Author’s Note: Authorities quoted in the text indicated as follows: Admiral Jellicoe (J), Vice Admiral Beatty (B), Admiral Scheer (S).
The time has now come to cast aside a mass of fiction relating to the Battle of Jutland. The present situation is an object lesson of the need of this. For we have seen the British controversies over the great naval action fanned into new flames by the publication in England of the “Harper Report.” The report, in itself, has given no excuse for the renewal of the controversies, as this document from the past does not contain any inflammable material. It is a very mild and harmless product, with nothing that gives any reason for the turmoil. But everything published as to Jutland is used by the disputants for the one purpose of providing fuel for their quarrels.
The history of the new contribution to the Jutland disputes goes back into the past. This report, The Record of the Battle of Jutland, was prepared under the direction of Admiral (then Captain) J. E. T. Harper, R.N., by order of the British Admiralty in 1919. Upon completion in 1920 it was not given to the public. Instead of this, the British Admiralty published at the end of 1920 a blue book, The Battle of Jutland, which contained the official dispatches of 1916. As their explanation for publishing this blue book instead of the Harper Report, the British Admiralty gave to Parliament a statement (November 22, 1920): “The reason for not publishing Captain Harper’s summary of events was . . . . that a record, based on British Official evidence only, would inevitably present a one-sided version . . . .” Admiral Harper has also published, as a comment on his report, a controversial booklet, The Truth about Jutland, and in this he implies that his report has been withheld from the public all this time because Admiral Beatty has been First Sea Lord of the Admiralty until this year.
In this regard, it is unfortunately true that, without any rhyme or reason, the bitter controversies over Jutland have become a blind quarrel between the partisans of Jellicoe, on the one hand, and the partisans of Beatty on the other. But it was also a true statement for the British Admiralty to give out in 1920 that any British narrative of Jutland compiled from “British Official evidence” in 1919 was bound to be “onesided.” This was not for controversial reasons, but because no one in the British Fleet had understood the tactics of the German Fleet in the Battle of Jutland. As a result, the British were so lacking in knowledge of what the Germans were doing at the most important stage of the action, that it was impossible in 1919 for the British Admiralty to compile an adequate narrative of the real course of the battle. For this reason, aside from any question of personal influence, it was not a matter of holding back the facts, as has been charged. It was a case of not having the true facts to give out, no matter whether anyone wanted to hold them back or not.
The Harper Report is the product of that situation of 1920. It is merely a summary, taken with a commendable absence of bias, from the British Official reports of 1916, which were published in full in the Admiralty’s blue book of 1920. For this reason the Harper Report was compiled from insufficient data. This precludes it from being an adequate account of the Battle of Jutland. And it adds nothing at all to our present knowledge of the great naval action because its material was included in these published British Official reports of 1916. Consequently, the claim of partisans that withholding the Harper Report has had a mysterious influence against getting at the truth must be considered one of the fictions of Jutland.
The Battle of Jutland, in regard to the movements of both the German Fleet and the British Fleet, was first correctly analyzed in the United States. For a long time no advance in this direction was made in Great Britain, and it was mainly through the efforts of Lord Sydenham, by means of questions in the House of Lords, that the British Admiralty at length conformed to this analysis. On March 2, 1922, the representative of the British Admiralty, in answer to one of Lord Sydenham’s questions in the House of Lords, stated that information had been received, “which had rendered necessary a revision of the charts . . . . as a result of the further information, and in order to elucidate the course of the action more fully, the scope of the work had been considerably extended.” As a result, the British Admiralty made drastic alterations in their charts and conceptions of the situations in the action.
These extensive changes were embodied in Sir Julian Corbett’s last volume of “Naval Operations,” which was completed just before the death of this official historian of the British Admiralty. Not satisfied with this, in 1924 the British Admiralty published it own Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, with these changes made a part of the account of the action and shown on the charts. But, most unfortunately, those in control of preparing this official Narrative also included in the text of their account of the battle a constant stream of comment, which went far beyond explanations and into controversies. This was so marked a fault, in what should have been an unbiased official narrative of facts, that it impaired greatly the value of the Admiralty’s own statements. The result was that, instead of giving a suitable official basis for agreement, the Admiralty’s Narrative had just the opposite effect, for it provided new subjects of controversy between the warring factions in the British Navy, and only increased the outburst of recriminations which blurred the facts. This year the Harper Report is made the excuse for more quarrels.
Things have now come to a pass where there is real need to get back to common sense. And the best way to accomplish this —strange as it may seem that one is obliged to say so—is the simple process of keeping in mind that the Battle of Jutland itself was actually fought by the rival leaders and naval forces of May 31, 1916— and not by anyone else! And the battle took place on that day, under the conditions existing on that day—and not on any other day in history! There has been too much straying away from the actual terms of the game that was played out then and there in the North Sea—and we must get back to thinking in these terms. If we insist on this basis of truth, we will get rid of an accumulation of imaginary situations which have been created since the battle, distortions of facts, gameboard speculations, versions artificially adapted to ex parte special pleadings—the mass of fiction which has been woven about the Battle of Jutland. By this use of common sense, in harking back to the men of the battle and to the day of the battle, all the controversies over Jutland will be automatically thrown out of court for they have been founded on fiction—not on facts. The actual facts as to the events of the Battle of Jutland are so self-evident that there are no grounds for controversies. Partisans have only managed to keep the quarrels alive by clinging to discredited tales, which are as extinct as the dodo. It is only the clamorous reiteration of these fictions that has caused confusion as to the facts, and this artificially produced confusion is the only “mystery” of Jutland. The “mystery” tale is a myth that has no excuse for existence. For the actual trend of the action, over its whole great area, was matter of fact to a degree rare in history.
The true events of the Battle of Jutland are made all the more clear because both the British Fleet and the German Fleet followed courses of action carefully laid down in advance. Consequently we have the unusual basis for knowledge, that, in addition to its being a battle of May, 1916, fought by the men of May, 1916, the Battle of Jutland was controlled by preconceived tactics which had been adopted for use in May, 1916. And the characteristics and influences, which have been read into the texts of controversial theses since that time, have nothing to do with the actual situation of May, 1916.
On the British side, a definite policy of caution had been adopted for the “contemplated conduct of the Fleet in action.” This was founded on the theory that the Germans would “rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavor to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions.” This cautious policy for the British Battle Fleet was made a matter of record in a written statement prepared by the British Commander- in-Chief, and formally approved by the British Admiralty on November 7, 1914. The quotations are from this statement and note of approval, and a most significant sentence was: “If, for instance, the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn.”
This predetermined cautious policy, adopted by the British Admiralty for the conduct of the British Battle Fleet in action, controlled absolutely the British tactics in the North Sea to the end of 1916. There were three occasions which offered the possibilities of actions between capital ships in the North Sea, and each time this cautious policy directed the movements of the British naval forces. In the Dogger Bank action (January 24, 1915) Vice Admiral Beatty, in command of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was pursuing an inferior force of German battle cruisers, suddenly turned his whole force eight points—an act which broke off the pursuit—because he thought a submarine was present. It was a false alarm, as no U-boats were with the German battle cruisers. The second meeting of the capital ships was the Battle of Jutland, and the effects of this adopted policy of caution will be shown in the ensuing article. The third occasion was the sortie of the German High Seas Fleet of August 18, and 19, 1916, when the British Commander-in-Chief reported that it was “unwise to pass over the waters occupied,” as he had again been obliged to use caution because “the ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the nineteenth of August.” (J)
The full text of this statement of the policy adopted for the conduct of the British Battle Fleet, with the approval of the British Admiralty, is given in the Naval History of the World War, and anyone desiring to understand the Battle of Jutland should study it carefully, as perhaps never in history did the conduct of a fleet in action follow so closely a predetermined course.
On the part of the Germans, the change in naval strategy which brought about the Battle of Jutland was the result of the action of the United States in the Sussex case. The German Imperial Government had been about to break away from the pledges exacted by the United States after the Lusitania crisis, and had planned a resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare. However, in April, 1916, the inexcusable torpedoing of the Sussex had brought a sudden ultimatum from the United States, and, as Admiral Scheer expressed it, the German Imperial Government “decided to give in and sent orders to the Naval Staff that submarine warfare was henceforth to be carried on in accordance with Prize Law.” This enforced suspension of [/-boat warfare made it incumbent upon the German naval Commander-in-Chief to do something with the German Battle Fleet, and the sortie into the North Sea was the result.
Admiral Scheer’s object was “to call out a display of English fighting forces as promised by Mr. Balfour,” and to compel them “to give battle under conditions favorable to us.” (S) Of course Admiral Scheer could not hope to engage the greatly superior British Grand Fleet in a set battle of broadsides. Consequently, the German Commander-in-Chief had taken the precaution to prepare in advance a means of evasion, in case that, instead of encountering the expected “conditions favorable” to himself of weaker enemy forces, he should meet the overwhelming superiority of the British Battle Fleet. For escape in any such sudden emergency, Admiral Scheer had devised a fleet maneuver which he himself called a “swing-around.” This was a countermarch of a line of warships, effected by preparatory and executing signals, so well coordinated that it was practically a simultaneous turn of all the ships in the line to an opposite direction. This maneuver was to be executed under the cover of smoke-screens, and it had been rehearsed until the German Battle Fleet was letter-perfect in performing the novel change of direction. Admiral Scheer’s scheme of evasion under the concealment of smoke was especially advantageous because such a simultaneous turn of warships had been hitherto deemed impracticable, and his enemy would have no idea of what was going on behind the clouds of smoke. With this system of rehearsed tactics the Germans entered the Battle of Jutland, and these rehearsed tactics were used in the action.
[Image: DIAGRAMMATIC CHART OF BATTLE CRUISER ACTION I. Battle Cruiser Action, 3:30-5:30 p.m.
- 3:31p.m. Beatty sighted Hipper. Airplane from Engadine had not been able to find enemy heavy ships.
- 3:48. Battle cruisers engaged.
- 4:06. Indefatigable sunk. British opened the range.
- 4:42. Beatty sighted advancing High Sea Fleet and turned north, column-right-about.
- 4:57- Evan-Thomas turned north. Hipper had also turned north ahead of the High Sea Fleet. ]
[Image: DIAGRAMMATIC CHART OF FLEET ACTION II. Main Engagement, 5:30-9:00 p.m. Allan Westcott, Professor, U.S. Naval Academy] - 5:30. Beatty’s British advance force pursued by united German forces of Hipper and Scheer.
- 5:40. From this time Beatty at full speed was turning to easterly courses in search of Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet—Hipper was turning to close Scheer—Scheer reducing speed to gather his fleet Hood had overrun far to eastward.
- 6:02. German Fleet turned to port, "To render assistance to the Wiesbaden" (S).
- 6:16. Jellicoe signaled Grand Fleet to deploy on port wing column, Beatty passed across to eastward. Defence, Warrior, Black Prince, put out of action. Warspite out of action. Evan-Thomas turned to take position astern of Grand Fleet. Hood turned back to take position ahead of Beatty. Invincible sunk at 6134.
- 6:35. Scheer executed first ships-right-about in smoke screen. Grand Fleet on course to south (6:50). British battle cruisers out of control on turn.
- 6:55. Scheer made second ships-right-about toward the British Fleet, with attacks of destroyers in advance.
- 7:17.Scheer made third ships-right-about, to westward. Jellicoe turned away to avoid torpedo attacks.
- 8:20. Last clash of heavy ships. Jellicoe in single line to southwest at 8:30.
- 9:00. British moved to southward, breaking off action. Germans made ‘‘close formation” (S) at 9:06, and passed across the wake of the British in the night. Action of fleets ended.]
From the foregoing, it will be evident that both sides had preconceived ideas of the tactics which were to be used in an action of fleets. As to 17-boats and aircraft, all early tales of their activities are now known to be false. The British reports of the presence of 17-boats were erroneous,1 and Admiral Scheer has stated in his report that he received no information whatever from outlying 17-boats. There was an airplane carrier with the British advance force, but the first attempt at observation by airplane was an immediate failure and ended the use of British aircraft in the battle. Admiral Scheer had originally planned to bring out airships as scouts, but after waiting several days for them to be able to take the air, he made his sortie without them. In the afternoon of May 31 these German airships attempted “long-distance reconnaissance” (S), but Admiral Scheer’s report has definitely disposed of them for the day of the battle by stating: “They did not succeed in taking any part in the action which developed soon afterwards, nor did they observe anything of our Main Fleet or of the enemy, nor did they hear anything of the engagement.” Consequently the Battle of Jutland was not affected by either submarine or aircraft—and all those having other impressions are mistaken.
1 “. . . . although many submarines were present.”—Admiral Jellicoe, Report
The day of the battle was cloudy, but the sun shone through the clouds most of the time. At no time was there anything approaching a sea. Visibility was reported as good in the first stages of the action, but later in the afternoon, there being little wind, mist and smoke hung heavy over the surface of the sea.
On that day there was a situation in the North Sea which cannot be obscured by all the misleading fictions which have been written. Irrespective of the movements of the rival commands, the broad condition existed that the weaker German Fleet found itself in a position where it must engage the overwhelmingly superior British Fleet at a long distance from the shelter of the German bases. Any evasion by flight was out of the question for the German Fleet, as Admiral Scheer had brought out with him the squadron of slow pre-dreadnaught battleships, and this had reduced his fleet speed to seventeen knots. The fleet speed of the British Battle Fleet of powerful dreadnaughts was twenty knots. Yet this superior fleet of greater speed failed to impose its strength upon the weaker fleet of inferior speed. The preceding sentence expresses the underlying tragedy of the Battle of Jutland2—and the sense of that failure, which must be explained, is one reason why the British accounts have to deal with justifications and recriminations, which have made their versions a series of arguments instead of statements of facts.
As is well known, on May 31, 1916, the dispositions of each commander had resulted in an advance force thrown out ahead of the main body of the fleet. Vice Admiral Beatty’s British advance force, six battle cruisers and four twenty-five knot battleships of the Queen Elizabeth type, came in contact with Vice Admiral Hipper’s German advance force of five battle cruisers. This contact brought on the Battle of Jutland— and from its very beginning there arose clouds of fiction.
2 “In our long and glorious naval history nothing directly comparable with this tragedy stands recorded.”—Lord Sydenham
Nothing could be clearer than the facts as to the opening of the action. It was all “daylight plain sailing”—and these facts are matters of indisputable official record. Yet the opening moves have been wreathed in a highly dramatic invention, which exceeds poetic license. The actual events were far from being dramatic in their casual sequence. At 2:20 p.m. Vice Admiral Beatty had been informed of the presence of enemy ships. At 2:33 p.m. he had signaled “Admiral intends to proceed at twenty-two knots.” At 2:39 p.m. he had information that “the enemy force was considerable” (B) and “that it would be impossible to round the Horn Reef without being brought into action.” (B) At this time, therefore, Beatty knew he was in an interposing position, and he had attained that advantageous position without the use of high speed. For until this stage, his speed had been only nineteen and a half knots. “Course was accordingly altered to the eastward and northeastward.” (B) At 2:52 p.m. Beatty made signal for a southeasterly course. At 3 :01 p.m. he signaled to alter course to east. At 3:12 p.m. he signaled, “Admiral intends to proceed at twenty-four knots.” At 3:21 p.m. he signaled, “Course northeast, speed twenty-three knots.” At 3 127 p.m. he signaled, “Assume complete readiness for action in every respect.” At 3 :30 p.m. Beatty, in his own words, “increased speed to twenty-five knots and formed line of battle” to, engage.
Consequently, it is a matter of unquestionable record that, from the time of the first information of the presence of enemy warships (2:20 p.m.) it was over an hour before Beatty “increased speed to twenty-five knots” (B) to engage the enemy. And yet, at this time (3:30 p.m.) the four powerful Queen Elizabeth battleships under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, “who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing north- northwest 10,000 yards” (B). This statement in Beatty’s report meant only one thing, that throughout this long period of maneuvering at moderate speed Beatty had kept Evan-Thomas “conforming” (B) to his various changes of courses, and separated from his battle cruisers by this interval of 10,000 yards. And, in all this time, Beatty had not made one signal to bring this strongest part of his command closer to his battle cruisers. The result was that these four battleships were so far away to north-northwest that they were useless in the ensuing engagement to south-southwest. We are thus forced to the conclusion that Beatty thought his six battle cruisers would be able to take care of the situation without assistance.
It would seem difficult to go far wrong in describing such simple movements of ships. Yet an altogether imaginary tale of a sudden impetuous dash at high speed by Beatty’s battle cruisers to intercept the Germans, has been industriously put into circulation, and still finds credence today. In 1919 this invention was exploited in a book which was given a cachet of artificial importance by the fact that Beatty wrote an introduction for it. This was The Battle of Jutland by Commander Carlyon Bellairs, R.N., and it was frankly an indictment of the British Commander-in-Chief, with a contrasting laudation of Beatty. The following travesty on the actual facts will show the extent to which this was carried in the book: “Beatty, having brought the enemy into action in a position advantageous for cutting them off from the Horn Reef, now reduced speed from twenty-seven knots to twenty-one knots to enable the four Barhams and their small craft satellites to come up.” A comparison with the actual records given above of the speed of Beatty’s battle cruisers in his opening maneuvers, will show how utterly contrary to facts was this version. Yet this has persisted to an astonishing extent. Five years afterwards Admiral Bacon, in The Jutland Scandal, wrote: “He, full of ardor, raced away. . . . . This was the action of an impulsive fighter, not that of an experienced admiral.” And, in this year 1927, Winston Churchill has joined the chorus: “But the facts, when at 2:32 Beatty decided that the enemy was present in sufficient strength to justify turning the heavy ships about, made it his clear duty to steam at once and at the utmost speed in their direction. All that impulse, all that ardor give, was no doubt present in the Admiral’s mind. . . . . “
To show the nonsense of all this, it is only necessary to point out that, after the time given (2:32 p.m.), fifty-eight minutes elapsed, and there were four changes of courses at moderate speed, before Beatty “increased speed to twenty-five knots” (B) at 3:30 p.m. to engage. But, regardless of the facts, thus fiction has been reiterated by the partisans of Beatty, with unfounded aspersions upon the conduct of Evan-Thomas, in order to give the wrong impression to the public that Beatty’s engaging with his battle cruisers alone was an act of impulsive and heroic “ardor.”
This first phase of the Battle of Jutland must be regarded as an action between rival battle cruisers, as Beatty, by thus allowing his command to remain divided, had committed himself to a fight in which the far distant battleships of Evan-Thomas would not be able to take any effective part. Under these conditions, the test at issue was clear. With Beatty in his interposing position, Hipper could not flee to his main body. He must fight his way in a stand-up battle to a safe junction with the German Battle Fleet. The whole question was whether Beatty would be able to dominate Hipper in this stand-up battle and prevent him from joining Scheer.
In pre-war calculations of strength, Beatty’s six battle cruisers would have been assigned a superiority of thirty-six to twenty-five over Hipper’s five battle cruisers. Consequently, on this basis of calculation, Beatty was justified in believing that his British battle cruisers would be able to defeat the German battle cruisers. But, like many other “on paper” calculations made in the World War, the forecast was not borne out by the event. For it was the British naval force that suffered repulse. The rival battle cruisers opened fire “practically simultaneously” (B) at 3:48 p.m. The trend of the action was south-southeast as Hipper did not edge away but maintained his fight on this general course, which was in the direction of the advancing German High Seas Fleet, although this was not apparent to Beatty at the time.
The result was not long in doubt. The Germans at once showed they were superior in range finding. They were able to “get on to their target and establish hitting in two or three minutes of opening fire.” (J) In contrast, the British were not at high efficiency in gunnery, and overestimated the opening ranges. At 4:00 p.m. the Lion was heavily hit, and one turret was disabled. Immediately afterwards German salvos penetrated the Indefatigable and she blew up. After this unexpected contretemps, Beatty turned away until he was out of range of the German guns (4:05 p.m.). He closed the range again and the fighting was renewed, only to meet another British disaster, as at 4:26 p.m. the Queen Mary met the same fate by explosion after penetrating hits. It was thus decisively settled that Hipper was to fight his way to a prompt junction with the main German Battle Fleet, and that Beatty had failed to stop him by means of the British battle cruisers only. In this phase of the action there had been destroyer attacks by both sides, but they had not affected the screened capital ships.
These were the actual events of Beatty’s failure against Hipper. Yet, in accounts of this episode, the same dramatic element has been laid on with an unsparing trowel. Witness this rhapsody in Churchill’s book, as to “the Vice Admiral pacing the bridge among the shell fragments rebounding from the water, and like Nelson of old in the brunt of the enemy’s fire. . . . . But the movement of these blind, inanimate castles of steel was governed at this moment entirely by the spirit of one man. Had he faltered, had he taken less than a conqueror’s view of the British fighting chances, all these great engines of power would have wobbled off in meaningless disarray.” It is difficult to believe that these mock heroics could have been written seriously, but they are typical of the state of mind of the Jutland partisan.
Hipper thus won his way to a perfect junction with Scheer’s advancing High Sea Fleet. The sudden appearance of the German Battle Fleet was a complete surprise to the British, and Beatty signaled by flags: “Alter course in succession sixteen points to starboard.” This flag signal was seen by Evan-Thomas, when the Lion passed to the north (4:53 p.m.) after the battle cruisers had made their turn. Evan-Thomas then turned his four battleships to the north astern of Beatty’s battle cruisers, and, as Admiral Scheer expressed it, “thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers.” The united German fleet followed, and the action “developed into a stern chase” (S).
What had been Hipper’s object was now transferred to Beatty. Beatty must make every endeavor to gain a prompt junction with Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet, which was hastening from the north at utmost fleet speed, in order to impose its overwhelming force upon the Germans. Just as the British had been ignorant of the approach of the German High Seas Fleet, so the Germans were ignorant of the approach of the British Grand Fleet. But an efficient joining of forces proved to be beyond the ability of the British. It was only too evident that methods of communication had not been devised which would insure that coordination of the whole British force. In fact, with the uncertain information Beatty was able to give Jellicoe, any such prompt junction could only have taken place through a miracle of luck. In the actual event, there was an error of over eleven miles to the eastward in location.
If the picture at this stage is visualized, we have no further difficulty in understanding the essentials of the Battle of Jutland. The weather had grown thick, with mist and haze hanging over the sea. We must not think in terms of small dimensions but must visualize the long miles of ships in formation, wreathed in smoke, over the vast areas of maneuver. The two great fleets were approaching one another under conditions that preordained the result. On the British side there was uncertainty for the Commander- in-Chief, not only as to the position of his own fleeing advance force, but also as to the location of the enemy—and always dictating his movements was the prescribed cautious policy for closing an enemy fleet. On the other hand, for the German Commander-in-Chief, the German battle cruisers had been turned back to close his Battle Fleet, and his whole united command was in hand and well disposed to carry out his long rehearsed maneuver for turning away in a concealing smoke screen when suddenly confronted by a superior enemy.
These being the actual conditions at the time, nothing can be further from the mark than to say that Beatty “delivered the German Fleet, and led it into the jaws of the trap.” Yet these are familiar reiterations in the Jutland controversies. It is now evident that the Germans were never in danger of being “entrapped.” As was inevitable from the British errors and uncertainties in location, the meeting of the fleets was a scene of confusion and again there were heavy British losses. Three armored cruisers were put out of action,3 “not aware of the approach of the enemy heavy ships.” (J) The battle cruiser Invincible also met the same fate which had destroyed the other two British battle cruisers. However, the British losses had not impaired the overwhelming superiority of the British Fleet, and Scheer would have had no chance in a battle of broadsides.
3 Defense was sunk; Warrior sank while attempt was being made to tow her home; Black Prince was sunk in the night.
However, when the German Commander- in-Chief found that he was in the presence of this superior enemy, he made use of his carefully prepared maneuver of evasion (6:35 p.m.) and, in his own words, “the swing-around was carried out in excellent style.” Scheer was certainly justified in adding the statement that “the trouble spent was now well repaid,” for this rehearsed maneuver of evasion was completely successful. The German Fleet was at once relieved from all pressure of the enemy, as it disappeared in a cloud of smoke, and left the British Commander-in-Chief, who “did not grasp the situation” (S), in ignorance of what had happened behind that smoke screen. After moving off to westward in safety for only twenty minutes, Scheer resolved “to make still further use of the facility of movement.” (S) At 6:55 p.m. he again executed his “swing-around” of the German Fleet, and moved straight at the deployed British Battle Fleet, with a torpedo attack of German destroyers thrown out in advance. In accordance with their preconceived tactics, the British Fleet was turned away four points from these German torpedo attacks. Then, for the third time (7:17 p.m.), the German Commander-in- Chief carried out his same maneuver of ships-right-about, behind a smoke screen. And again the German Fleet withdrew in safety, leaving a puzzled enemy groping uncertainly at an empty cloud of smoke.
In this regard, there has been another crop of feckless controversies as to Jellicoe’s cautious method of deploying his Fleet. All these debates were wasted words. For, now that it is known that Scheer came back to contact with the fully deployed British Battle Fleet, the much discussed method of deployment cannot be considered as of the importance assigned it. Even if the British deployment had not come to the Germans in the first place, the Germans had afterwards gone to the British deployment, and the German Fleet had not found any difficulty in drawing away from the fully deployed British Battle Fleet by means of their well prepared maneuver of evasion.
[Image: This chart was signed by Vice Admiral Beatty, affixed to his report of the action, and was published in the British Admiralty’s official blue book, The Battle of Jutland (1920). This is a typical British chart of the action, and shows the British lack of knowledge of the thrice executed swing around” of the German Fleet by ships-right-about (6:35 p.m., 6:55 p.m., 7:17 p.m.). The contrast with the actual course of the action is shown by the chart on pages 172 and 173.]
It is a strange comment on the course of the battle that this thrice executed German “swing-around” or ships-right-about was not understood by anyone in the British Fleet. The accompanying British chart of the action was signed by Beatty and affixed to his report—and it is typical of all the British charts. None of these showed the German “swing-arounds” until after the corrections were made by the British Admiralty, as has been described. The strongest testimony as to this ignorance of the British was in Jellicoe’s book, published three years after Jutland. In this the British Commander-in- Chief made the positive statement that “altering by turning all the ships together” was out of the question under battle conditions—• and he wrote this in perfect unconsciousness that his enemy had carried out just such a turn three times in the action itself!
Of course this fact, that the British had no idea of what the Germans were doing, helped the effectiveness of these rehearsed German maneuvers. But the actual reason for their success was because the Germans created by these means the very situation against which a cautious policy had been prescribed in the doctrines adopted in advance for the conduct of the British Fleet in action, which have been quoted: “If, for instance, the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn.” This preconceived cautious policy was the salvation of the Germans. Scheer himself has stated that the British Fleet might have made an effective reply to his maneuver “if it had kept firmly to our line.”
But the tactics adopted in advance did not permit the British Fleet to close the retiring German Fleet, and from this time the German Fleet was not in great danger, nor even seriously engaged. The rest of the action was merely the story of the British Fleet at a loss, peering into a vast cloud of smoke and mist behind which the German Fleet had disappeared. So utterly did the British fail to feel out the positions of the enemy, that only occasionally would the German ships appear and disappear in this concealing cloud. As darkness came on, these tactics on the part of the Germans, with the British fixed idea of the dangers of torpedo attacks, became more and more baffling to the British Commander-in-Chief. And with darkness (9:00 p.m.) came the decision which ended the Battle of Jutland.
The British Commander-in-Chief has stated that he “rejected at once the idea of a night action between the heavy ships.” To the Germans the British had conceded a superiority at night which put this out of the question.4 As to the decision to avoid a night action, both Jellicoe and Beatty are on record as being in agreement at the time— and this is one point concerning the battle over which there is no controversy. By order of the British Commander-in-Chief the British Fleet moved through the dark hours “some eighty-five miles” (J) from the battlefield. This must be considered, in every sense, as breaking off the battle of the fleets —as ending the Battle of Jutland—for the British light forces were ordered to conform to the movements of the capital ships. And not one of these auxiliaries of the Battle Fleet was given a mission to seek out or keep in touch with the enemy.
4 “The German organization for night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent, ours is practically nil. They use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results.” (J)
On the part of the Germans, Admiral Scheer, in the words of the British Admiralty’s Narrative, “decided to make straight for Horn Reef in close order during the night, maintaining his course regardless of attacks.” He fully expected a night action, but he made the strongest disposition of his Battle Fleet against attacks, and determined to push his way through any opposition the British might offer. However, as the British Fleet had moved away to the south, the German Fleet passed across its wake to safety. In so doing the German Fleet plowed through the straggling British light craft left in the wake of the retiring British Fleet. But in the night there was only isolated fighting, altogether by chance, and without coordination or control.
The discussion over the “night action” of the light forces has been voluble, and much paper has also been wasted in controversies as to the “might-have-beens” if use had been made of information of the German positions in the night. But, in regard to both these phases of the Jutland disputes, the futility of the debates has been made evident beyond any misunderstanding. In the first place, the “night action,” as anything but a series of chance encounters, has been ruled out entirely by a positive statement in the British Admiralty’s official Narrative. “The flotillas were ordered to take station astern five miles, and no instructions were given them to attack the enemy, nor were they informed of the enemy’s position. In these circumstances, no organized attacks were made in the dark hours.” In the same way, speculations as to what might have happened if use had been made of the information giving the positions of the Germans in the night, are also blocked by a dead wall. All such information was precluded from having any effect upon the result, because Admiral Jellicoe had disposed his whole force to keep on through the dark hours on southerly courses, with the fixed determination of not making any move against the enemy until daylight. There was no possibility of any information changing the British Admiral’s resolve not to seek the enemy until daylight.
By the time it became daylight, all information as to the positions of the Germans was doubly of no value to the British; first, because the German Fleet had already passed safely across the wake of the British Fleet on its way to Horn Reef; secondly, because there had been so much straggling of the British Fleet in the night, that “the difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet .... rendered it undesirable for the British Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight as had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and destroyers before renewing action.” (J) Nothing could be more explicit than this—and it proves conclusively that there was no possibility of a renewed action between the fleets, no matter what information might have been received. And this disposes of another flock of Jutland fictions, which has been prolific in controversies.
The foregoing has given the essential facts of the Battle of Jutland, in contrast with the fictions which have been put into circulation. As has been stated, these facts are plain for all to read. They are all established beyond any question, and there can be no dispute over them. If only we put the battle on the basis of these actual events of
May 31, 1916, nothing will remain of the inventions of the succeeding years—and all the controversies will die the death of the fictions on which they have been founded.
In regard to the results of the Battle of Jutland, there is no avoiding the conclusion that the British failed to impose their superior force upon the German Fleet for two obvious reasons. In the first place, the British were not prepared with methods to close an enemy retiring fleet, because they were controlled by preconceived doctrines that especially warned them against such a course. In the second place the Germans had made special preparations, which made the problem against a retiring enemy fleet more difficult. Therefore, the blame for failure should be given to these British tactics, prescribed in advance by the Admiralty. It is unjust to charge the responsibility against the brave men who fought the battle. They were restricted to a cautious system of tactics which had been dictated to them. The fact that these tactics were inadequate for the situation in the Battle of Jutland was not their fault.
The mistaken idea that the Battle of Jutland had such an effect upon the German Fleet that “it never came out,” is another of the fictions of Jutland. The sortie of August 18-19 has been described. After the end of 1916, the German Fleet continued to be a most active force in the war, and it kept a wide area in the North Sea cleared for the egress and entrance of [/-boats in the great German campaign of unrestricted warfare. For this reason, the British failure to win a decision in the Battle of Jutland became more and more disastrous to the Entente Allies as the time went on, for it was only by this active use of the German Fleet that the [/-boat campaign could be carried on. Another result of Jutland has not been duly appreciated. Instead of having any ill effect, the action gave to the German Navy so great a prestige that the German Naval Staff gained the influence necessary to win their argument for the adoption of the policy of the German Navy for unrestricted U- boat warfare. Consequently, not only did the German Navy emerge from Jutland with the naval forces necessary to maintain the U-boat campaign, but also with the added power necessary to bring about the adoption of this unrestricted [/-boat campaign. This is the true measure of the tragedy of the British failure to overwhelm the German Fleet at the Battle of Jutland.
Since the foregoing article was written, Admiral Scheer, the German Commander-in- Chief, has published a personal statement as to the Battle of Jutland, in the Fortnightly Review for October, 1927. He has agreed with the estimate given of the Harper Report, as he has written: “ ‘Harper’s Record’ concerning the Battle of Jutland, the publication of which had aroused such great expectations of important revelations—particularly in view of the fact that the British Admiralty had refused to release it for more than seven years and a half—must, I fear, have proved a great delusion. The report gives us no new facts as to the course and conduct of the battle . . . .” The German admiral has also perceived that the report was merely being used as a means for reviving the quarrels concerning the British leaders, for he has added: “It appears to me to be rather a contribution to the controversy between Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty. . . . .”
Admiral Scheer’s comment points the sermon that the “British criticism of the British leadership in the battle” has not given to the world a victorious impression. “Zealous efforts were and still are being made, to estabish the tactical errors made by the individual commanders, or to put the blame upon the imperfection or inadequacy of this or that type of battleship construction.” As has been explained, this has given an unjust impression of blame, where the actual cause of failure was the restraint placed upon the British leaders by the cautious policy which had been adopted by the British Admiralty for the conduct of the British Battle Fleet.
The German admiral has realized that the British leaders were obliged to act under this policy, as he has written: “At the outbreak of the war the British Admiralty had decided to adopt the strategic defensive, inasmuch as it hoped to achieve its goal by the operation of the principle of the fleet in being.” Admiral Scheer has stated that the British Commander-in-Chief “stood face to face with a task which diverged from his
general strategic duties. The strategic defensive demanded reserve and repression so that the striking power of the Grand Fleet might not be diminished, and the sacrificing of ships was therefore to be avoided.” The German admiral’s recognition of “the strategic limitations placed upon Admiral Jellicoe in the matter of avoiding losses in ships” goes to the heart of what has been urged above, that the blame should be given to the enforced cautious tactics and not to the men who were obliged to use those tactics.
Admiral Scheer confirms what has been stated of the change of German naval strategy, when the German Imperial Government was forced to abandon unrestricted U- boat warfare by the ultimatum from the United States: “But as the German Government found itself unable to come to a resolute determination to ignore the protests of the United States—as England had done in the matter of international law at sea— it became necessary for the German Navy to seize the offensive in 1916.” This effect of the Sussex ultimatum has never been fully understood in Great Britain.
He has also confirmed the statement of “the real object, which was to force the British Fleet to emerge from its secure retreat in the Orkneys Lord Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, sought to quiet the population by declaring that all preparations had been made to punish the Germans severely if they made another such attack.”
The failure of the airships as scouts has been reiterated, “because the aerial scouting service could not be made use of at that time.”
Finally, Admiral Scheer has used almost the same terms as to the far reaching ill effects of the British failure to destroy the German Battle Fleet at Jutland: “The destruction of the German Fleet would have proved an enormous success for England, for it would have made impossible the carrying out of the 17-boat war, the damaging effects of which, England had already begun to experience (despite the limited application of this form of warfare). For the submarine fleet, deprived of its support in capital ships, would soon have been blocked in.”