Editor’s Note:—This article was submitted in December, 1932, in the Prize Essay Contest, 1933.
Experientia docet
Comte, in his Positive Philosophy developed the theory that if history were intelligently studied, and the underlying conditions which existed at the times of important modifications in human affairs were disclosed, the actions of the human race whenever similar conditions exist in the future could be definitely predicted. He ascribed this to mass thinking, what we now call mass psychology, a very different sort of thinking from that of leading intelligent minds.
This mass thinking frequently proceeds along the lines which lead to mass action utterly at variance with the reasoned planning of the most cultivated intellects. As Nietzsche expressed it:
Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule.
Harsh as this statement may be, it still contains an element of truth, indicating a danger which must always be guarded against.
Whether these views be absolutely correct or not, one thing is certain. Improvements in human affairs proceed along certain definite lines. They cannot be hurried by the adoption of revolutionary reforms before the time is ripe for them. Leading thinkers may point out the obviously unfortunate results which flow from present methods, but the mass mind does not react to the reasoning. Norman Angell in The Great Illusion, published in 1914 and widely read, painted in lively colors the disastrous economic effects of a great war, and the World War shortly followed. J. Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace predicted accurately what was to be expected from the Versailles Treaty, but no successful remedial measures were adopted. These are random examples of the unwisdom of expecting human affairs to be guided solely by the reasoning of intelligent thinkers. No matter how foolish and how devastating economically and socially we may consider armed conflict to be, we have nevertheless to recognize the outstanding fact of its great probability in the present stage of human mass thinking, or more properly, lack of thinking.
World organization for the preservation of peace is not a new problem. On the contrary it has engaged the attention of mankind almost since the dawn of history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many plans were devised leading to the organization of states into alliances or agreements which might be called forerunners of a “United States of Europe.” The nineteenth century saw a continued succession of attempts to achieve this object. The Holy Alliance, entered into by the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia in the same year (1815) as the Congress of Vienna, adopted as its guiding principles the basic elements of the Christian religion—justice, charity, and peace—and all powers who would subscribe to these principles were invited to join. Great Britain did not accord with this “piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense” and her opposition made the plan abortive. The balance of power established by the Congress of Vienna led to the informal understanding known as the Concert of Europe, which up to the World War practically guided the destinies of modern nations and bid fair, toward the end of the century, to develop into a world concert. The various congresses which met during the nineteenth century to handle particular problems which arose among the several nations all arrived at settlements consonant with the prescriptions of the Concert of Europe, and involving the principle of the balance of power. As to the Holy Alliance itself, it is interesting to note that the United States, invited by Russia to become a party, expressly refused on the ground that non-intervention in European affairs was a fixed principle of American policy. This was but a step in the direction of the companion policy, opposition to the intervention of Europe in American affairs, culminating a few years later in the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.
The fundamental idea common to all the congresses and international conferences was the preservation of the status quo as existing at the time of each meeting. Various means to “implement” the agreements adopted, by providing penalties for non-conformance, were resorted to, such as binding the signatories to use force of arms against any recalcitrant members. Generally speaking, the diverse interests of the participants were recognized in proportion to the international position of each and the military power which each possessed.
So, when the problem of armament limitation is approached, we find the “balance of power” idea an integral part of all plans suggested. The existing naval and military strength of the powers concerned must be duly regarded.
The principle was recognized in the Washington naval treaty and has persisted ever since. Obviously, to maintain this balance of power, force is required. How much force, and how distributed, seems to be the question at issue.
When one examines the fundamental facts underlying the theory of armament limitation, it becomes apparent that principles are involved which are seemingly irreconcilable. On the one hand we have the national interests and aspirations of the leading nations of the world, which, considered from the viewpoint of any one nation, are impossible of fulfillment without conflicting with the aims of another, and in some instances, with several other nations. On the other hand we have the proposal that each nation shall limit or reduce its military and naval forces which it is relying upon to sustain its special interests in the world arena.
The terms “national interests and aspirations” are here used as indicating the policies of a nation, what a nation believes to be necessary for its normal life and development. It can, of course, be argued, on broad philosophical grounds, that such belief is a mistaken one, and that nations could and should abandon such of their claims as bring them in conflict with other nations, or at least compromise them so as to accord with claims of all nations. But no such proposition is advanced at the present time in connection with the efforts to limit armaments. It seems to be tacitly agreed that national sovereignty forbids the introduction into the discussion of such delicate points as the justice of the conflicting aims of the conferring nations. In other words, it is contemplated that each nation will continue to push its special interests in international affairs, overreaching others whenever possible, and at the same time will, mainly for reasons of economy, agree upon a pro rata reduction in its armed forces.
Can it be expected that any real and enduring good can result from this plan of procedure? Is it not probable that when such an agreement is entered into and duly signed and ratified, it will become the aim of each participating nation to seek and apply some special advantage in carrying out its terms, thus breaking the spirit of the covenant while adhering to its letter? Patriotism almost seems to demand such action, if patriotism be based on national self-interest alone.
But, it will be argued, even though nations may adhere to their conflicting national policies, the fact that an all-round reduction of military power has been arranged will have the distinct advantage of reducing armament expenditures and thus lift in some degree the economic burden from each. From this point of view the limitation of armament question becomes simply a problem in the reduction of armament expenses. In other words, it is not the effective military strength of each nation which is criticized, but only the enormous costs involved.
There can be no question that the main impelling motive underlying the demand for limitation of national armaments is the desire to reduce the amounts annually expended for armament purposes. In all discussions of the subject the financial burdens of the various nations in maintaining their armaments form the leading argument against military and naval preparedness. Protests against armies and navies existing at all are of course not uncommon, and there are many who sincerely believe that war would be automatically abolished if there were no armed forces in existence. But, generally speaking, it is the immense cost of armaments, rather than the principle under which nations maintain their fighting forces, which is now so greatly agitating the public mind. Therefore, when limitation of armaments is urged, it is under the natural belief that any reduction made in the quantity of armament involves a proportionate reduction in the cost of armament.
So far as naval armament is concerned this does not necessarily follow. It is plainly possible to effect a considerable reduction in the amount of naval armament, that is, in tons of vessels of various categories, only to find that the cost per ton of vessels thereafter constructed rises to such an extent as to offset in large measure, if not entirely, the expected saving. This is more likely to happen if, when establishing limited tonnage quotas, artificial restrictions as to sizes of units, character of armament, etc., are included in the limitations established. The desire to make as powerful as possible a vessel which is restricted to a given displacement inevitably leads to the incorporation in her hull of the most ingenious weight saving devices it is possible to design, and to the adoption of refinements in construction which would not be considered if the normal method of design and building had been followed. The example of the German Deutschland is frequently pointed to in this connection. Such methods of construction naturally prove most expensive.
There is also to be considered the practice of increasing the efficiency of existing vessels through improvements to their structure or operating facilities. This is especially resorted to where agreement has been reached that no more of a certain type shall be built for a given period. It then becomes important to increase the offensive and defensive power of the older vessels allowed to be maintained in service in order to attain equality with vessels of more recent construction. This is exemplified by the modernization of battleships program of England, Japan, and America. Considerable sums are expended in this manner which also reduce the hoped for saving from armament limitation.
The best way to demonstrate the truth of the above statements is to illustrate by a specific case. For this purpose it is proposed to review the experience of the American Navy since the Washington treaty, and to find out how far the savings effected by that treaty and the subsequent London treaty have inured to our benefit. Records of expenditure and other data between June 30, 1921, and June 30, 1931, will be used. The first date is chosen because it was the end of the fiscal year just preceding the Washington treaty, and the second date because later records are not fully available at the time of writing.
When our government convoked the conference on limitation of armament, and Pacific and Far Eastern questions, to meet in Washington in 1921, it prepared an agenda indicating what subjects would be discussed. The most important, and the first to be taken up, was the limitation of naval armaments. In his opening address of November 12, Secretary Hughes stated:
The first (consideration) is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues, its regulation is impractical. There is only one adequate way out and that is to end it now.
In order to accomplish this object and “end it now” a program was presented which included the following:
- That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
- That further reduction should be made through scrapping of certain of the older ships;
- That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned;
- That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.
The program was agreed to substantially as proposed. Before treating the naval limitation feature in this article it is desirable to recall briefly some of the circumstances leading up to the calling of the conference.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had for some time caused concern to our State Department. The last regular renewal of the alliance had expired July 13, 1921, after which it was continued subject to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The cancellation of this alliance was one of the major purposes of the American government in convoking the conference, since the activities of Japan, then as now, in the Chinese areas, particularly Manchuria, were a matter of grave anxiety to our government. The open-door policy in regard to China was in evident jeopardy. The Mikado’s government seemed determined to establish an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine as the basis of its handling of Asiatic questions, with an interpretation favorable to special interests of Japan. The fact that England was obligated by the alliance to join Japan if the latter went to war with any other country was a danger point which this country felt should be removed. Consequently, the action taken by the United States in drastically reducing its naval power was not only for the expressed purpose of curtailing expenditures and abandoning naval competition but was a quid pro quo in securing cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the substitution in its place of the four power treaty relating to insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean and the nine power treaty relating to China, both of which treaties were concluded in the same conference.
The American government had entered in 1916 on a naval program providing for the construction of ten battleships and six battle cruisers, initially influenced by the treatment accorded to American trade by the belligerents prior to our entry in the war. This program was suspended when we entered the war, but was taken up again when peace was declared, and was said to be causing considerable consternation in Great Britain and Japan. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance seemed likely to take on added importance as a result.
These well-known facts are cited merely to make clear the situation as it existed at the time of the Washington conference, so that the purpose underlying the American action in sacrificing the position of leading naval power can be comprehended. How far the aims expressed in the opening address of Secretary Hughes were achieved will appear later.
Writers who have treated the subject of the Washington conference are practically unanimous in asserting that the curtailment of building and the scrapping of millions of dollars worth of construction partially completed, together with valuable ships in service, constituted an epoch in international affairs, eased strained relations rapidly becoming more acute among the leading naval powers, and resulted in immense savings to the national budgets of the nations chiefly concerned. The fact that a doubt had arisen in the writer’s mind regarding the results, particularly financial, of international disarmament conferences, determined him to review the situation and attempt to satisfy himself upon the subject. The conclusions arrived at so far as naval limitation is concerned are presented for what they may be worth.
The “core of the difficulty,” competition in naval programs, has not been abandoned as the result of the Washington conference, nor has competition been remedied by “resolves with respect to the method of its continuance” as adopted by the later London conference.
Let it be granted that some positive action was required from our government to secure the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to allay the apprehension of other nations with regard to our naval building program, were the steps taken the wisest, and those best calculated to achieve the ends in view? This question should be asked, not in a spirit of criticism of the American conferees, who it is believed adopted the plan which seemed to them best fitted at that time to the purpose, but in the light of the happenings of the last ten years which casts an illuminating gleam over the reactions and procedures of the nations involved.
In the first place, it is very much doubted that lasting good can ever result from such violent upheavals and drastic changes in policy as were resorted to when the carefully planned 1916 building program was suddenly abandoned in spite of the fact that vast sums had already been expended in its prosecution. The thing was unreasonable on its face, and reactions were bound to occur. We know now that while our naval authorities, partially stunned by the catastrophe, struggled with the scrapping puzzles and worked out the devious compensation problems involved, other nations were preparing and putting into effect the cruiser building programs which have placed them far ahead of us in comparative naval strength.
Suppose now that a slowing up in our building program had been offered, by adopting an annual expenditure rate such as our own budget could sustain, thus giving England and Japan the opportunity to build up to any extent they thought necessary and which their budgets would permit. Could the other objects of the conference have been attained by a concession of that kind?
It may be thought that questions of this nature are idle at this date, and so they would be, were it not necessary as a guide to our future policy to establish a basis of comparison between what actually happened and what might have happened, in order to determine whether the results attained were superior to those results which might otherwise have been expected. In other words, one cannot say that the results of any given action were advantageous unless they are compared with the results which would have followed had that action not taken place. Specifically, it is believed that had the Washington conference visualized the situation better, we would have retarded our construction program in order to conform to budget requirements, and would have attained the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a consequence. It is proposed then .to compare the probable results of continuing the 1916 program thus slowed down with the results of the program actually followed.
It will be necessary here to review briefly what took place after the Washington conference, even though it is familiar to most readers of this article, in order to establish the points it is desired to press.
We believed that the principle of parity in tonnage between Great Britain and ourselves, and the ratio of 5:3 between ourselves and Japan, had been established not only for capital ships but for auxiliary ships also. The program presented by Secretary Hughes at the opening of the conference included the following:
(4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.
But England and Japan, to say nothing of France and Italy, did not take the view that auxiliary combatant ships had been limited by the conference and at once started on a cruiser building program. Up to 1926 Great Britain had laid down seven 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers; Japan twelve cruisers of varying sizes; France six; and Italy two. Meanwhile the United States laid down none. We woke up to the situation in 1926and started the Pensacola, inaugurating a series of 10,000-ton, 8-inch- gun cruisers, considered to be greatly superior to the old designs. Thus a new field of competition was opening up. The Geneva conference of 1927 failed to find a satisfactory solution of the problem, although it did succeed in bringing into sharp relief the conflicting viewpoints as to necessary auxiliary combatant vessels, particularly as between England and ourselves.
After the abortive Geneva conference the situation remained unimproved, although the subject of constant discussion, until the meeting of the London conference in January, 1930. In the interim one new thought had been evolved, called the yardstick formula, which provided for comparison between two different types. A small number of large cruisers was to be held equivalent to a large number of small cruisers. This seemed to offer an excellent working basis. But, like the weather, while a great deal was said about it, nothing was actually done about it.
The London conference established the cruiser categories under which we are now building. The cruisers thus constructed and in course of construction are affected in their design by the rules laid down in the London conference. Being limited as to tonnage it has naturally been the object to include the maximum offensive and defensive power on the displacement allowed. Further, the battle cruiser type not being allowed us, we have to offset that fact in some degree with the power of our cruisers. If we possessed the capital ships which were scrapped by the Washington conference, it seems evident that our cruiser building program since then would have been much modified. Bearing in mind that the 1916 building program provided for ten Omahas in addition to the capital ships, and that the ten Omahas have been constructed, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that had the balance of that program been carried out we could have got along up to the present without the cruisers authorized since the Washington conference. In any event, if we now possessed the scrapped capital ships with the ten Omahas, our position would be much superior to what it is with the ten Omahas and the cruisers built and building since the Washington conference.
The cruisers built since the Washington conference, and particularly those laid down since the London conference, have, owing to the limitations imposed and service expected of them, mounted in cost to a remarkable degree. And those not yet authorized but forming part of our quota will cost even more. Thus, the Pensacola type cost about $1,400 per ton, while the 10,000-ton, 6-inch-gun cruisers on our program will cost over $1,800 per ton, fully armed and equipped.
If the Washington treaty had not been entered into, and the battleships and battle cruisers in course of construction June 30, 1921, had been completed, the expenditures which would have been involved can be calculated in the following manner:
Battleships under Construction, 1921 | |||
Name | Cost (est.) | Per cent Completed | Cost to Complete |
Washington | $27,000,000 | 76 | $6,480,000 |
South Dakota | 36,000,000 | 39 | 21,960,000 |
Indiana | 36,000,000 | 35 | 23,400,000 |
Montana | 36,000,000 | 28 | 25,920,000 |
North Carolina | 36,000,000 | 37 | 22,680,000 |
Iowa | 36,000,000 | 32 | 24,480,000 |
Massachusetts | 36,000,000 | 11 | 32,040,000 |
Total cost to complete | $156,960,000 |
In the case of battle cruisers, it is thought wise to eliminate one, the Ranger, from the calculation. She was only 3.8 per cent completed, and as she was under construction at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company’s plant where the Constellation was also being built, she could have been discontinued with but little loss except the value of work already accomplished. No “scrapping” charges of an appreciable amount would have been incurred. Five vessels of this type would have permitted employment of the rotating reserve system which was later adopted for the fleet generally. Four vessels would be in actual service with one in turn under repair.
The following table shows the cost of completing the five battle cruisers:
Battle Cruisers under Construction, 1921 | |||
Name | Cost (est.) | Per cent Completed | Cost to Complete |
Lexington | $38,000,000 | 35 | $25,044,000 |
Constellation | 38,000,000 | 23 | 29,360,000 |
Saratoga | 38,000,000 | 36 | 28,220,000 |
Constitution | 38,000,000 | 13 | 33,060,000 |
United States | 38,000,000 | 12 | 33,440,000 |
Total cost to complete | $149,124,000 |
In order to present a comparison between what our fleet might logically have been had the Washington conference not instituted the scrapping program, and what it is today, it will be assumed that our construction since 1921 involved the completion of the building then in progress (with the exception of the battle cruiser Ranger), spread out, however, for the reasons indicated above. In addition, it will be assumed that two aircraft carriers have been authorized and constructed, in lieu of the Lexington and Saratoga. These assumed aircraft carriers, being initially designed for the purpose, would undoubtedly be much more satisfactory than the two ships named and would have cost much less. Assume that the displacement of each would have been not more than 20,000 tons and the cost of each would have been about $25,000,000.
The expenditures which would have been necessary since June 30, 1921, to complete the ships which were scrapped and to build the aircraft carriers are approximately as follows:
Battleships (see preceding) $156,960,000
Battle cruisers (see preceding) 149,124,000
Aircraft carriers (see preceding) 50,000,000
Total $356,084,000
We have now to consider the sums which have actually been spent. Approximately $127,000,000 which had been invested in the battleships and battle cruisers was of course lost when these vessels were scrapped. It is not proposed, however, to include this amount in the following statement, as it had been expended prior to the Washington conference, and it is only the amounts expended since the treaty went in to effect that will be considered. But the cost of scrapping the vessels must be charged up as part of our expenditures since June 30, 1921, as this cost was directly due to the Washington treaty. The amount so expended was $26,894,594.
Cruisers, Category A, Completed | ||
Name | Keel Laid | Cost |
Augusta | July 2, 1928 | $13,460,327 |
Chester | March 6, 1928 | 14,480,145 |
Chicago | September 10, 1928 | 11,764,653 |
Houston | May 1, 1928 | 13,915,892 |
Louisville | July 4, 1928 | 11,415,887 |
Northampton | April 12, 1928 | 14,336,171 |
Pensacola | October 27, 1926 | 15,195,941 |
Salt Lake City | June 9, 1927 | 13,424,945 |
Total Cost |
| $107,993,961 |
Cruisers, Category A, Under Construction June 30, 1931 | ||||
Name | To be completed | Per cent complete | Expended | Cost to complete |
Astoria | 1933 | 11 | $1,650,000 | $13,350,000 |
Indianapolis | 1932 | 65 | 9,750,000 | 5,250,000 |
Minneapolis | 1933 | 10 | 1,500,000 | 13,500,000 |
New Orleans | 1933 | 16 | 2,400,000 | 12,600,000 |
Portland | 1933 | 53 | 7,950,000 | 7,050,000 |
San Francisco | 1934 | 7 | 1,050,000 | 13,950,000 |
Tuscaloosa | 1934 | 2 | 300,000 | 14,700,000 |
Totals |
|
| $24,600,000 | $80,400,000 |
Ten of the battleships have involved the expenditure of heavy sums for modernization purposes. On June 30, 1931, there had been expended for this amount $46,184,980 with the Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico yet to be modernized. About $24,000,000* more will be required for this purpose.
*Editor’s Note:—This has proved to be an underestimate.
It seems highly probable that if the seven battleships and six battle cruisers which were scrapped had been part of our fleet, no money would have been expended for modernization purposes on the ten older battleships. It would not have been economy to do so, since these ships would have become over age in 1932-36 and with the powerful new capital ships on our list it would not have been good policy to spend such large sums on the older ones. Consequently this modernization cost is a charge to our program resulting from the Washington treaty.
The fifteen Augusta class cruisers, built and building, were laid down since the Washington treaty. Their cost is shown as tabulated in the next column.
The final cost of each of the vessels above listed as under construction has been placed at $15,000,000, which is believed to be a conservative estimate. They should cost more than the vessels of the same class already completed, owing to certain improvements incorporated in them.
The question whether or not these fifteen cruisers would have been built if the Washington treaty had not nullified our capital ship program is, of course, an open one. It is believed to be a fair assumption, however, that with the annual expenditures necessary to complete the capital ships, the ten Omahas, the submarine, destroyer, and auxiliary program, and to build the two aircraft carriers which would have been necessary in place of the Saratoga and Lexington completed as battle cruisers, we would not have laid down these fifteen cruisers. Their cost, incurred and obligated, is consequently included in the comparative statement.
The last item to be considered is the cost of converting the partially constructed Saratoga and Lexington into aircraft earners. The final completed cost of these two vessels is approximately $90,000,000. The Saratoga was 33 per cent and the Lexington per cent completed as battle cruisers when the conversion work was started. It ls impossible to estimate what part of the work already done was useful to these vessels as aircraft carriers. However, about $10,000,000 had been charged to them, and allowing $10,000,000 more for armor and armament, auxiliary machinery, etc., not yet charged at time of conversion, we find that about $20,000,000 should be deducted from the final cost of these vessels to ascertain the amount expended since 1921 in finishing them as aircraft carriers. This leaves $70,000,000 to be included in the comparative statement.
As the result of the foregoing calculations we obtain the results tabulated as follows:
Expenditures since June 30, 1921
Due to Washington and London Treaties
Scrapping of naval vessels $26,894,594
Modernization to June 30,1931 46,184,980
Modernization to be completed in 1934 24,000,000
8 Augusta class, completed 107,993,961
7 Augusta class:
Expended to June 30,1931. 24,600,000
To complete in 1934 .......... 80,000,000
Saratoga and Lexington as aircraft carriers 70,000,000
Total.............................. $379,673,535
Compare this total with the $356,084,000 which would in all probability have been sufficient to complete the new capital ships (except the Ranger) scrapped under the Washington treaty and to build two aircraft carriers in addition. All other parts of our building programs, both actual and assumed, would have been the same. The figures to be contrasted are the two totals above.
While the calculations in all the above, made up largely from estimates, may be inexact, it is believed that they are sufficiently accurate to demonstrate that there has been no saving to our government as the result of the Washington treaty. On the contrary, in the spring of 1934 we will, as a direct consequence of the Washington treaty, complete expenditures for work now in course which, together with expenditures already made, constitute a total greater than the possible saving effected by discontinuing the program in effect at the time of the Washington treaty. If it could be said that this greater cost had produced a fleet more powerful and better suited to our needs than the 1916 program would have provided, but little criticism from the naval point of view would arise. But to be required to spend more money and to obtain thereby a less effective fleet is a sad commentary on the application of the limitation theory in practice.
So far nothing has been said in regard to the 10,000-ton, 6-inch-gun cruisers which we are allowed to construct under the terms of the London treaty, nor of the three additional 8-inch-gun cruisers also forming part of our tonnage quota. The former have not yet been authorized by Congress, while the latter, though authorized, are not yet under construction. (Note: Certain of these ships have since been begun.—Editor.) Their cost has not been included in the comparative data given above.
We have in prospect the building of the three 8-inch-gun cruisers and nine 6-inch- gun cruisers. These with several aircraft carriers and a large number of destroyers and submarines are required to bring us up to treaty strength. The cruisers are designed under the restrictions imposed by the London treaty. None must exceed a displacement of 10,000 tons. Three can have 8-inch guns while nine are limited to 6-inch guns. A certain percentage can have “flying decks.” They will cost not less than $200,000,000 when fully equipped.
Suppose that the restrictions of the Washington and London treaties were suddenly removed, and that our Navy Department were authorized to expend $200,000,000 in new construction of any type thought most suited to our needs at the present time. Would these cruisers be the type chosen?
It is possible that these vessels are exactly what our fleet needs, taking into consideration our present available force afloat. But if so, it must be regarded as a fortunate coincidence. The decision to build them in a “free field” would mean that we preferred them to five or six battle cruisers, or to approximately six battleships. It would mean that we considered a 10,000-ton cruiser just the right type to flank our main fleet and also to guard our commerce abroad, and that there would be no economy in greater displacement and perhaps fewer units.
If it did not mean all the above, then it must mean that we are planning to spend $200,000,000 under the limitations of the Washington and London treaties in a manner not the best for our own naval needs. It has been shown above that, following the adoption of the terms of the Washington treaty, we have sacrificed naval preponderance with no financial benefit to the nation. And now our plans call for what may be further uneconomical expenditures merely because there seems to be no other line to take under the terms of the two treaties named.
The hope that other nations will agree to reduce their effective naval forces by one-third or one-quarter and thus spare us the necessity of building “up to strength” can only be classed as illusory. The conditions confronting them are not favorable to such action, especially since the plan offers them no substantial economic relief, as it does to us.
The theory that nations can fairly apportion weapons of war among themselves on a predetermined schedule verges upon the incongruous since the very nations agreeing upon the apportionment are potential enemies, and each has every reason to urge the weapons best suited to itself and least suited to the others. That this has been evident in the various naval conferences can hardly be denied. Such compromises as have been achieved have been based on the hope of economic relief. Our own experience (and doubtless the experience of other nations) shows that no economic relief has been attained. Why, then, should the system be continued?
It is fully appreciated that the views here expressed may be classed as reactionary and pessimistic in the extreme, and that it is necessary to keep in mind the sincere and long continued efforts which have as their objects both the minimizing of the danger of war and the reduction of the financial burden due to armaments. The writer has the fullest sympathy with these aims, and has no wish to decry the earnest efforts which are being made for the improvement of the armament situation. His only argument is that these efforts are being misdirected, and that it is better to recognize that fact and to seek a more suitable channel for international attempts to better conditions rather than to continue along the same old unsatisfactory path.
It is, of course, trite to insist that efforts to avert war should be directed at the causes of war instead of at the means of making war. However, there can be no question that here lies the only final solution of the problem. But it is utopian to expect much progress along that line under the present disturbed condition of international affairs.
Under these circumstances it seems highly desirable to rid ourselves of the hampering conditions imposed upon us by the Washington and London treaties, and to enter into no more pacts of that character. No economic benefits can, in the long run, flow from quantitative limitation of armament agreements. The very fact that nations agree to divest themselves of certain weapons presupposes a latent intention to make use of other weapons not barred by the agreement and improved in quality to the utmost limit possible, in sustaining what each considers its rightful claims in world position. And it invariably happens that the substituted weapons, both those improved and those introduced as the results of inventive genius, cost more to produce and maintain than the discarded ones.
Confining the discussion to naval armament alone—for we have had no actual experience with other limitation so far we find that the five nations principally concerned, England, America, Japan, France, and Italy each has its own peculiar problems as to necessary naval force, and that the requirements of any one are dissimilar to the requirements of all the others but influenced largely by the potential power of the others. Consequently the satisfactory prorating of tonnage in various categories is extremely difficult. And even if accomplished as the result of compromises, the predetermined ratios of strength in each category must soon be upset by variations in the efficiencies of each category, due to the causes described in the foregoing pages. Expenditures which it was thought would be reduced begin to mount, competition is as rife as ever, and practically no useful result is accomplished. It would be much better to go at once to the root of the problem, and seek some means to accomplish directly the ultimate aim in view, limitation on expenditures for armament. World opinion would never be satisfied with a reduction in the amount of armament, as the result of any conference, unless it were definitely established that a corresponding reduction in cost had also been attained. And it is this world opinion which has to be considered, since it forms the basis on which international relations are founded.
The conference at Geneva should modify the text of the opening paragraph of the proposed convention to read as follows:
The high contracting powers agree to limit and, as far as possible, to reduce their respective expenditures for armaments as provided in the present convention.
Speaking now of naval armaments only, the schedules and tables of past expenditures and proposed programs which have been prepared by the various nations for the conference should be utilized in a manner to establish the limits of naval expenditures for each nation in the immediate future. Three years would probably be as far ahead as it would be wise to go, coinciding with the expiration of the Washington and London treaties.
The articles of the convention should be wholly devoted to clarifying and specifying the details of the main agreement. So far as the naval part is concerned, restrictions as to number of effectives should be eliminated entirely. Restrictions as to categories of ships and tonnage of units should likewise be discarded, to permit economic utilization of the funds to be expended.
There would remain the problem of canceling the terms of the Washington and London treaties.
Article XXI of the Washington treaty, in its first paragraph, provides that any contracting power may request a conference with the other contracting powers with a view to reconsideration of the provisions of the treaty when the requirements of national security appear materially affected by any change of circumstances. This would warrant our government in laying before the other signatories a plan for the dissolution of the Washington treaty as being generally unsatisfactory in its operation.
Article XXIII of the London treaty, in its final paragraph, offers a means of escape from that treaty, provided a “more generally known agreement” can be substituted.
A convention drawn on the lines indicated above could contain a clause abrogating the Washington treaty and would constitute the “more generally known agreement” required to cancel the London treaty.
The effect of such a convention on our own naval program could be none other than beneficial as compared to the existing agreements. It would permit us to review our estimate of the situation completely, and to undertake the construction of those vessels which strategic and tactical studies prove most needed at this time. Thus such funds as become available for naval purposes in the immediate future could be applied in the most economical manner, within the limits of the convention totals.
We, of course, operate under congressional budgetary limits, and have done so for some time. A convention drawn under the terms indicated above would simply assure us that other nations were also restricted within known budgetary limits. It is hardly pertinent to object that we could not be certain that other nations were in fact honestly observing their convention set limits, since this same objection applies to all other types of agreements which have been tried or suggested.
In conclusion the writer desires to make it clear that the plan here suggested is offered solely as a means of escape from the conditions of the Washington and London treaties, and not because of any abiding faith in the efficacy of international agreements to limit armaments.
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There is no sound reason for believing that the world has passed into a period of assured peace outside the limits of Europe. Unsettled political conditions, such as exist in Haiti, Central America, and many of the Pacific islands, especially the Hawaiian group, when combined with great military or commercial importance as is the case with most of these positions, involve, now as always, dangerous germs of quarrel, against which it is prudent at least to be prepared. Undoubtedly, the general temper of nations is more averse from war then it was of old. If no less selfish and grasping than our predecessors, we feel more dislike to the discomforts and sufferings attendant upon a breach of peace; but to retain that highly valued repose and the undisturbed enjoyment of the returns of commerce, it is necessary to argue upon somewhat equal terms of strength with an adversary. It is the preparedness of the enemy, and, not acquiescence in the existing state of things, that now holds back the armies of Europe.—Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. August, 1890.