery.—The close perusal of history also points out that the basic principles of naval gunnery remain the same now as when artillery was first employed on shipboard. By principles is meant those fundamental requirements such as the necessity for expeditious loading; quick, exact determination of the range and estimation of the change of range, together with prompt, efficient sight setting and gun laying, all of which contribute to rapid hitting with the gun, the dominating instrument of naval war.
The details, important for investigation, then are the application of the above principles of tactics and gunnery to modern armaments and the influences of weapons which supplement artillery, upon the employment of the gun.
Game Board Deductions.—The game board furnishes the best means for the study of the geometric principles of fleet tactics, and the important relationship of time and space, provided proper regard is had for artificiality when the broad ocean and the circumstances of sea life are represented upon a flat table in a comfortable room. On the game board there is proneness to overlook the effects of low and varying visibility on both tactics and gunnery. Here there is no difficulty in locating one's position or in coordinating the navigational work of many ships regardless of time or conditions. The turmoil of battle does not disturb tranquility of mind; and the details important in the employment of arms, through which alone victory is gained, cannot correctly be simulated.
The two important points most clearly brought out by game board maneuvers are:
First.—That in tactics it is necessary always to preserve a better degree of concentration of force than does the enemy. Encourage the enemy to divide his strength; divide your forces when necessary but have care to maintain a condition which avoids confusion and interferences and affords a strong mutual support between all detachments at all times.
Second.—That it is desirable for every group of ships, employing guns as their primary armament, to keep target vessels under broadside fire and to preserve a line of bearing as nearly normal as possible to the bearing of the enemy.
The world-wide struggle now raging has subjected theories to an acid test of battle substantiating the correctness of these two theoretical precepts but also demonstrating the difficulty and uncertainty of complying with academic axioms. It will be long before unprejudiced and complete data become available regarding actions of the present war but any discussion of modern naval methods must have regard for the light shed upon them by the censored reports, however biased and incomplete, regarding the recent tragedies of such wide and intense interest. In studying the methods of the belligerents, and in measuring the results of their efforts, care must be had to retain a correct mental picture of the areas over which naval operations have been projected; the peculiar conditions obtaining because of the nearness to one another of the principals in the struggle; the restricted and well-defined lanes of communication; the shoal waters and especially the weather normally experienced in the North Sea and Channel. One must also have clearly in mind the military characteristics of the tremendous number of naval units employed by the warring nations.
Visibility.—Important indeed, as having a paramount influence on tactics and gunnery, have been the visibility conditions obtaining, affecting navigation, the discovery of the enemy, and the degree of definition of targets. There has been fighting during a great variety of circumstances—rough seas and darkness at Coronel—fog and mist at the Dogger Bank and at Heligoland—fine weather off the Falklands— and low visibility in the Battle of Jutland.
The inclination to abandon the routine exercises of peace during inclement weather and the tendency to seek always the most perfect conditions for target practice and maneuvers are natural but with them grows the practice of ignoring the possibilities of fighting under other than favorable circumstances. Coming together, somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, out of a fog or mist always has been a common experience of ships which, we may be sure, will continue in the future, as in the past, to be a likelihood of marine warfare. Tactical studies not having full regard for the possibility of unexpected contact are incomplete and perhaps confusing.
Let us, for a moment, consider details which become controlling when conditions for seeing are not the best.
Navigational Difficulties.—Uncertainty with regard to the whereabouts of ships underway becomes probable when the sky is overcast or seeing conditions are poor. This uncertainty grows as the period of unfavorable weather is prolonged or as the amount of maneuvering indulged in is increased. When the weather is thick, navigation is difficult, ships get lost, uncertainty commands, and coordinated wide-spread operations are impossible, particularly on the part of small craft which are not always navigated with the precision of larger units. Low visibility may frustrate all efforts of the tactician when in contact with the enemy.
(Attention may be invited to the usefulness of a mechanical tracker as an aid to navigation in trying occasions, when there is much maneuvering and attention centers on other matters than dead reckoning.)
Inconspicuousness.—The importance of inconspicuousness has been clearly shown recently. At sea we will certainly not care to be more easily visible to the enemy than he is to us and we will not wish him to be able to identify our force while we are uncertain perhaps as to the composition of a concourse of vessels sighted unexpectedly.
The cage masts, two of which are erected on battleships and one on armored cruisers, are very prominent and well-defined structures of a fixed height, which might serve excellently to assist the enemy in obtaining and keeping the range as well as to furnish him always with unmistakable marks of identification. We should seriously consider whether or not the masts are entirely justified to-day or if less conspicuous structures for spotting, more closely resembling those carried by foreign capital ships, would not better fill the requirements of war.
Similarity in Appearance.—One can conceive of occasions when uncertainty regarding the identification of a single vessel might be a matter of very considerable moment. The ability to deceive the enemy in this respect we will not care to deny ourselves. It would seem important that all fighting craft of a navy, in so far as may be practicable, should resemble one another in appearance. At great distances a battleship should be difficult to distinguish from a cruiser, and the scout from the destroyer.
Once locked in gunfire, exactness in gun laying is necessary in order to hit and the distance of the target at which the artillery is directed must be known within exceedingly narrow limits when shooting at long range. With several vessels engaged a. mistake of target by a ship or by part of the battery of a ship may make the difference between defeat and victory. The likelihood of such mistakes becomes very great when the targets look alike and are not readily designated from the fire control stations or held by the gun trainers who are easily thrown off by a yaw of the vessel or the shock of discharge of their own pieces.
Are not the chances of deceiving the enemy lessened by making
new construction, from year to year, radically different in appearance
from that already in commission? And might not marked
differences in the appearance of ships composing the fleet simplify
the problem of battle gunnery for the enemy which it opposes?
While the matter of hoodwinking the foe is under consideration
one should note that the paint brush, always a pleasing implement
to the sailor, recently has taken on a far greater prominence in
naval affairs in the endeavor to mislead. The blending of colors
and shading to create wrong impressions, to promote invisibility,
and to eliminate definition for range finding and gun pointing
has been found exceedingly desirable.
Smoke.—Formerly the smoke from the battery had an influence,
almost controlling on both tactics and gunnery. To-day the
discharge from funnels may be a most important interference
encountered on the field of battle. Any one who has ever witnessed
the evolutions of many ships has been impressed by the
effects of the funnel smoke on proceedings. Ships using Welsh
coal probably make somewhat less smoke than do those burning
other fuels, but, under forced draft, a collection of coal consuming
vessels always produces a black pall which might seriously hamper
operations.
Under certain conditions, superiority in numbers would be
nullified by the effects of smoke, which temporarily shut vessels
completely out of the action and permitted concentration on
others and their destruction in detail.
Ample evidence of the disturbing influences of smoke and of
the tactical use of the smoke screen to shield destroyer attack and
to cover the maneuvers or changes of course of capital ships when
under the fire of a superior force has appeared in the published
reports of recent actions.
The ability to control their funnel smoke is a very valuable
military characteristic of oil burning vessels and, in the future,
we may confidently expect smoke to become even a greater factor
in the tactics of sea warfare than has been the case in the past.
Cruising Formation.—The disposition of ships in the cruising
formation has been shown to be of the gravest concern, especially
for large fleets requiring much sea room.
Dispositions always should guard against surprise on the part
of the enemy but permit instant advantage to be taken of any
situation in which the antagonist happens to be encountered.
When on soundings where anchored mines may have been laid, sweeping operations on an extensive scale, are necessary. Where floating mines or submarines may be utilized by the opponent, the capital ships will have to rely for protection during daytime, to a very considerable degree, on a screen of destroyers covering the advance of the major units and enveloping the head and both bow quadrants. The interval of this screen from the battleships and the distance between the vessels composing it depends on the visibility. The interval should be sufficient to ensure absence of danger from the torpedoes of a submarine. The craft composing the screen must move promptly to positions from which they will not interpose interferences with the major units in the event of it becoming necessary for the latter to open fire (The German fleet is reported to employ its torpedo craft in this manner).
It will be seen that a great many speedy destroyers are necessary as adjuncts to the capital ships.
The usefulness and activities of the fast and handy destroyer have been augmented considerably by the guns, searchlights and the fostering influences of the fast cruisers utilized to support and to assist their operations. (The battle of October 17, 1914, off the Dutch Coast, in which the Undaunted and four British destroyers sank the German S-115, 117, 118 and 119 furnished a striking example of the value of supporting high speed scouts and also of effective gunnery on the part of craft, the primary armament of which has always been considered to be the torpedo.)
The time necessary to attain the proper formation and to complete the final arrangements for conflict is ensured only by surrounding the vessels, on which the brunt of the encounter must fall, by a swarm of fast cruisers and alert scouts. The battle cruisers may be employed as tentacles to hold the foe until crushing force is applied. Without eyes and tentacles the mighty strength of an aggregation of battleships may be unable to assert itself intelligently or successfully. At times it may become necessary for the outposts to take long chances in the attempt to check or to hold the enemy.
When cruising at night, except in bright moonlight, the box screen of destroyers, is impracticable. It cannot stop a rush of the adversary's torpedo craft and it would constitute a serious menace to the safety of the entire fleet because of the difficulties of station keeping and the likelihood of the occurrence of confusion which it promotes. In darkness great ships desiring to avoid attack should turn into an area in which freedom from molestation on the part of enemy torpedo vessels may be expected. The attendant destroyers must then seek the enemy's main body or be interposed in the direction from which torpedo attack may be suspected. Destroyers will not approach the capital ships of their own force after nightfall.
Attention may be drawn to the importance of the training of the entire force combined for cruising in the presence of the enemy and incidentally of the necessity for effective recognition signals for use by day as well as by night.
Maneuvers.—Theoretical views as to battle maneuvers cannot all be corroborated by the reports of recent experiences abroad. As yet there is no complete information available regarding the methods followed in the great battle of May 31.
It would seem however that, in approaching, ships should be formed in order of battle before reaching the fighting range. A danger would be that of retaining the approach formation too long. The commander's great endeavor is to avail himself of any advantages of light, wind, weather, sea or other circumstance and he will desire to avoid all resemblance of confusion. Capital ships in line, or line of divisions, of groups of homogeneous vessels are the formations to be chosen in making the distant approach with that class of vessel, lines of bearing of leaders being normal to that of the enemy. Groups should be steadied in columns before the enemy's fire has become effective, and it may not be improbable that all groups of capital ships may finally adjust themselves into perhaps an irregular single column as at Tsushima.
The approach should be continued, until fire has become effective, by slight simultaneous changes of course on the part of the division leaders each followed by the vessels of his division. Each group keeps the bearings of its opponents as nearly as possible at right angles to its own line of bearing.
The actual distance at which to open fire is dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere, the state of the weather and the accuracy of the shooting, range keeping and spotting. It is a mere waste of ammunition to fire at ranges where there can be no reliance upon making hits, but it has been shown to be entirely feasible to use the armament effectively beyond the distances at which penetration of the opposing armor is theoretically possible. The opponent's fighting power may be materially reduced and fire superiority obtained at long range, and so tremendous is the effect of modern gunfire, that every effort must be made, from the first, to deny to the opponent the effectual use of his artillery.
Should the enemy attempt to close with undesired rapidity, his effort may be frustrated by standing away somewhat, still keeping him exposed to full broadside fire, and by using the guns accurately. Ships in line of bearing advancing toward and firing at others on the bow may be exposed to the greater danger from torpedoes. Line of bearing changes are difficult but may be useful. It is considered, however, that generally opening or closing the range should be made by lines of bearing of divisions, division leaders preserving the bearing and other ships following their leaders in column.
Great care will be necessary in maneuvering to prevent any group of ships becoming isolated, and also to escape being trapped into positions in which ships blanket the fire of others, or interpose undesirable smoke interference, or in which all divisions are not favorably placed for effective gunnery and surely able to support one another from the first moment that fire is opened.
Maneuvering will always be a requirement of battle—one can hardly expect the units and tactical groups of a great fleet to go down to defeat tamely without attempting to exercise this power to escape punishment, any more than can one look to the other side not to make the effort to improve, through maneuvers, situations which to it appear to be favorable. The slow group of capital ships must be the center about which tactical effort centers but it is futile to attempt to establish definite geometric details for the conduct of operations, simplicity must obtain. Careful drill and painstaking rehearsal at sea alone will accomplish the final indoctrination of leaders, permitting the co-ordination, on which success in battle so largely depends.
Speed.—High speed has figured prominently in the engagements of the present conflict and has introduced novel factors at which we may next glance.
Formerly speed was considered to be of the greatest importance in the events leading up to action, but it will be seen now to have other important functions. While widening vastly the theatre of operations and enhancing the value of time, tactically superiority in speed lends itself particularly to the initiative. It permits the force possessing it to compel situations and conditions which the other side must meet and it supplies a means for perhaps controlling or imposing the "rate of change of range," a supreme detail in long range gunnery.
Sight Bar Range.—It is well understood that the ability to obtain correctly and to keep the sight bar range is by far the most important factor in fire control. The advantage enjoyed by a vessel that can and does obtain and keep the range within an error of 50 yards over one unable to secure the range within 150 or 200 yards would be enormous.
One hears much about shooting at long range but not a great deal concerning the problem of hitting with changing ranges. Though, target practice demonstrates that, to make a maximum of hits, it is desirable to have as small and as constant a change of range as possible, in battle if the range or the rate of change of range are constant for you they are likewise constant for the enemy. An ability to hit while these are varying considerably confers an advantage to the force able to control the fire, under the difficult conditions imposed, which might entirely nullify all efforts of the opponent.
Correct prediction of sight setting, incident to the time of flight of the projectile, is most difficult at long ranges when high speeds are employed and courses are varied and under these circumstances this prediction is of transcendent importance. On the ability to keep the range, which permits rapid hitting, improvement in naval gunnery now essentially depends.
To indicate the progress in this particular it will be remembered that in the battle of Tsushima the range varied between 6000 and 4000 yards and the change of range never exceeded 200 yards a minute. Generally it was less than 100 yards a minute. On August 28, 1914 the Lion hit and sank the Ariadne with two salvos at a range of 5000 yards when the latter crossed her bow at high speed. In this instance a change of range of about 700 yards a minute must have been experienced. In the battle of the Falklands, fought at exceedingly high ranges, fire was checked by the British ships when the change of range became very great. We have yet to obtain reliable information on this point regarding the Battle of Jutland but, having in mind the speeds employed, a casual glance at the diagrams that have appeared indicates that it was not a parallel fight and that considerable changes of range occurred.
Great changes of range cannot be obtained realistically in target practice because of the slow speed at which only it is possible to tow the targets and the danger to which the towing ship may be exposed. Firing one or two turrets from a ship approaching or receding at a known speed from a slowly moving target is a very different proposition from keeping an enemy, moving rapidly toward or away from an adversary, under the effective broadside fire of the latter.
The great fleets already possessing fast capital ships have long worked for a solution of the most perplexing factor of the difficult problem of fire control giving to speed in battle a vastly greater importance than has heretofore been conceded to this characteristic in navies not containing large vessels capable of steaming rapidly. While final reliance in matters of fire control must be in the good judgment and eyesight of the spotter nevertheless mechanical appliances are necessary to assist the control officer when conditions favor their employment. Gunnery is constantly becoming more scientific, no means for enabling one to place and to keep impacts on the targets should be ignored and complication is not and never has been an objection provided the mechanism works and satisfactory provision has been made for a failure of the apparatus.
Protection Against Torpedoes.—Speed combined with ability to maneuver constitutes a considerable protection against gunfire and is the most effective reply to the menace of the submarine and the torpedo. This latter tactical function of speed has been clearly demonstrated during the past two years. Vessels in regions where the presence of enemy submarines may be suspected, now customarily proceed rapidly and change the course every few moments.
Range.—Though engagements at sea have opened at ranges previously unheard of during the conflict now raging, neither the damage inflicted or the percentage of hits obtained are surprising to those acquainted with the advance in the art of gunnery.
In 1912 it was reported in the British Press that German naval officers were not satisfied with the German gunnery methods and that, as a result of an experimental firing by the Posen, high spotting stations were to be established on their ships. Until that time Germany had not taken seriously the gunnery improvements introduced into the British service and the principle prevailing in the German navy seems to have been that of the fastest possible shooting consistent with accuracy at moderate ranges, 5000 to 7000 yards.
At about the time of the Orion-Thunderer trials, when the old style of individual gun laying was pitted against the "director" plan, a report appeared in British papers of certain gunnery experiments conducted by the battleship Elsass, and outsiders suspected then, that the Germans were probably working as diligently as the British for a solution of vexing questions regarding the collective control of gunfire at long range.
Possibly the Germans in their training before this time had the idea that, because of their proximity and position with regard to Great Britain, in the event of war with that power, they would be able to choose the battlefield and probably the weather in which they would fight. England could not rest satisfied when drilled for certain peculiar conditions and has had to be prepared to carry the offensive to an enemy in any quarter of the globe. In some respects, with long naval frontiers, reaching into the two great oceans, over which the widest range of climate and of weather extends, our position is not unlike that of England and we cannot properly carry on training exclusively in any one locality or arbitrarily adopt standard circumstances of sea and weather for our naval activities.
If Germans held rigidly to the views believed to belong to them in 1912, which seemed to lend themselves most particularly to close, sharp work, they have since demonstrated the possession of a highly scientific knowledge of the game of gunnery in all of its phases, and a clear understanding of the fact that the seaman must have a better ability than his adversary to hit rapidly, at long, short, or at quickly changing ranges. Gunnery skill, which does not ensure the severe punishment of an enemy under any circumstances of contact, however unfavorable sea or weather, is insufficient. Expertness with weapons may enable one to escape from unhappy tactical situations but unless it exists, better tactics and superiority in numbers may be equally unavailing.
Errors of Gunfire.—There has been much discussion in our service regarding the advantages and disadvantages of dispersion in gunnery. Allowing a considerable error in keeping the range, with wide dispersion the chances of making a few hits at sea would seem better than when shots are kept falling close together. With wide dispersion, however, many hits cannot be made, the precise control of gunfire becomes impossible, and nothing better than a mediocre performance is to be expected. In peace all effort should make for the most exact precision in all details, for it is evident that in battle the precision of peace can never be attained.
While concerning ourselves with important details of gunnery, that of ferreting out and reducing or eliminating the small errors which combine to make up the lack of uniformity of performance and the considerable dispersion of heavy artillery presents itself. There is no subject of greater moment to the gunner of the army or of the navy than this. In order to study it intelligently and exhaustively firing experimentally, as nearly as possible under service conditions but where results always may be measured with exactness, would seem an absolute requirement.
In the well appreciated necessity for bringing closely together the two military arms of the government, might not the establishment of a common proving ground for the long range experimental work of both the army and navy be very desirable? The economy of the government which would result therefrom and the great advantages to both services obtained through having all the work of progressive, experimental gunnery combined would certainly more than offset any disadvantages that might be claimed because of friction in the administrative details for the regulation of such an establishment.
The facilities for the study of long range ballistics at Indian Head have long been entirely inadequate. At Sandy Hook the army is somewhat better equipped than is the navy for this work but it is understood that a private plant has recently acquired a proving ground far more suitable for the study of long range fire than either of the government establishments. Such a proving ground will vastly strengthen the position of the private corporation in the field of ordnance and gunnery perhaps, in time, at the expense of the government.
Initial Advantage.—It will be appreciated that the attainment of the initial advantage in gunnery may not be gained by all the vessels of one side, though for each individual ship, the early acquirement of this advantage is of supreme importance. A single ship leaving the formation during the early stages of battle confers upon the enemy an almost incalculable advantage and the ability of every vessel in his force to maintain position and effectively to deliver fire even though it be but a small fraction of that which the ship originally was capable is a matter of greatest concern to the commander-in-chief.
Collective Fire Control.—We may note at this point the importance of the collective control of the fire of an aggregation of ships—also a feature of battle not brought out always by peaceful target exercises.
The prevalence of mist or smoke in the theatre of operations may cause independent and unexpected encounters between groups of ships, unequal in numerical strength, of great consequence in fleet action. The likelihood of such encounters between individual ships or between groups of ships unequal in numbers, is a compelling reason for incorporating in every unit of the fleet the very strongest characteristics. This size alone permits.
In these isolated combats, as well as in an engagement between the battle lines, the collective fire control counts heavily; unless a capital ship is able to concentrate the fire of her battery with that of another or others, on an active enemy, or to divide the fire of her guns effectively if the necessity for so doing arises, her value in fleet action may be discounted. The tactical concentration of ships is valueless unless, with it, there is effective concentration of artillery.
Night Action.—The Battle of Jutland has given further illustration of the disinclination to join capital ships in night action, when the uncertainties and confusion of conflict may be so vastly augmented.
It should not be assumed however that battle between large units cannot be conducted after sunset. In war darkness has generally conferred an advantage most particularly to the better disciplined force determined to impose the initiative. A few vessels well grouped and handled might after nightfall throw disorder into a numerous collection of ships and a fleet much inferior in the numbers of capital units may seek to compel surprise action at night, if it is within its power to do so, and the activities of the enemy torpedo craft do not prevent it, rather than to accept battle in daylight.
The side forcing the attack at night, being able, to some degree, to time and plan the encounter, might enjoy a great initial advantage in the use of both guns and torpedoes.
Torpedo Attack.—The problem of night torpedo attack and defence remains among the most involved confronting the seaman. At night or when visibility is poor the destroyer attack must be driven in to a very close range.
On the part of the destroyer the factors of keeping the torpedo prepared and adjusted to run for long periods; having it instantly ready for employment when the fleeting opportunity for using it occurs; the uncertainty of search for the enemy in darkness, possibly in bad weather; then the attainment, perhaps at high speed, of the proper position for discharging the weapons, despite the disconcerting influences of exploding shell, possibly of confusing searchlight beams; and, at the proper instant, of launching the projectile accurately directed are all to be taken into account. From the viewpoint of the battleship we know that it is difficult to see and promptly to hit the torpedo vessel but it is perfectly understood that the difficulties are not all confined to one side.
A high degree of specialization would seem necessary for the personnel of the torpedo fleet. Service in destroyers is most instructive for developing initiative, self-reliance and skill in seamanship. Perhaps it is the best school to-day for the young sailor, but the effort to broaden the education of the naval officer must not shorten the experience of those serving in these vessels neither should it militate against the formation of corps of efficient specialists having taste and talent for the arduous duties required of them, not only in the destroyer, but also in the submarine and in the airship.
Searchlights.—It would seem that there may be occasions when it would be very improper for a capital ship to show a light which might attract searching torpedo craft from great distances. To hit efficiently, however the target must be clearly seen and when one vessel or a small number of ships are actually assailed and their positions are definitely known, illumination by searchlights, necessary to permit accurate shooting with the guns, may become advantageous.
The beams of searchlights thrown on an attacking vessel greatly embarrass her. Though lights indicate the target for the torpedo craft they make the estimation of the range on the part of the latter difficult, and cause confusing shadows and silhouettes. A ship will not wish to employ many searchlights but must have several available which may be used positively and effectively when circumstances make illumination necessary. The use of searchlights has been referred to frequently by those reporting events of the night of May 31.
It appears to have become a part of the duty of scout cruisers, in covering destroyer attack, to illuminate the torpedo target with searchlights, in order to distract attention from the torpedo craft which they are supporting, and to draw the fire of the enemy.
Torpedo Defence System.—An essential for the torpedo defence system of a battleship is effective flexibility adaptable to any conditions of service. If the capital ship has been under gunfire during daylight a highly centralized, permanent and elaborate system with the use of which perfection has been attained in target practice may utterly fail because of a very trifling damage. Present effort is to have each of the night torpedo defence stations self-contained and independently effective. When the collective control of the secondary weapons becomes impossible, the passing to group and then to individual control should be a prompt possibility.
For torpedo defence volume of accurate, well controlled, very rapid fire is essential in order to hit the swiftly moving torpedo vessel. Interferences in pointing incident to the firing of several guns close together are particularly trying at night making the fire delivery slow and erratic and the control difficult. To gain volume, and at the same time to minimize interferences would seem to be strong arguments for the multiple mounting of torpedo defence guns, i.e., the mounting of two or three guns in a way permitting all to be laid and fired by one set of pointers.
The director system may be applied to groups of the secondary armament but it would seem probable that the installation of guns in multiple might better overcome the disadvantages incident to the independent laying of many pieces and retain the extreme handiness requisite for purposes of torpedo defence. The mechanical difficulties incident to preserving the ability to work the pieces rapidly and conveniently, while considerable, should not be insurmountable.
Torpedoes.—During the Japanese-Russian war it has been estimated that the Japanese destroyers fired about 370 torpedoes, making 17 hits, about 4 per cent. Eight of the hits were on ships at anchor. The torpedo in 1904-05 was far from being the weapon of to-day and possibly it was then not used with great skill. Statements have appeared from time to time, regarding the employment of torpedoes and numerous torpedo hits on various types of vessels have been claimed and acknowledged by both Germany and Great Britain but we have nothing definite as yet, on which to base positive conclusions regarding the present effectiveness of these self-contained projectiles. It is probable that, when exact information becomes available, it will be found that they have inflicted considerably more damage on both sides than has been reported.
The surface torpedo vessel is a most serious menace to the safety of large ships after nightfall but the long range torpedo has given to the destroyer now conveying it, a primary role in day action long since well recognized as having a decided moral if not material influence upon the tactics and the gunnery of the battleship. The above water tube of the destroyer is the least complicated and the most precise mechanism for the discharge of the torpedo under service conditions. Nothing has been published as yet regarding the use of torpedoes by large vessels during the present war but it is believed that the difficulty of directing accurately and of firing torpedoes from submerged tubes installed in vessels moving at high speeds has not yet been solved in a manner sufficiently satisfactory to warrant the sacrifice of the great space and displacement necessary for the establishment of many submerged tubes in a capital ship.
To permit prediction in directing the torpedo, particularly necessary because of its long "time of flight," and to enable the leader of a group of capital ships to avoid dangerous torpedo water the continuous plotting or tracking of the enemy is necessary. This is a strong argument for the development of an efficient mechanical tracker if it can be obtained.
Mines.—A prominent British writer some years ago ventured the prophesy that "the future successful naval tactician will not be one who places his fleet in the most advantageous position for gunfire, but the one who can force his opponent over a skillfully mined area." Though this prediction has not yet been fulfilled in the present conflict it has not been because of the neglect of the mine, fully recognized as a tactical weapon.
It will be remembered that in the battle of August 10, 1904, the Japanese destroyers, when seen by the Russians to drop what appeared to be mines in their path caused the capital ships of the latter to make a wide change of course while under gunfire. These supposed mines were really coal bags or baskets. As an example of more recent employment of the floating mine the press report is of interest that, in the raid of November 3, 1914, the rear one of the German cruisers threw over mines, one of which was struck by the British submarine (D-5), then running awash.
The shoal waters extending for great distances off our own coasts are well adapted for mining, now perhaps the commonest activity of naval war and the organization, in peace, of a sufficient mining service would seem an important part of preparedness. The work of mining sea areas generally, must be under naval control in war; should not serious effort be made toward bringing under a centralized management, the activities which already exist, the supplying of suitable materials, and the training requisite for mining and for mine sweeping on a broad scale? Here would appear to be a wonderful opportunity for co-ordination.
Submarines.—Though its greatest successes perhaps have not been in the attack of war vessels, the German U-boat has shown again that the strongest military characteristic that can be given to a vessel, designed primarily to keep the enemy away from the home coasts is sea endurance.
Small radius of action and inefficient weatherly qualities made brief the existence of the gunboats of former days, also the "coast defence" battleships and the torpedo-boats, of recent years, designed solely for the so-called purposes of "coast defence." yet we see now the submarine destined to go through the same cycle of development as that through which has passed the other units finding places to-day in fleet action. It must appear logical that effort should make for the development of the submarine of larger size, better speed and a wider radius of action.
The press has frequently mentioned anti-submarine methods, devices, and the types of craft adapted as patrols for submarine defence purposes, but precise information is not yet available regarding these. Sufficient is at hand, however, to indicate the importance which these details have in naval affairs. Here again is great opportunity for the co-ordination of numerous and, in peace, conflicting interests.
Aircraft.—The great speed and mobility of naval units together with the many types and the numbers included in modern fleets extend the field of battle over immense areas. To co-ordinate the efforts of all participants accurate information to-day is of first importance.
Aircraft appear to have taken unto themselves scouting as a primary role. It must seem, however, that while vessels navigating the air may supplement they cannot supplant fast cruisers for the service of information. The latter possess a sea endurance and 'navigational reliability, together with an ability to render a maximum of service under all the various circumstances which may be encountered in war which cannot belong to a vessel navigating a widely different medium. There is a high percentage of fog and considerable bad weather prevailing during certain seasons on both our Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. Aircraft would be useless for over-sea work during the existence of either fog or bad weather.
The European air-ship has been most useful when operating from the land or in short flights from a parent ship in smooth water. It will be discovered probably that not the least important duty of the German aircraft has been to keep under close observation the regions in the neighborhood of the German fleet bases, thereby enabling war-ships to conduct battle preparations without serious interruption incident to a close confinement to home ports where discipline and training both suffer severely. For spotting purposes at sea it is difficult to conceive of reliance on the hydroplane or dirigible at the present time, though for indirect fire, as in the case of bombardments, these together with kite balloons would be invaluable.
(The British fleet utilized an airplane to advantage on the afternoon of May 31 and if a German Zeppelin observed the British dispositions on the morning of June 1, as rumored, it may have influenced the later movements of both main bodies.)
The navy lacking an efficient air service must, as a result of its deficiency, suffer loss in the effectiveness of types armed with the weapons in which confidence is imposed for success in battle. Perhaps the greatest lesson impressed by recent events is that the presence of efficient aircraft, submarines, and of torpedoes and mines will, in the future, more than ever before, disincline the leader of a great fleet to engage another, approximately his own in strength, in the home waters of a skillful enemy where the naval commander may expect to find the stage most carefully prepared and set for the tragic drama of naval conflict.
Communications.—Second only in importance to procuring information on which to base action is the necessity for reliability and effectiveness in communicating information. There is no detail now meriting closer attention on the part of those interested in naval progress than the development of radio for ship's use.
Science, no doubt, will do much toward eliminating the difficulties incident to interference and it is reported that the practicability of a radio direction finder has already been demonstrated successfully.
The desire for improvement in materials should not however obscure the importance of having an adequate trained radio personnel. We have heard of England's hasty effort to enlarge this service at the beginning of the war. In the event of hostilities, when all requirements become far more exacting than for the ordinary routine of peace, a very considerable number of expert operators at once will become necessary, in every class of ship and at all shore stations, for the important duties of radio communications—Can they be obtained?
Casualties to Material.—There is nothing which impresses the naval mind more deeply than the recent reports regarding casualties incident to defects and deficiencies in material. The derangement of the steering gear of the Warspite in the Battle of Jutland is a notable instance, also the destruction of the British battle cruisers.
Man is the most delicate mechanism on board ship. In battle men work under great stress and they may, in turn, subject their implements to the harshest treatment. How important becomes a full regard for the violent usage these may receive under such circumstances. Particularly this applies to the ordnance mechanisms of the mammoth battleshisp now projected in which the fighting power is concentrated in a few turrets each containing a considerable percentage of the vessel's offensive power. The possibility of a misfire, a jammed breech block, a fuzed primer, a hoist failure or other trivial but not unusual mishap should be eliminated beyond the realm of chance or a tremendous unit of the fleet may be deprived suddenly of power of offence on the supreme occasion for which the ship was created.
Water-Tight Subdivision.—Though the subject perhaps has only an indirect bearing on tactics one cannot fail to note that the importance of stability and buoyancy in ships, ensured by suitable water-tight subdivision, has been again made manifest during the present conflict. The sudden sinking of large vessels is a casualty that now excites only passing interest.
It was reported in 1904 that the loss of a Japanese battleship was due to the inability to close a water-tight door leading to a coal bunker in use at the time contact was made with a mine. Since that occasion the Japanese have devoted great attention to the closing of water-tight openings, particularly those leading to bunkers, promptly and surely. The practices of peace are opposed to the complete water-tight integrity of compartments below decks but the piercing of bulkheads is a feature of construction which must always weaken and place the water-tightness of subdivisions under suspicion. Needless to say, cutting should be minimized and where a water-tight bulkhead has been pierced, the provision for the closure of openings in emergency should be both prompt and positive.
The distortion of bulkheads adjacent to boilers, due to heat when fires are lighted, and coal lodging in door frames are common interferences with the quick closing of bunker openings, the likelihood of and the serious objections to such mishaps are not always appreciated on board older ships. The advent of the oil burner permits far better water-tight subdivision than was ever possible formerly but the arrangement of bulkheads to resist the penetrating effects of the explosion of torpedo and mine is now the most serious problem confronting the naval designer.
Battle Training.—It has been said of us by foreigners that, while we are very keen in our training for target practice, in our preparations for battle we fail. A brief glance at one or two features of our methods will be helpful in clarifying ideas on this subject.
In the ordinary exercise of peace, the tediousness of which competition does much to relieve, the natural tendency merely to beat the other fellow sometimes has a baneful influence. It is frequently overlooked that the competition is simply a means to an end, the purpose being to promote a skill which will ensure a good performance at any time and under all circumstances and not only under the conditions ordered for a particular problem of target practice.
(Study of the methods employed abroad for retaining the fighting edge, during the long months of waiting, would be of great interest to us who sometimes complain of a few days delay in the conduct of a target practice when trained to the minute for the performance.)
Where training is conducted intensively with the view of winning in a competition, economy of effort on the part of participants will often limit the scope of their endeavors.
Status of Petty Officers.—In gunnery the inclination becomes very strong to regard all details but the simple mechanical operations of loading and firing, of gun pointing and of sight setting, as belonging exclusively in the hands of officers. The usefulness of the petty officers, in whom much reliance must be confided in battle, is apt to be overlooked. This indeed is very objectionable practice.
The number of officers can never be sufficient to give one command at every gun station. To the gun captain belongs the knowledge and the ability to fight his own weapon and if he is removed then another member of the gun crew should possess the understanding which assures an intelligent control of the piece. In the turrets of the capital ship, where an officer generally has direct charge, this may seem a matter of less importance than at isolated stations, such as those for broadside guns, but such is not the case. The officer at the gun or at the centralized control of a battery of guns may be eliminated at any time and an important part of the peace duties of each is to prepare his men so that the portion of the ship's offensive power, under the officer's charge, may not be nullified by his absence or disablement.
In the small cruiser, the gun boat, and the destroyer particularly the centralized control of the artillery is difficult and perhaps, under some conditions of service, impossible. In these vessels, which reasonably may expect to fight at moderate or short ranges, training for individual control of the guns is of paramount importance. In every ship, however, the complete instruction of the crew regarding the power, limitations, range table data, etc., of their weapons is very necessary. There is nothing abstruse or incomprehensible with regard to these details. The men take an interest in their proficiency with arms greater than in any other detail of ship life and the familiarization of the ship's company with the use of weapons merits the most careful, thorough and constant regulation. (Any one who has ever been in company with a German or a Japanese war vessel for long cannot fail to have noted the unrelenting attention given to the acquirement of proficiency, individual and collective, with weapons.)
Reserve Ships.—The complications and time involved in the training of a naval unit for battle to-day are well understood. Reserve ships, without complete organization or adequate crews, are of but slight military value. They pad the navy list, however, and exhaust considerable sums from the general appropriations. It will be recalled that Cradock's vessels were old, and their defects of design were well understood, but these defects were not more responsible for the quick destruction of his ships than that certain of them had been hastily manned and sent out poorly prepared to meet an enemy well trained for the supreme test of battle.
An ancient ship of the line to the government is like an old garment to an individual—hard to part with. The time comes however when these should be discarded for economic if for no other reasons. A wise plan to follow occasionally is to utilize obsolete armored vessels for gunnery purposes as was done with the old Texas and has been customary abroad for years in all navies that have striven constantly to cover every phase of preparation for battle. In so far as battleships are concerned, strength of reserve lies in the national facilities and abilities existing for the rapid construction of new vessels, not in a dependence on ancient and discarded craft armed with inefficient weapons. Certain of these only may have a usefulness in war but the number employed and the useful scope of their employment always will be exceedingly limited.
Tactical Training.—A navy "for defence only" is a catchy phrase appearing frequently in the reported utterances of statesmen. Because a navy is intended for defensive purposes does not make less important the various operations through which alone training for active service can be accomplished in peace. One who would devote vast sums to the construction of new ships and yet withhold the considerable funds necessary for realism in the necessary and periodic mobilizations, the maneuvers and exercises all making for the acquirement of proficiency in the employment of ships and weapons lacks sadly in his conceptions of the stern requirements of war. The United States has never held a single war maneuver along the broad lines of those for years conducted abroad. Effort has just begun to give the commander-in-chief experience in handling the many vessels he would be called upon to use at once in the event of hostilities. All great navies except our own are having practical experience in war, what great handicaps are to be overcome in the effort to attain the proficiency now existing in those services?
Naval Power.—In closing one may again note that the most casual glance at the events of the past two years indicates clearly that the relative importance of the factors which make up naval power remains unchanged.
The description of any of the countless appliances continually being devised and extolled in the public press for the purposes of battle strongly appeals to the popular imagination. Inventive skill, however, is not monopolized by any one people and materials for war cannot be perfected and used for long only by one nation. Knowledge of them, if ever secret, soon becomes common. The war has shown that to-day the possession of a novel appliance may secure a momentary advantage but, that at sea first reliance must be had in an organization which ensures skill, forceful and determined, in the tactics and the gunnery of ships. The paramount factor of naval power remains the personnel, adequate in numbers and strong in training, discipline and morale.