During a recent battle problem, a signal officer whose tenure had been relatively brief, spun the pages of the signal book in a frenzy, as flags and pennants, in hoist after hoist, fluttered to the yardarm of the flagship, and he was overheard to remark: “Oh, for the good old days when they had only one signal—engage the enemy.” His composure was not aided by several pairs of stern eyes that awaited his interpretation of the admiral’s wishes nor by a waggish signalman, who queried: “Sir, I thought they only dressed ship on holidays.”
However, before jumping to conclusions concerning the so-called halcyon days of visual signaling, a consideration of two British signal books of the eighteenth century may revise hasty opinions, and in any event will demonstrate the enduring principles upon which the art of signaling was founded.
Prior to any available signal publications of the United States Navy, excepting a handwritten sheet of recognition signals used by John Paul Jones, is a British Signal Book for the Ships of War, 1796 and a later edition of 1799. Although they are not the earliest known signal publications of the British Navy, the basis of much of the subsequent signaling of navies throughout the world may be found within the covers of these books.
Precautions as to handling the signal book are contained in the first section.
Particular care is to be taken by the several commanders furnished with these signals, that they may be timely destroyed, with every other signal and introduction given for the conduct of the fleet for his information, so that they may not fall into the hands of the enemy, by the capture or loss of their ships.
Other general instructions concerning the system are set forth.
The signals are to be complied with by the Ships of the Fleet, generally, unless they are especially addressed to particular Ships, Squadrons or Divisions, denoted by their proper distinguishing signals shewn at the same time; and to which such signals are meant then only to relate.
All general signals made by the Admiral are to be repeated by the different flag officers of the Fleet; and those made to particular ships also, whenever it appears that the Admiral’s intentions may be thereby more expeditiously communicated to the ships concerned. But when such signal respects any Squadron or Division of the fleet separately, it will be sufficient for the Commander thereof to indicate his notice of the signal by shewing the answering flag; being at liberty on such occasions to postpone the repetition of the Admiral’s signal until he deems it expedient to direct the immediate Execution of the specified movement or purpose of the signal, by the ships under his direction.
The answering flag referred to above was in no case to be hoisted until the purport of a signal was “fully understood.”
The system upon which the content of this book was built consisted of a call system, several special flags and pennants, and a numeral signal system.
The call system was made up of six pennants, three provided as calls for the first, second, or third squadron, and three for the first, second, or third division. To call a specific division, such as the second division of the third squadron, the second division pennant was hoisted above the third squadron pennant. There were various additional calls for different units of the tactical organization, and all calls were pennants, while the numerals representing the signals themselves were flags.
For making signals a series of twenty-five numeral flags was provided. Each of these represented a specific signal. In addition, the numeral flags, one to zero, were used in combination to refer to other numbered signals in the book. A special pennant meaning one hundred was used in forming high numbers, and a substitute flag (repeater) was also used for convenience in making up numbers in which duplicate digits appeared. Each signal was written out opposite a number and to send that signal the given number was hoisted using the numeral flags necessary. The book contains 183 consecutively numbered signals with numerous blank meanings which an admiral could fill in with any special signals that he might desire.
The numbered signals, together with the call system, a successive movement flag, a station (position) pennant, a preparative flag, an annulling flag, an affirmative flag, a negative flag, an interrogatory pennant, and a numeral pennant (to be used above numeral flags when they were “expressive of number only,” and did not refer to the signal of that number), gave an admiral a very useful and flexible system of flag signaling.
It is a tribute to the effectiveness and distinctiveness of the numeral flags to note that several of them are identical in design and color with certain of the modern international alphabet flags, including those which now represent B, K, P, Q, U, and X. The designs of O, M, and W were also among the numeral series but with slightly different colors.
Should an admiral have reason to believe that his numeral equivalents had been compromised he could change them by hoisting a special flag, indicating that a new assignment was about to be made. The flag which in the new assignment was to represent numeral “one” was then hoisted, followed by that which was to represent “two,” then “three,” and so on in order until the whole series of flags had been assigned new values.
But visual signaling required certain other knowledge than merely that of the flag designs. In addition, a signal officer needed an expert knowledge of ships and rigging, for often a flag hoisted at different points carried an entirely different meaning. For example, the yellow flag when hoisted at a yardarm annulled the preceding signal, or the signal then flying. However at the ensign staff, this same flag denoted that punishment was about to be inflicted, and if historical accounts are correct we can surmise that this particular flag was so hoisted frequently. It does not seem unlikely that if a signal officer overlooked this flag at the yardarm, he might very possibly see it hoisted at the ensign staff of his own ship. The “red pendant” when hoisted at the ensign staff signified that “the ship’s companies will have time to dine.” No doubt this signal was recognized as instantly, and cheered as loudly, as certain signals are today.
Supplementing the flag signals were others of a visual nature such as the signal meaning “have discovered a strange fleet.” To make this signal, the main and fore-topgallant sails must be loosed and hoisted, the topsail yards lowered and four guns fired. There was also a numbered flag signal for this same meaning, and when it was used, the signal was “hauled down once for every five sail seen.”
In those signals in which the firing of guns was a part, the interval between guns was also important, and each such signal specified whether the guns were to be fired at slow time (20-second interval) common time (6 seconds) or quick time (1.5 seconds). Although a signal officer might be a success even if he knew little of harmony, he must certainly have a nice sense of rhythm and time.
At night, various combinations of lanterns on square and triangular frames were used in connection with guns and false fires and when sighting strange ships the signals were to be displayed “where most visible to the Admiral, and as little as possible to the strange Ships.”
The signals in this book, although only 183 in number, cover a wide range of subjects, all the way from the direction of battle maneuvers down to a signal meaning “The Admiral is about to fish.” The usefulness of this early publication cannot be doubted, but its next edition apparently took liberties with the personal privileges of an admiral, and the above signal was no longer included. Unquestionably its deletion brought many sighs and head-shakings, as the sad passing of the old Navy was reluctantly recognized.
The 1799 edition of the British Signal Book for the Ships of War was based on the same general principles as the 1796 edition, but the number of signals was almost doubled, and index tabs were provided to mark important divisions of the book. A few of the flags in the previous book were done away with and several new designs introduced, some of which are still in use although with different meanings. Two substitutes (repeaters) were supplied instead of one, as before.
The Union Jack took on considerable significance as a signal for it was used at the fore-topmast head to call a pilot aboard, a practice which is international custom today. In addition, depending upon other points of hoist it might be a summons for the captain of a ship to come on board the flagship, or for a lieutenant, or a midshipman.
A special set of flags and pennants was provided to enable ships to exchange calls, each ship being given a number. Combinations of flags and pennants represented the numerals one to nine. When hoisted at the fore they denoted units, but at the main, they denoted tens. In addition, a ball at the fore represented 100; at the main, 200. The number 365 required a ball, two pennants and a flag at the fore, and simultaneously a ball, a pennant, and a flag at the main.
The keeping of a signal log was also required. “In every ship a book is to be kept in which every signal that is made is to be entered; the signal number is to be specified, as well as the purpose for which the signal was made.” Thus did the introduction of paper work creep into a profession that up to that time had demanded only men of action.
The mission of a battle fleet is aptly set forth.
The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are, that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy’s ships greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet.
It has long been hearsay, greeted with scorn by the cynical, that in the good old days, a battle was fought only on a ship-to-ship basis. Although the above quotation does not imply that an enemy was always to be trusted to fight on terms of equality, the Signal Book for the Ships of War, 1799 proves that this gallantry (or possibly convenience) was not a myth in the British Navy.
If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which by the flight of some of their ships becomes inferior, the ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line without a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances will allow.
It seems that the most effective way to accomplish this would be to remain in the line and carry out the principle of concentration, but apparently there was another school of thought at that time.
Accompanying the Signal Book for the Ships of War, 1799 was a supplementary publication, Night Signal Book for the Ships of War. This book contained seventy numbered signals. A table of night equivalents was provided by which the numbers could be made. Lights in various combinations represented 1, 2, 3, and 4; false fires or rockets, 5; one gun represented 10, two guns 20, three guns 30, and so on up to 70. To make intermediate numbers, a series of numeral signals was made, which added up, totaled the required number. Thirty-seven was made by three guns for 30, false fires or rockets for 5, and the proper combination of lights for the additional two required to total 37. When the guns would not be distinguishable, as during a night engagement, there were various arrangements of lights in square and triangular frames to represent the necessary multiples of ten.
Nelson’s famous signal at the battle of Trafalgar indicates that vocabulary signals were much more complicated than tactical signals. W. J. Gordon in his Flags of the World describes the incidents connected with this signal. The enemy fleets were about a mile and a half apart, slowly closing to gun range. As they waited, Nelson is reported to have remarked to Captain Blackwood, of the Victory: “I’ll now amuse the fleet with a signal.” To the flag lieutenant, one of whose letters is authority for the story, Nelson then said: “Mr. Pasco, I wish to say to the fleet, ‘England confides that every man will do his duty,’ and you must be quick, for I have one more to make, which is for close action.” Mr. Pasco, however, ventured to offer a suggestion: “If your lordship will permit me to substitute ‘expects’ for ‘confides,’ the signal will soon be completed, because the word ‘expects’ is in the vocabulary and ‘confides’ must be spelled.” The substitution was apparently satisfactory to Nelson. The word “duty” was not in the vocabulary either and required four separate hoists with a total of thirty-seven flags to spell it out. Altogether, twelve hoists were necessary to make the historic signal “England expects that every man will do his duty.”
Such a long and complicated procedure for a single signal would dismay the most proficient of modern signal personnel, and on that famous day in 1805, when it was successfully completed, the flag lieutenant’s associates must have congratulated him with a characteristic "Cheerio, Flag s!’
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IT is generally believed that war can be brought about only in answer to a strong demand for it by popular opinion, but even in the most recent events we have examples that show how easily the current affairs may be turned by the action of the executive. Thus, a diplomatic note by the government of Mr. Cleveland brought us to the verge of war with Great Britain; and through the initiative of Mr. McKinley, the nation has been placed in the position which it now occupies in the Philippines, without any initial impulse on the part of popular opinion.—Reinsch.