Mission
1. To formulate an equitable scheme governing promotions in the navy.
2. To educate officers for, and retain the best officers in, the higher grades of the navy.
Methods Under Discussion at Present
The two general systems of promotion in the navy which are most talked of are (1) Promotion by selection and (2) promotion by seniority. Neither of these plans has, so far, been without grave faults that all recognize, but for lack of a better system, “selection” has come to be the method at present employed.
“Selection,” theoretically, is the ideal method of promotion. But there are three principal causes which weaken its equitable practice in the navy, two of which cannot be eliminated and the third only lessened. These may be briefly stated, as follows:
1. Size and wide distribution of the navy.
2. Fallibility of any temporary selection board or assemblage of officers.
3. Varying careers and performances of officers of equal ability or promise, making just comparisons impossible.
These directly result in the following:
(a) Indefinite future and outlook for officers, due to unknown factors which may, some day, enter into their rejection for promotion.
(b) Personality and popularity, while being a necessary military attribute, overshadowing n> lack of other necessary attributes, such as keen mind, initiative, savior and willingness to assume responsibility.
(c) Disgruntled attitude of those men “ passed over,” yet retained in the service.
(d) “ Bootlicking ” by men of inferior qualifications, or favoritism, sometimes unintentional, on the part of those higher up.
Under the first classifications above we will discuss the general power of each in regard to this particular question.
1. Size and wide distribution of the navy.
This is a necessary state of affairs, but an enemy just the same, to proper and equitable scheme of promotion by “selection.” There is no doubt but that in cases of small plants or concentrated organizations that “ selection ” forms an excellent basis for promotion. This is the business man’s scheme. He employs it to good effect among his salesmen or his shop executives or whatever his expert employees may be, but he has a much simpler job than can be conceived of in the navy. This is because he bases his selection on direct competition. In the case of salesmen, for instance, they work for the same end—districts are so distributed among them that their chances may be equal, or else, a scheme of promotion from a poorer to a richer district is maintained, in comparison not with each other’s performances, but with results expected and standards set. In many companies, salesmen are given a certain allotment and if they obtain this allotment of sales, they are said to have made an average of 100 per cent. Standings are sent out each month to each salesman and he knows if he is doing well or poorly and his efforts are then controlled by his ambition.
In the navy this is not practicable at present because we are all working for the same end, but with different tools. We would as well conduct a competitive target practice between the Kentucky and the Pennsylvania, without any allowance for size and type of guns and then appoint a board of officers to decide upon the results, or upon hearsay evidence as to which pointers were the best. However, transfer the pointers, ship to ship, and conduct another practice, under the same conditions, and the combined results of the two practices would give direct and just data with which to make comparisons. In the navy we are all shooting at the same target, but we are not a homogeneous force, and naturally our scores are different.
The navy is too large to allow the futures of all to depend on a few officers who may know a few intimately, a few officially, but the largest number not at all, and let them depend on the paper records, which are as different in themselves as the various commanding officers are in their ideas of perfection.
This force (the size of the navy) will defeat itself. It is too big and clumsy to manoeuver and the forces of selection are weakened more and more as the size of this force grows larger.
3. Fallibility of any selection board or assemblage of officers.
We think that this is a self-evident fact, that every selection board that meets is liable to mistakes and is liable to work injustice no matter who the selecting officers may be. The strength of this argument has recently been brought out to the service under the new scheme of “ electing ” officers for promotion. Every officer called upon to name those officers junior to him whom he considers most worthy of promotion has been confronted with this problem. He has been given a list—a typewritten page or more— of those officers eligible, and told to make his recommendations. He knows some of these intimately, perhaps others he knows casually, and all have been surprised at the large percentage that he knows not at all. So it is with a selection board, and the result is that records must be resorted to, to try and do all justice to all concerned. We know of cases of officers who are extremely well known in the service and are extremely popular, who are considered efficient officers in their work, but who would be no more fitted to be promoted than one not so well known or popular, not because he is not as efficient or of equal or greater promise, but because he has not “rounded out his career.”
Take, for example, any popular commanding officer of a destroyer. Assume that he is known as a dashing, virile, capable man, commanding a highly efficient vessel, and compare him with one not so well known outside of his ship, but who has been an efficient gunnery officer and executive of a small battleship. We cannot compare them equitably, any selection between the two would he an injustice. One would be more fitted to command a battleship than the other because of his knowledge of material, whereas the other would be superior due to his dash, experience of command, etc. A just choice is impossible.
As it is difficult for a selection board, so it is difficult for the service to select and we must provide a back-ground—something definite, so that our comparisons may not be haphazard. To do this we must provide requirements and education of these two officers so that there will be no doubt as to who casts the blacker shadow.
It is the likelihood of such temporary selection board to make mistakes that is the cause of “ indefinite outlook ” for officers. We cannot afford to make such mistakes, for a 2 per cent error affects the morale of the whole. So long as the fallibility of a selection board is acknowledged, this system will be a source of discontent and worry, because there is no trial, the board meets with closed doors, and there is no rebuttal.
3. Varying careers and performances of officers of equal ability or promise, making just comparisons impossible.
This state of affairs is a necessary condition in the navy, under present practice. One man in the navy may have a liking or an aptitude for gunnery, so his inclinations are toward always engaging in a gunnery job. He may consider that his mission is to attain perfection in gunnery, but unless he wishes to continue as a gunnery expert until retired, he forgets his real mission, which would be to so educate himself as to attain all the capabilities which will qualify him in time to become commander-in-chief of the fleet or to command any of its sub-divisions. At the same time, another man may not take a “ study ” such as “ gunnery ” for his hobby. He may take a liking to destroyer work and follow this work for many years because he enjoys early command and early responsibility. But this man, too, is forgetting his chief mission and when he reaches the grade of commander, ready for promotion to the grade of captain, he is not fitted for the promotion inasmuch as he is not familiar, or perhaps not even conversant, with modem fleet formations, maneuvers, tactics, organizations, as well as the handling of big guns, powerful engine-room plants and elaborate fire-control schemes. This man would be a detriment to a big ship if ordered to her, as he, who should know more about her than anyone else, in a general and yet conversant way, would be spending his time learning from his subordinates and dependent upon them, rather than letting them benefit by the fruits of his experience.
These two men whom we have cited may be excellent men, they may have all and even more promise than others in their respective grades, but they would not be as capable as commanding officers of large units, because they have not been educated up to it. They have followed their own inclinations and preferences too long and have forgotten the interests of the service and the debt they owe that service. This in spite of the fact that they have worked as hard and with as much devotion to duty as any other man in service.
Thus our present system of allowing varying careers is working an injustice, not only to the officers themselves, but to the service efficiency. If we can stop this latitude and state certain requirements which will be necessary for certain promotion from one grade to another, these requirements to be stated specifically and published to the service so that an officer will know that he must have satisfactorily passed all requirements before he can be promoted, our officers will have a more definite, concrete problem to solve.
However, we must make allowance for specialists in any scheme we may evolve, because specialists are often a great advantage to the service and some specialists are necessary.
The foregoing (1), (2) and (3) are the causes of the detrimental effects. They may be likened to the naval policy of a government being the cause of a great navy.
Hut the actual forces that are at present combatting contentment and efficiency in the service are the direct results of these three main conditions, which it is known we cannot materially change. But we can evolve a method of promotion that will eliminate wholly or to a great extent the detrimental results.
It is not the purpose of this paper to dwell too long on the detriments, we are more concerned with a solution, but it will be well to expand slightly on these so-called detriments so that we may decide on the best solution to our problem.
The first
(a) Indefinite future and outlook for officers, due to unknown or unexpected factors which may, some day, enter into their rejection for promotion.
This is a result of the present system, and a direct result of condition (2) (above) and affected to a large extent by condition (3). To eliminate this feature of the present system, we should have:
1. Definite goals to attain in order to become eligible for promotion.
2. In case of failure to qualify to know why.
This cannot be accomplished by the present system of decisions resting on a few officers whose decisions need no explanation, are made behind closed doors, and may be at fault even 111 exceptional instances. We must have definite requirements, definitely stated, so that officers may strive to attain them and reach them or fail, as the case may be, knowingly.
Much of the dissatisfaction in connection with the present scheme of promotion is due to this indefinite outlook. It is indefinite in the eyes of many because it is based on:
1. Unequal competition, widely separated, and with different standards and different tools.
2. Being known to the board.
This brings us to the discussion of result
(b) Personality and popularity, while being a necessary military attribute, overshadowing a lack of other necessary attributes, such as keen mind, initiative, savoir and willingness to assume
responsibility.
This feature is detrimental to any scheme of selection, as
promotion may rest on “ being known to the board ” in equally deserving cases. Open decisions, openly arrived at, would prove more effective in upholding the service morale, than allowing a temporary selection board to decide on officers’ futures. In order to successfully waive this weakness in the selection method now employed, we would have to appoint a board which personally and officially knows all officers in question, which is impossible.
Next to be discussed is fault
(c) Disgruntled attitude of those men “passed over, yet retained in the service.
Self-respect and self-conceit which are inherent to human nature cause this dissatisfaction. Men are passed over who ate not only left in the position of “ wondering why,” but sometimes the service at large “ wonders why ” such and such an officer was passed over.
The present system of allowing officers to follow their preferences too much in regard to duty is the father of this difficulty. Were officers made to “ qualify ” for certain grades by passing satisfactorily certain “ requirements,” they would definitely comprehend what was necessary for them to become eligible for promotion and would work toward this end. If they failed, they could be definitely shown where they failed and with this knowledge would come the realization that in a fair and above-board competition, they had lost, due, not to the policy of the board, or the selection of a few, but to insufficient effort on their own parts. Disgruntlement comes chiefly from expressed sympathy from friends. Lack of such sympathy does not lessen the disappointment perhaps, hut does away with the “chip on the shoulder” and replaces it with determined effort to qualify as soon as possible.
The last named of these detriments, effects of the present system of “selection,” is
(d) “Bootlicking” by men of inferior qualifications with the converse of favoritism, sometimes unintentional, on the fart of those higher up.
“Bootlicking” is, in general terms, the name of tactics employed in any organization or assemblage where personal favor of others is advantageous. It is not the manner in which a man who stands on his own merits gets ahead, but in all too frequent cases is successfully carried on by men of lesser qualifications.
There is the man who advertises his commendable acts to his superiors, and the man who takes credit for certain results obtained through the efforts of others. Sometimes, and oftentimes, the “ bootlicking ” is apparent to the senior, and the junior excites disgust, rather than admiration, and this would almost always be the case were the two officers together for a great length of time. But due to the comparatively short cruises together, an officer can often get away with his false advertisement and be separated from his senior before he is found out. This senior carries with him wrong impressions.
This fault, however, is not so prevalent in the service as to be dangerous, but it does exist to a sufficient extent to make the possibility of its future effect on fair selection felt.
The other side of the question, favoritism is even more dangerous. It is human nature to wish for the welfare of our friends: In a voting scheme we are liable to bring this desire to affect our better judgment, where the choice may be between a classmate, or a shipmate, and another. Admirals will stand by a loyal staff, captains to loyal ship’s officers, and unintentionally will give them a great deal of latitude in any preference.
We should eliminate this personal element if possible. We should eliminate also political endeavor. Elimination of these two things would serve only towards establishing a purely just and equitable scheme of promotion, one by which a man must stand on his own merits. We cannot eliminate them under the present scheme of having a selection board or by a scheme of “ voting." The fact that a man is “ known,’’ or what we have heard about him, is sure to make itself felt in a consideration of one man known and another unknown.
To do away with this effect, we must decrease the latitude of the selection board so that all will be equally well known, and all will be equally well represented. This can be done only by the requirement method; that is, requiring that each man perform certain work satisfactorily and that each man shall have qualified under well-understood and definite rules for promotion.
By the above reasoning, all the principal detriments to the system of “ selection ” can be eliminated by establishing a system of promotion on qualification, the qualifications being the satisfactory performance of certain duties or their equivalents by every officer in the service. On this basis officers can be compared one with another and in no other way can the system be made equitable and just to all.
Regarding the other principal method of promotion, vis., “ promotion by seniority,” much has been said in the past few years. It is generally agreed among both laymen and members of the service that this method is wrong because:
1. It does not encourage competition.
2. It gives the laggard the same monetary reward as the ambitious worker.
3. It fills the upper grades with men whose age may have affected their efficiency.
Therefore, we cannot solve our problem by reverting to our former method of “ promotion by seniority.” However, we must have some method of classification; that is, we must have seniors and juniors in a military organization and any plan of promotion must, between two officers of equal qualification, give the preference to the senior.
A good and efficient officer is not afraid of “ selection.” He welcomes it, as it means promotion to him. He is willing to show all that he can do better than others and is willing to cast his lot in with theirs on a competitive basis. Any and all efficient and true naval officers would welcome an equitable and just system of selection. But, so far, the service is not satisfied that such system has been evolved. Therefore, in our solution we must state the ideal conditions and then formulate a plan that will attain them or approach them closely.
Solution
From the above general outline of the faults that we have encountered in existing and previous systems of promotion, we should proceed to eliminate these faults and come to our decisions.
The principal defects that we must eliminate are:
(a) Chance of error of temporary selection boards.
(b) Indefinite policy, causing indefinite future for officers.
(c) Effect of “ bootlicking ” or favoritism.
(d) Disgruntled attitude of men “ passed over.”
We should make allowance for:
(I) Standardizing careers of officers to provide homogeneous navy.
(II) To recommend policy as to numbers of specialists, either as to type of vessels or as to sciences, commensurate with future requirements of the navy.
(III) To recommend policy to permit promotion of such specialists.
(IV) To see that attribute of personality comes into our factors for promotion by selection.
(V) To make allowance for “ selection up,” in exceptional and especially deserving cases.
(VI) To make allowance for obtaining the service opinion in cases under (V).
Under the principle defects that we must eliminate, we have cited
(a) Chance of error of temporary selection boards.
To leave the subject for a minute, we will outline the apparent good which our General Board has done for the navy. This board has, for years, gone into the materiel and personnel requirements of the navy. It has information at hand on all subjects in this regard. It keeps informed as to the naval policies and potentialities of foreign powers, and after due deliberation advises as to our own requirements. The advice of this board on the subject of ships required, number, size and types, and as to the armor and armament required is the closest thing to the “ last word on the subject ” in existence, simply because it has a system, carried out earnestly and without regard to politics or any outside influence whatsoever. It is a board that can and does stand on its own merits and beliefs, and in so doing has done immeasurable good.
We made this board one of great importance, but the duties of this board, in regard to personnel, carry it into the numbers required only. This board advises that we need so many admirals and so many ordinary seamen, etc., but goes into the question no further. It keeps our navy balanced by its efforts. It consistently advises against an overload of one class of vessel. In a few words, it works towards the maintenance of a homogenous navy, well balanced and sufficiently powerful to look out for the best interests of the country.
Thus, if we place such importance in the guiding spirit of a board to act in regard to materiel, why not appoint an exactly similar board with similar duties as regards personnel ? Why not appoint a board, composed of high ranking officers, to look after our personnel needs?
Naval power consists of two great forces: personnel and materiel. Why go about the supply of the first in a haphazard way? Just as ships become obsolete before they drop to pieces, so do men. But men can be educated and modernized, whereas few ships can be. A personnel board of equal advisory power as the General Board could do great good.
The establishment, then, of a “personnel board,” with broad duties, would largely eliminate the chance of error, because by practically establishing a permanent board we would establish a group of officers whose sole business it would be to know all officers due for promotion, a study of their past performances, etc.
Therefore, we decide to establish such a board and will proceed with our solution to see if duties could not be imposed on such a board to carry out the requirements stated above.
(b) Indefinite policy, causing indefinite future for officers.
If such a board were, after due deliberation, to establish certain requirements or their equivalents for each grade and state them to the service, we would have a certain definite goal to attain and officers could work definitely toward that end.
Suppose we start with stating the necessary requirements for promotion to the grade of Commander, or, if thought practicable, to the grade of lieutenant commander. We state definitely that an officer, to he eligible for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander, must have satisfactorily performed certain duties which the board considers necessary for an officer, at this stage of his career, in order that be may be considered a well-rounded officer. We would then have all officers arrive at the grade of lieutenant commander, ready to graduate from the watch-standing class, ready to assume responsibility as a head of department or as the commander of a small vessel, with a definitely established groundwork. He will have performed duties before be reaches the grade of lieutenant commander which we know should have made him a naval officer in every sense of the word.
Then we pass on to the requirements for duties, or their equivalents, which must have been satisfactorily performed to become eligible for further promotion, and so on until we reach the requirements for promotion to the grade of rear admiral.
This plan, fully worked out, would present an ideal condition. It is a condition impossible to attain under our present system. This plan, if fully carried out, would change the officers of the navy from a heterogeneous group, among whom comparisons cannot be justly made, to a homogeneous group, in which any man of any particular grade would be fully qualified in all respects to fulfill any and all duties required of that grade.
This state of perfection cannot be reached perhaps, but a proper system, properly carried out, can approach it closely. First of all. we know that in every group in which equal opportunity is afforded, some man will excel. That is due to his superior mind, interest, adaptability or personality. But that is no reason why every man should not be educated properly in a service such as ours. We can lessen the gaps between men greatly if we give them an equal chance, if we force on them an equal opportunity, and force them to qualify in all respects, and if we forbid them, in their younger days, to follow too much their own likes and preferences.
Therefore, we must state, as some of the duties of the board :
(a) To establish well-defined requirements, or their equivalents, for qualification in each grade.
(b) To study officers’ records and see that they are given opportunity to attain those requirements.
(c) To officially note on officers’ records why they have not attained certain requirements, and whether it should stand in way of their promotion.
- Whether opportunity not offered, due to time.
- Whether better employed as a specialist (with the consent of officer concerned).
- Whether considered unfitted, for any reason, to fill any required position, at any stage of his career.
- Whether due to sickness (permanent or temporary).
(d) In case of an officer failing to qualify (to satisfactorily perform certain specified duties), to notify him why he failed, and, if possible, give him further and immediate chance to qualify.
We believe that such a hoard carrying out these duties would do away with the effects of indefinite policies.
(c) Effect of “ bootlicking ” or favoritism.
Such a board, working for the good of the navy, under well- defined rules and requirements would certainly lessen these effects, because its recommendations would he the result of study of past performances and possibilities, and not be influenced by general impressions.
Therefore, we must go on to establish further duties for this board.
(e) To keep all records open and fairly referred to.
(f) To receive all fitness reports.
(g) To standardize fitness reports and require full reports at all times. To be able to require any desired information from reporting seniors at any time.
(h) To be free to visit all or any vessels and make reports, on its own observations, as to conditions found, due to personnel.
(d) Disgruntled attitude of men " passed over!’
This brings up “ promotion by selection.’
We must make allowance for “ selection up ” in exceptional and plainly deserving cases. In order to carry this out successfully, as brought out in the first part of this paper, we must eliminate the “ personal element ” and false impressions. Therefore, if we allow our board, after due deliberation and study of officers’ performances, to make recommendations for promotion of deserving officers, we are making allowance for such “ selection up.’’ But we can eliminate the personal clement largely by limiting our board to the making of recommendations only, and then once, or twice, a year, having such recommendations submitted to the service for vote.
In other words, were a commander through his exceptional ability recommended by the board for promotion over others senior to him, this recommendation would be voted on by all captains and admirals, the result of this vote being final. If it were a captain in question, of course only admirals would vote on the recommendation. In this way we have the approval of the service on such awards due to exceptional ability, and we have no “ feeling ” of injustice on the part of those “ jumped.” At the same time, the officer so promoted would be assured of his position as being a deserved one in the eyes of his fellow-officers.
Therefore, to cover this, we must enlarge on the duties of our hoard, as follows:
(i) To recommend for promotion any qualified officer of the grade of lieutenant commander or above, whose record justifies his being advanced a grade in preference to any officers senior to him and eligible. (In other words, to allow recommendations for “ selective promotion ” in cases where exceptional record plainly justifies such reward.)
(j) To submit these recommendations to all officers in the service of the rank to be attained by officer recommended, and of all senior ranks. The recommendations to be decided, for or against, by this vote of officers.
Thus, we find that such hoard can largely eliminate principal defects of present systems of promotion and we proceed to form duties for the board, so that we will make allowance for desirable features in a new scheme:
Taking them as stated:
(I) Standardizing careers of officers to provide homogeneous navy.
We believe we have taken steps toward the accomplishment of this end in our first stated “ duty ” of the board, vis., (a) to establish well-defined requirements, or their equivalents, for qualification in each grade.
During the past two years, it has been shown that our present systems of “assignment to duty” have been successful, under the stress of war conditions. The detail office of the Bureau of Navigation is subject to direct compliance with the needs of the navy under the plans of the Office of Naval Operations. If “ Operations ” states a certain policy, it necessarily changes the policy of the detail office, in order to provide suitable and properly fitted officers to command or officer certain vessels or operations. Therefore, the detail office cannot definitely establish set policies and then carry them out without regard to other influences arising from the changing requirements of the service.
We might state that this board should " make all assignments to duty,” for then they could directly carry out its duties (b) and (d). This, in view of the above, is considered impracticable and it is not in the best interests of the service to take the duties of the detail office from the Bureau of Navigation.
Nevertheless, we must allow our board to “see that officers are given opportunity to attain these requirements.” To provide for this we must add to the duties of this board a further duty:
(k) To provide lists of officers to the Bureau of Navigation, these lists to be kept up to date and showing:
- Officers in order of seniority in each grade.
- Officers fully qualified for promotion.
- Officers not fully qualified for promotion and indicating the duties, or their alternatives, which must be performed by each officer to complete requirements.
The addition of this duty might seem to complicate greatly the duties of the detail office, but we must remember that our “ requirements,” under this proposed system, have been published to the service and each officer has his own definite career to follow out. Therefore, our officers themselves will request such duly as will “ round out their careers ” and the detail office will not be unnecessarily hampered by the recommendations of the personnel board. We have added duty (k) to the board so that they may assist officers in their “ education,” but it is more probable that this feature will work automatically and that officers will look out for themselves without such assistance.
Suppose that we have a commander who has never been an executive officer of a large vessel, and that this is a requirement for his promotion to captain. He will file his application for this duty in the Bureau of Navigation himself. The only difference that this would make over the present system is that this officer would not be indifferent as to “ rounding out his career,” nor would he request destroyer command, for instance, due to his own preferences, instead of the duty required. In other words, he would be forced to educate himself and in doing so would add one more “ rounded out ” officer to those eligible for promotion to the captain’s grade.
(II) To recommend policy as to numbers of specialists, either as to type of vessels or as to sciences, commensurate with future requirements of the navy.
This is closely allied to (III), so we will take them up together.
(III) To recommend policy to permit promotion of such specialists.
We can standardize all careers except the careers of those men we term as “ specialists.” Specialists as to type of vessel may be classed as men who wish to make a life-work in the study, strategy, tactics, handling, maintenance and design of certain vessels, such as (1) aircraft, (2) submarines. As to sciences, we may have specialists in (1) gunnery, (2) engineering.
There are some men who we may decide are desirable or fitted for permanent work as such specialists. For instance, a young officer may have been in the submarine force for a long time, and to have expressed the desire to remain in this force. Our board must then establish, commensurate with the importance of such vessels and in relation to the power of the rest of the navy, a definite number of such men in each grade. Also, the board must provide for requirements of such men, that they may make their chosen work their mission in life, but that they will not spend so much time in such “ special work ” as to lose touch with the rest of the navy, to the extent that they would not even he good commanders of large submarine forces, for the reason that they would not be broad enough to cooperate with other types of vessels.
We are taking a step backwards if we adopt any method tending toward the eventual creation of separate corps. This we have consistently set ourselves against in the navy. The endeavor has been to create the “ all round officer ” and when one compares our navy with other services, we have cause to congratulate ourselves on our course. We have had no serious difficulty in finding men from the general service to efficiently perform the special duties in connection with gunnery, navigation, destroyers, submarines, mines, aircraft and last, but not least, engineering, without complicating the service with corps promotion and precedence problems in the line. Our officers are the best all-around men in their profession in the world. We can specialize on “ designers,” but not “ manipulators." The former can be kept well in hand because but few are required and they can be handled as we now handle the specialists in engineering, for shore duty only, without interfering with the homogeneity of the line officers. This restriction would not have to be “ for shore duty only ” in the case of type specialists, such as submarine and aircraft experts, but could, after reaching the grade of commander, restrict them to duties such as shore duty, command of mother ships, and large forces of the type of vessel concerned, and staff duties on the staffs of commanders-in-chiefs. It must be remembered also that we are requiring these men to become educated in surface ships, so as to broaden them in order that they may grasp the necessity for cooperation of forces. It is a question of established requirements again.
Therefore, to take care of this we must impose the following duties on our board :
(l) I o adopt a published policy of establishing definite numbers in each grade of “ specialists ” commensurate with the requirements of the navy.
(m) To establish alternate requirements for specialists, either as to type of vessel or as to sciences.
(n) To keep the navy balanced, as regards line officers, not allowing overload of “specialists.”
(IV) To see that attribute of personality comes into our factors of promotion.
In “ rounding out the careers ” of our officers we take care of this automatically. We believe that with broad duties required in which satisfactory performance is required, that sooner or later the man lacking in this essential will be "caught up.” A study of results obtained will show such failing.
(V) and (VI) have been covered under (d) Disgruntled attitude. etc.
In line with the above there are other duties that should be assigned this board for the welfare of the service and which may be added:
(o) To recommend that all existing vacancies in higher grades be filled with senior qualified men in grade below, except as under (i) and (j).
(p) To recommend for retirement all officers who have reached certain specified ages in each grade, such as are now existent.
(q) To establish minimum time each officer must be in each grade, regardless of qualification, to prevent congestion and crowded application for existing qualifying jobs.
(r) To safeguard the officer and afford him every opportunity, together with necessary advice, as well as safeguarding the interests of the navy.
(s) To submit records and recommendations to the examining board, as required. (The data upon which the examining board will work, will have been prepared in accordance with the approved requirements of the proposed personnel board.)
To conclude our solution, we see that our principal defects are covered and that we have made allowance for desirable features. It must be remembered that this plan starts with the assurance that an officer reaches the grade of lieutenant commander well rounded out, and that to do this we make our first requirements for promotion to take effect with this grade. In other words, to become a lieutenant commander, an officer must have performed definite duties, or their equivalents, before he is eligible, these requirements to be sufficiently broad to assure his entering this grade, a full-fledged, rounded-out naval officer, capable of responsibility.
Such system might take period of evolution of four or five years, but any satisfactory system will take time to evolve.
As we think we have fairly covered the situation and have presented an attempt at a solution, we come to our decisions.
Decisions
1. To establish a permanent board of high ranking officers to carry out duties (a) to (s) above, and to take the place of the selection board. (Duties (a) to (s) listed oh pages 729 to 735 for easier reference.)
2. I o establish “ selection by elimination,” elimination to be made due to well-defined requirements and reasons.
3. To allow the permanent board to recommend qualified officers of plainly exceptional ability and record and of the grade of lieutenant commander or above to be advanced to the next higher grade, regardless of seniority.
4. To submit these recommendations to all officers in the service of the rank to be attained by officer recommended, and of all senior ranks. The recommendations to be decided for or against by this vote of officers.
Major Duty of Board
To provide sufficient well-trained officers in each grade.
additional duties
(a) To establish well-defined requirements, or their equivalents, for qualification in each grade.
(b) To study officers’ records and see that they are given opportunity to attain those requirements.
(c) To officially note on officers’ records why he has not attained certain requirements, and whether it should stand in way of his promotion.
- Whether opportunity not offered, due to time.
- Whether better employed as a specialist (with the consent of officer concerned).
- Whether considered unfitted, for any reason, to fill any required position, at any stage of his career.
- Whether due to sickness (permanent or temporary effect).
(d) In case of an officer failing to qualify (to satisfactorily perform certain specified duties), to notify him why he failed and, if possible, give him further and immediate chance to qualify.
(e) To keep all records open and fairly referred to.
(f) To receive all fitness reports.
(g) To standardize fitness reports and require full reports at all times. To be able to require any desired information from reporting seniors at any time.
(h) To be free to visit all or any vessels and make reports, on its own observation, as to conditions found, due to personnel.
(i) To recommend for promotion any qualified officer of the wade of lieutenant commander or above whose record justifies his being advanced a grade in preference to any officers senior to him and eligible. (In other words, to allow recommendations for “selective promotion” in cases where exceptional record plainly justifies such reward.)
(j) To submit these recommendations to all officers m t e service of the rank to be attained by officer recommended, and of all senior ranks. The recommendations to be decided, for or against, by this vote of officers. .
(k) To provide lists of officers to the Bureau of Navigation, these lists to be kept up to date and showing:
- Officers in order of seniority in each grade.
- Officers fully qualified for promotion.
- Officers not fully qualified for promotion and indicating the duties, or their alternatives, which must be performed by each officer to complete requirements.
(l) To adopt a published policy of establishing definite numbers in each grade of “ specialists ” commensurate with the requirements of the navy.
(m) To establish alternate requirements for specialists, either as to type of vessel or as to sciences.
(n) To keep the navy balanced, as regards line officers, not allowing overload of “ specialists.”
(o) To recommend that all existing vacancies in higher grades be filled with senior qualified men in grade below, except as under (i) and (j).
(p) To recommend for retirement all officers who have reached certain specified ages in each grade, such as are now existent.
(q) To establish minimum time each officer must he in each grade, regardless of qualification, to prevent congestion and crowded application for existing qualifying jobs.
(r) To safeguard the officer and afford him every opportunity, together with necessary advice, as well as safeguarding the interests of the navy.
(s) To submit records and recommendations to the examining board, as required. (The data upon which the examining board will work, will have been prepared in accordance with the approved requirements of the proposed personnel board.)