What is it about Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) that furnishes so much fuel for lively conversation?
The infusion of NATOPS into naval aviation has been hailed as a long overdue step by some aviators, accepted with passivity by others, and viewed by still others as a swift kick in the ego—an Orwellian conspiracy. Many of the arguments that have been advanced are of more than isolated interest, since they touch on matters of concern to all naval officers, but the debate can not be appreciated without an understanding of the subject.
NATOPS was conceived by the Naval Aviation Safety Center in 1960 with the objectives of obtaining and publishing optimum methods for operating naval aircraft, disseminating these methods to the pilots and crews, and requiring compliance with them. The program is now in full effect throughout the naval air establishment, and its scope may, in part, be judged by the fact that it encompasses flight procedures, emergency procedures, communications, ground training, briefing and debriefing, personal flying equipment requirements, line operations, and start and taxi procedures.
The NATOPS program is administered by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). Under his cognizance, a standardization advisory board monitors the program and supervises the preparation and publication of NATOPS manuals for each type of U. S. naval aircraft. Standardization co-ordinators are assigned to major command headquarters, and standardization evaluators for each model aircraft are assigned to replacement air groups. The standardization evaluators have the responsibility for conducting annual flight checks on aviators and crews to determine the extent of compliance with the program at the squadron level. To quote from the letter of promulgation for the A-4 (A4D) NATOPS manual:
The Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Program is a positive approach towards improving combat readiness and achieving a substantial reduction in the aircraft accident rate. Standardization, based on professional knowledge and experience, provides the basis for the development of an efficient and sound operational procedure. The standardization program is not planned to stifle individual initiative but rather, it will aid the Commanding Officer in increasing his unit’s combat potential without reducing his command prestige or responsibility.
The NATOPS Manual is published for the purpose of standardizing operational information that does not appear in the flight manual or the Naval Warfare Publication series. Compliance with the stipulated manual is mandatory. To remain effective, however, this manual must be dynamic. It must stimulate rather than halt individual thinking. Since aviation is a continuingly progressing profession, it is both desirable and necessary that new ideas and new techniques be expeditiously formulated and incorporated. The NATOPS Manual is a user’s publication, prepared by and for users, and kept current by users in order to achieve maximum readiness and safety in the most efficient and economical manner.
Standardization is not a new idea in naval aviation; it begins in pre-flight school and accompanies the aviator until his retirement. Furthermore, no one can object to the goals of the NATOPS program: increased safety and combat readiness. What, then, is the reason for the aviator’s instinctive reluctance to accept NATOPS?
To begin with, there is the belief that NATOPS is unnecessarily circumscribing the aviator’s work, and that it will fail to be responsive to his interests. Formerly, the squadron CO formed his own set of rules, establishing within his command the procedures which are now established for him by the NATOPS Manual. Whether his rules were good or bad, they were at least his. He is still, of course, free to write his own doctrine, except that where conflict exists, NATOPS prevails. If he so desires, he can still suggest changes in the manual; this may prove to be small consolation, however, for the loss in command prerogative.
In addition, the program rubs some people the wrong way by seeming to take a pot shot at the lone-eagle, freewheeling-type of rugged individualist. To quote from the pamphlet NATOPS Sense (NAVYVEPS 00-80Q-63), “ . . . all who have blended into this program and have made it what it is today realize sooner or later that Uncle Whiskers never intended to set up a progressive-type academy when he established the Navy. History shows that the SOP system works. It shows that loners end up dead.” Those who object to this line of thought will point out that the history of aviation is a history of the accomplishments of loners—Eugene Ely in his Curtiss pusher, Joe Foss in his Wildcat, Alan Shepard in his Mercury Capsule. They will argue that the very processes by which naval aviators are trained, and the vicissitudes of their profession, provide a severe test of the solitary individual’s ability to stand up against the imperatives of the physical world. They will say that first solo would have been just another hop had someone been riding in the rear cockpit, that the pilot of a single seat attack plane, with its nuclear capability, represents what may be the consummate example of sheer quantity of responsibility vested in a single individual. And they will argue that this pilot must not merely follow a dogmatic set of procedures, but that he must be a resourceful and adaptable loner if he is to accomplish his objective.
Naval aviators come in all sorts of psychological shapes and sizes, yet each possesses a good supply of self-reliance and an independent state of mind. These characteristics are essential in a flight student; they are further developed throughout flight training, and reemphasized through experience in operational aircraft. The naval aviator is likely to be proud of his squadron and generally convinced that it is different from, and better than, other squadrons operating similar aircraft. He wears the distinctive squadron insignia on his flight jacket, and he notes with approval the characteristic markings which identify the aircraft he flies. It requires no stretch of the imagination, therefore, to understand that this aviator will probably be suspicious of a system of enforced standardization that would require him to explicitly follow the procedures followed by all other squadrons operating the same type of aircraft. Although the logic of NATOPS and the need for it might be evident, the fact remains that it seems to represent a subtle but ominous shift in ideology. As NATOPS Sense aptly puts it, the pilot is convinced of, “the superiority of Flying Technique A (mine) over Flying Technique B (yours).” His resistance might be compared to that which currently exists in some areas against all-number telephone dialing. He feels that he is the victim of a scheme to stifle his individuality. He feels that, although the objectives of the NATOPS program are sound, the organization itself will inevitably develop a tendency toward authoritarianism, that directives will flow freely down-hill, but that suggestions will have rough sledding uphill.
A really new idea is an affront to the status quo. The concern which exists, then, also touches on the possible entrenchment of the status quo—the limiting of flexibility and vitality. Attempts to explain the process by which the individual aviator is expected to write the NATOPS Manual himself, by pushing for changes where changes are needed, are interpreted as attempts to justify unreasonable pressures against his independent character. The Lone Eagle feels he is being swallowed by the Social Ethic.
Proponents of NATOPS will emphasize that, first of all, the interchangeability of pilots between squadrons, and of squadrons between ships, could not exist without complete standardization of all phases of operations. The qualification of pilots in type by the Replacement Air Group, which subsequently feeds them into various fleet squadrons, also imposes a standardization requirement.
Proponents will also point out that, despite the independent character of the aviator, he could scarcely be in a profession where he would be more dependent on the work of others—their collective efforts, for example, to maintain his aircraft, to provide navigational aids, facilities and fuel, and to control his flight. The systematic, technical nature of flight and of aircraft forces the individual aviator into a certain amount of orthodoxy; advances in technology seem to go hand in hand with encroachments against individuality. Furthermore, the cost and complexity of modern weaponry have made a system of standardization economically inevitable. When the point has been reached where a single aircraft may cost half as much as the Louisiana Purchase, we have to be certain that each of these aircraft is being operated in exactly the optimum manner and when this optimization has been accomplished, we have arrived at the equivalent of NATOPS. The technological onrush has been more rapid in aviation than in most areas. The naval aviator’s art has become more of a science. As performance of aircraft has increased, margin for error has decreased. As margin for error has decreased, the allowable deviation from optimum procedure has decreased. Thus NATOPS seems to be a logical evolution in the gradual advancement of the state of the profession.
Faced with such an evolution, it is easy to plead for nonconformity as an end in itself; rebellion against NATOPS just for the sake of rebellion, however, is no more praiseworthy than is mute acquiescence to it. Nor would it be proper to ignore the fact that technical and scientific advances have made such an evolution necessary. Nostalgia for the good old days does nothing for combat readiness.
Those who support the NATOPS system emphasize that it does not so much stifle the hard-bitten individualist as it does place additional demands on him. Whereas his departures from conventional methods were once effected at the squadron level only, they must now stand the test of expert evaluation by the NATOPS organization, and, if found to be acceptable, they will be implemented throughout the naval air establishment. The point is also made that prior to the introduction of NATOPS, it was possible to find different and conflicting requirements imposed upon pilots and crews by such publications as flight handbooks and OpNav instructions. NATOPS has served to resolve these areas of dispute.
The NATOPS system is a logical and inevitable evolutionary offspring of technological advancement and the level readiness concept. It provides a fundamental and necessary framework which, if properly understood and used, should result in an increase in combat readiness, and a cutback in aircraft accidents. These essential benefits will be realized only if the individual pilot understands the system, its functionings, and his responsibilities within it.
Although the scope of NATOPS is extensive, the procedures set forth are the best, and should remain so, provided that suggestions from aviators continue to flow in. The manuals should provide a starting point for safe and efficient flight operations.
No amount of standardization, however, can begin to provide for all the contingencies of operational flying. An analogy exists in a story concerning Abraham Lincoln, who, as a young man, was in command of a company of troops during the Black Hawk War. He was marching them across a field and desired to pass through a gateway into an adjoining field. Not knowing any command that would accomplish the passage through the gate he shouted: “This Company is dismissed for two minutes, when it will fall in again on the other side of the gate.” Similarly, with NATOPS, standardization can insure that the day-to- day processes and functions of routine operations are carried out in the best possible manner but beyond that lies the illimitable area of independent action. The requirements for original creative thought and the exercise of command responsibility remain unchanged.