Two men are most directly responsible for the present organization of the Vietnamese Navy, the late Captain Ho Tan Quyen, South Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations, (1960-1963) and his American advisor (1961-1964), Captain Joseph B. Drachnick, U. S. Navy. (Captain Quyen was killed during the 1 November 1963 Vietnamese military coup.)
Together, they dedicated themselves to the task of shaping the government of Vietnam's 5,900-man naval establishment into a truly effective combat force, designed to fight and Will, not the classic naval engagements one reads about in history books, but today's deadly counterinsurgency war against the Communist Viet Cong.
In an environment where the bloodiest battles involving waterborne units are often fought 200 miles inland on uncharted and constantly shifting delta river systems, there is little in the way of existing naval doctrine which is of much use. True, the files of the French admiral in Far Eastern waters shed light on some important lessons learned during the eight long years of the Indochina War. In these files, for example, can be found the Dinassaut concept—naval units designed specifically to provide close support to ground forces by exploiting the mobility afforded them by the many Indochinese rivers in the Mekong and Red River deltas. In an article Published nearly ten years ago, Ambassador Robert McClintock described how the French organized these river task forces, composed of various types of French and locally-modified U. S. landing craft whose heavy armor and large caliber guns made them veritable “water tanks.” (See Robert McClintock, "River War in Indochina," U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, December 1954, p. 1303.) Much later, Bernard Fall, in his book Street Without Joy, was to sing their praise in his vivid description of the Battle of the Hoa-Binh Pocket, concluding that these naval assault divisions “may well have been one of the few worthwhile contributions of the Indochina war to military knowledge.” This then was about all in the way of historical precedent that the Vietnamese CNO had to guide him when he set about the job of reshaping the Vietnamese Navy.
Analyzing the problem, it seemed clear that the Vietnamese Navy could make two very significant contributions to the military campaign against the Viet Cong. The first would be to seal off the more than 900 miles of coastline from the 17th Parallel down to the point where the Ca Mau Peninsula joins the Cambodian border, thereby depriving the Communists of their seaborne infiltration routes into South Vietnam. A most unconventional solution was devised—the Junk Force. The second naval contribution would be to carry the fight to the enemy in the inundated delta region south of Saigon by finding new and better ways of operating within the complex network of rivers and canals which criss-cross the entire area. Here the River Force was organized. While giving priority attention to these two tasks, there was no intention of neglecting the Navy’s continuing and basic missions of patrolling the seas, of maintaining an amphibious assault capability, and of providing combat and administrative surface lift. Nor was the fact overlooked that the Navy could not be effective without a soundly conceived and well-organized structure of schools, supply depots, and shipyards.
These considerations logically enough led to the familiar triangular organization consisting of a naval headquarters, the operating forces, and the shore establishment. Located on the Quai le Myre de Viller (now called Ben Bach Bang) along the right bank of the Saigon River—just next to the modernistic statue to the Trung sisters who, in 39 A.D., led the first Vietnamese uprising against the Chinese—the naval headquarters serves as the hub of all naval communications and as the command and control center for the CNO. The shore establishment consists of the naval school system, the most important elements of which are the Naval Academy at Nha Trang, graduating nearly 100 ensigns every 18 months, and the special petty officer’s course that trains 540 men every 14 months; the Saigon shipyard—one of the largest ship repair installations in Southeast Asia; and the Naval Supply Center in Saigon, the heart of the logistic support for the Vietnamese Navy.
The operating forces include the Sea Force, the River Force, the Marine Corps, and the Junk Force. The Sea Force, which the Vietnamese like to call their “blue water navy,” is made up of a Mine Flotilla of coastal minesweepers (MSC) and minesweepers motor launch (MSML); an Amphibious Flotilla which works with the Marines, of light cargo ships (AKL), landing ships tank (LST), landing ships medium (LSMS), support landing ship large (LSSL), and gasoline barges (YOG) and a Patrol Flotilla of submarine chasers (PC), 180-foot submarine chaser escorts (PCE), and the recently delivered 17-knot motor gunboats (PGM).
The larger ships also provide strategic sea lift for the entire Vietnamese armed forces. Invulnerable to the sabotage and ambush which the Viet Gong so frequently uses against the road and rail communications running north-south along the coast, this force, in addition to its patrol and amphibious combat Missions, carries more than 2,000 troops and 3,000 tons of cargo up and down the peninsula each month.
The River Force includes three essential elements: The River Assault Groups, the River Escort Group, and the Transport Group. This important inland waterway force is especially designed to operate in the Mekong Delta. The striking power of the River Force is concentrated in its River Assault Groups. Patterned after the French Dinassauts, each of these groups is capable of operating separately for extended periods as a mobile task force with as many as 600 troops aboard and supported logistically by an LSIL or an LCU. A typical River Assault Group might include an CLM (command ship), an CLM (Monitor), several armored LCMs and a half dozen or more armored LCVPs. These naval units normally participate in joint operations with the Army and Air Force under the over-all operational command of the local Division Tactical Area Commander of the Province Chief.
The River Assault Groups have been so effective that they have forced the Viet Cong to go to great lengths to prevent them from taking part in these joint operations. The favorite Viet Cong defense is to block the larger canals and rivers with waterway barricades. The construction of these “road blocks” is very expensive in terms of the man-hours of labor involved, but the Communists think nothing of compelling the entire population of a local village to do this work for them.
The next element, the River Escort Group, is a pragmatic organization designed to perform the necessary functional mission of escorting vital convoys of sampans carrying rice, charcoal, and other essential cargoes from the lower Ca Mau peninsula up to the capital city of Saigon. It includes several LCMs (Monitors), more than half a dozen armored LCVPs, and almost 20 heavy patrol boats of old French vintage. Until this Group was organized, the Viet Cong not only collected taxes and tolls from the individual producer as he sought to carry his goods to market, but they also were able, by regulating the flow of these basic commodities to the capital, to manipulate prices to their advantage in Saigon, a city of more than two million people.
The third element, the Transport Group, was established, to provide logistic support for the River Force during its operations in the Mekong Delta. Based in Saigon, this group is composed of a number of LCUs, each capable of transporting 150 tons of cargo or five light tanks at the slow but adequate speed of six knots.
The Marine Corps consists of a Marine Brigade made up of four infantry battalions, each 1,100 men strong, an artillery battalion equipped with 75-mm. and 105-mm. howitzers, and an Amphibious Support Battalion. These troops are earmarked as a key element of the General Reserve of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. This “Reserve” assignment does not in the least inhibit the Marines’ natural longing for a good scrap and, as a result, elements of the Brigade are constantly being deployed from one end of the country to the other for operations against the Viet Cong. For example, on 3 January 1963, President Diem’s sixty-second birthday, the Marines launched the largest amphibious assault ever attempted in South Vietnam. Euphemistically called the “Waves of Love” Operation, it was a two-battalion landing in the lower Ga Mau Peninsula. The commitment of a Marine battalion carries with it far more combat punch than a regular Vietnamese Army battalion, since their 1,100-man strength makes them more than twice the size of an Army Battalion.
In their eagerness to close with the enemy, the Marines have come up with a novel “water cavalry” concept built around a fast, unsinkable craft called the “Dong Nai” or “Shallow Draft” boat. Powered by 40-horsepower outboard motors, these fiberglass boats can attain speeds of between 17 and 20 knots while carrying eight combat-loaded Vietnamese Marines. Capable of operating under power in as little as ten inches of water, they are ideal for swamp, river, or over-the-beach operations. Combat-tested by a team of U. S. Marine Corps and Army officers, these boats have proven their usefulness in scouting and Patrolling, laying ambushes, and in amphibious assaults throughout the southern delta area.
If “water cavalry” and Dinassauts or River Assault Groups are considered unconventional applications of naval power, the fourth Part of the operating forces, the Junk Force, must really raise some eyebrows among the ‘black shoe” professionals. Originally conceived several years ago for close-in coastal surveillance and counter-infiltration patrols, this Force received a general blessing from the U. S. Department of Defense in April 1960. For various reasons, the project developed rather slowly until the present American naval adviser came aboard at MAAG, Vietnam, in December 1961, and threw his personal support behind the Junk Force effort. Then things really began to move. Shipbuilders who were constructing wooden fishing boats one at a time, the way they had been building them for centuries, were promptly initiated into the wonders of modern production-line techniques, of two-shift and three- shift working days, and of standardized ship design. Perhaps even more important, they were inspired for the first time with the idea that, even as shipbuilders, they, too, could make a direct contribution to the defense of their country. To the complete amazement of the fishermen in seacoast towns such as Phan Thiet, Nha Trang, and even sophisticated Saigon, miracles were performed, and the junks began to roll off the production lines.
A Vietnamese junk is a hybrid craft that defies description. One recent survey estimated that some 40,000 of them operate within the 40,000 square miles of South Vietnam’s coastal waters. Captain Quven was reported to have said that “our junks may be defined as any craft large enough to carry a water buffalo standing athwartships.” Insofar as the current program is concerned, however, the junks of the Junk Force were designed by a U. S.-Vietnamese team of naval officers and are of four basic types: the command junk, equipped with both sails and an auxiliary motor; a smaller version also carrying both motor and sail; a still smaller junk, powered only by motor; and a more or less standard fishing craft operated entirely by sail. These ships are being organized into Junk Divisions, each composed of approximately 20 junks.
Nearly 460 personnel from the Vietnamese Navy, supported by over 3,700 volunteers recruited from the many fishing villages that dot the long coastline, are required to man this fleet. These irregulars have extremely high morale and even carry their enthusiasm for their work to the point of having tattooed on their left breast their motto, “Sat Cong,” which means, “Kill Communists.” When this fad began, many of the volunteers developed bad skin infections as a result of unsanitary tattoo needles. When the U. S. naval adviser heard of this, he stepped in promptly and requisitioned sterile tattoo machines from the States. These eliminated any further cases of infection. One day, however, an indignant message came in from the U. S. CNO to the effect that the Congressional committee investigating the foreign aid program wanted to know why the devil the Navy Section of MAAG, Vietnam, needed two tatoo machines, even though they were listed in the M.A.P. catalogue.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this whole new Junk Fleet concept is that it has produced a “bargain basement” coastal patrol force. The cost of the sailing junk is only $850, while the more expensive motor version costs $2,040. At the same time, the whole fleet has a long-term, practical, peacetime utility in Vietnam’s rapidly growing fishing industry, once the Viet Cong are defeated. Thus, it has a built-in means of amortizing the original outlay from the defense budget.
This versatile Junk Fleet is the backbone of the coastal surveillance plan. Each Junk Division, with two-thirds of its ships on station at all times, is assigned a patrol area of from 20 to 30 miles. Operating in sections of three junks each, the junks maintain contact with higher authorities using U. S. Army portable radios. Hugging the coast—they seldom operate more than three miles from shore—the junk fleet checks on the activities of civilian fishermen and inspects the innumerable small beaches, so characteristic of South Vietnam, to insure that they are not being used by the Communists as bases either for the transit of trained cadre, arms, and equipment from north of the 17th Parallel or for local resupply between mutually supporting Viet Cong units in South Vietnam itself. If enemy activity is detected, it is immediately reported to the nearest Coastal Surveillance District Headquarters. These District Headquarters—there are four, spaced at approximately 200- mile intervals along the coast at Danang, Cam Ranh, Vung Tau, and the southern island town of Phu Quoc—maintain a surveillance plot, analyzing the incoming intelligence from the various junk sections in their area and forward this to the central Coastal Surveillance Information Center at the Naval Headquarters in Saigon. Should the junk patrols run into any sizeable enemy force, the District Headquarters, which is directly tied in with the parallel level Vietnamese Army and Air Force headquarters, can immediately dispatch one or more of the fast PGMs to the scene, while at the same time arranging for a mobile, joint task force including ground and air units of appropriate size to move in and destroy the Communist units.
There was a time in the very early planning for the Junk Force when it was thought that it might best accomplish its mission if it operated in a semi-clandestine manner. The idea then was that the junks would be built so as to be indistinguishable from the familiar fishing junk that provides both the home and the means of livelihood for so many Vietnamese families. As such the Junk Force would have been able to mingle with the local fishing fleets and thus become an important source of intelligence on Communist coastal infiltration activities. Attractive as this proposal first seemed, it soon became obvious that it would be impossible to implement the force in that form. For one thing, however cleverly disguised the junk itself might be, any newcomer would stand out like the proverbial "sore thumb" in the closely knit society of a fishing village, and the presence of a strange crew would be common knowledge in no time at all. Furthermore, once the government started placing orders for large numbers of fishing Junks, the whole project would be given away anyhow. Therefore, it was decided that the Junk Force should operate quite openly, and there was no need to try to conceal the presence of these junks. On the contrary, there were certain definite psychological advantages to be gained by giving them a "distinctive uniform"—that is to say, a coat of paint and a sturdy sail. Thus, like the policeman on his beat, they become symbols of law and order and soon win the respect and co-operation of all honest citizens. In a similar manner the Junk Force is taking on the characteristics of a regular Coast Guard, performing the role of a “water constabulary,” comparable in many respects to the U. S. Army Constabulary which patrols the long border in the American zone between East and West Germany.
This brief description of the organization and functions of the various elements of the South Vietnamese Navy emphasizes certain conclusions which are generally held by the American authorities in Saigon. To begin with, while it is a very young Navy, it has been well designed to meet the military requirements imposed by the protracted counterinsurgency campaign. Secondly, the South Vietnamese CNO showed both imagination and common sense in making optimum use of his small force in support of his country’s overall national campaign to defeat the Viet Cong and bring peace and prosperity to every village and hamlet in the land. Finally, the Vietnamese Navy is developing new tactics and techniques through practical experience, for naval operations in what the Communist themselves call a “people’s war.”
Graduated from Stanford University in 1959, Lieutenant Murphy was assigned to the USS Surfbird (ADG-383) operating out of Sasebo, Japan, from 1960-1961, and to the USS Westchester County (LST-1156) operating out of Yokosuka, Japan, from 1961-1962. From 1962-1963, he served with the Military Advisory and Assistance Group in Vietnam as an advisor to the captains of five Vietnamese LSILs, which patrolled the coasts and rivers of South Vietnam. He held the rank of lieutenant during his service in Vietnam, but upon his separation from active duty in August 1963, he reverted to his present rank of lieutenant, junior grade.
Colonel Black was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy with the Class of 1940 and served in the OSS in the European Theater during World War II. He received his M.A. degree in International Relations from George Washington University. During his career, he has commanded the 2nd Battle Group, 19th Infantry, served as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and has been both student and temporary instructor at the National War College. He is currently serving in the J-5 Division, CinCPac, having just completed a tour of duty with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.