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The first of the two official inquiries in*0 the Titanic disaster was a U. S. Congressional investigation conducted under the chairmanship of Senator William A. Smith of Michigan commencing on 19 April 1912. The second) was the Official British Court of Inquiry conducted under the jurisdiction of Lord Merseyi in London, England. The Congressional i°' vestigation began just four days after the disaster; the British inquiry started on 3 MaI' 1912.
The findings of both these investigation can fairly be summarized by quoting from the British Court of Inquiry.
There are contradictions and inconsistencies in the story as told by the different witnesses- But the truth of the matter is plain. The Titanic collided with the berg at 11:40. The vessel seen by the Californian stopped at this time. The rockets sent up from the Titanic were distress signals. The Californian saw distress signals. The number sent up by the Titanic was about eight. The Californian sa"' eight. The time over which the rockets fro111 the Titanic were sent up was from about 12:45 to 1:45 o’clock. It was about this time that the Californian saw the rockets. At 2 m the second officer called to the Master that the ship from which he had seen the rockets ha
disappeared. At 2:20 a.m. the Titanic
had
foundered. It was suggested that the rockets seen by the Californian were from some other ship not the Titanic. But no other ship to this theory has ever been heard of.
These circumstances convince me b
President of the Court] that the ship seen
by
the Californian was the Titanic and if s0> aC cording to Captain Lord, the two vessels wc'c about five miles apart at the time of t disaster. The evidence from the Titanic c°r roborates this estimate, but I am advised t the distance was probably greater, though n more than eight to ten miles. The ice by vvfl!(.e the Californian was surrounded was loose extending for a distance of not more than or three miles in the direction of the Tito ^ The night was clear and the sea was smoo
The April 1962 issue of the Proceedings marked the 50th anniversary of the sinking of the SS Titanic with the publication of an article titled “The Titanic Disaster,” by Mr. Carrotliers. Now, more than five years later, the author is convinced that he has done a grave injustice to Captain Stanley Lord, one of the leading participants in the tragedy.
When she first saw the rockets the Californian could have pushed through the ice to the open Water without any serious risk and so have come to the assistance of the Titanic. Had she done so, she might have saved many if not all °f the lives that were lost.
The foregoing statements had long been accepted by me as being a valid judgment of '''hat happened at the time of the Titanic faster.
Among the many letters received at the ‘'aval Institute commenting on my previous article was one from Mr. Leslie Harrison, general Secretary of the Mercantile Marine ^ervice Association, in Liverpool, England.
‘ rr. Harrison was extremely critical and he stated emphatically that from the evidence Presented at both investigations, the light 0r lights) seen from the Titanic during the puking could not possibly have been those of ae Californian. Furthermore, Mr. Harrison
c°ntinued,
Captain Lord, of the Californian, was condemned by a Court of Inquiry at which he aPpeared only relatively briefly as a witness; l)'38 never formally charged with the oflense, l°f] which he was later found guilty; was not effectively represented, and subsequendy was refused any right of appeal. The circumstances are such that the Council of the Mercantile "farine Service Association (all of whom are serving or retired British shipmasters) and neir advisors are convinced that the findings °f the British Court of Inquiry insofar as they relate to Captain Lord and the Californian eannot be sustained, and constitute the grossest miscarriage of justice in the history of dtish Inquiries.
T .
^ 0 say the least, Mr. Harrison’s letter came
a complete surprise, especially 50 years
r the disaster. In my reply, I reiterated
am facts ancj circumstances which still
j^vinced me beyond doubt that Lord
eersey’s and Senator Smith’s conclusions and
nations of the evidence relative to Captain
Lord were correct; that every statement of fact quoted in the extract from the findings of the British Court of Inquiry I had read myself in the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies.
In recent years, there has been a growing agitation for a complete review of the part played by Captain Stanley Lord and the Californian in the Titanic disaster. On 5 February 1965, the Mercantile Marine Service Association presented a strong petition, on behalf of the late Captain Lord, addressed to the President of the British Board of Trade. The petition’s introductory paragraph read,
The Council of the Mercantile Marine Service Association present this their petition to the President of the Board of Trade and ask him to exercise his powers under Section 475 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 and order the rehearing of that part of the 1912 inquiry into the loss of the White Star liner Titanic which found that the British ship Californian, of the Leyland Line, could have come to the liner’s assistance and save many, if not all, of the 1,500 lives which were lost.
The petition then went on to present, in Captain Lord’s defense, a powerful case which would be difficult, if not impossible, to deny. Nevertheless, in September 1965, the Board of Trade rejected this petition. The Board informed the Merchantile Marine Service Association that,
Your petition does not suggest that there is any new and important evidence which could . not have been produced at the formal investigation into the loss of the Titanic; and the president has asked me to tell you that, having carefully considered your Petition, he is satisfied that there is no reason to believe that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
The Board of Trade’s letter concluded with, “ . . . the President does not consider that the Board should exercise their discretionary power to order a rehearing.”
gain atti Proache Port ant the nak closed c stern lig appeare The S 3 5-year- hound t knots sh evening became
to stop At ab out to ( tyhat af hderabl hoard q ever, th hght mi 2°n. Th aboc to Capt ship ani f°rnian.
Concurrent with the presentation of this Petition to the British Board of Trade, a book entitled, The Titanic and the Californian was published. The book, written by Peter Pad- field, contains a complete and unbiased analysis of the sworn testimony given by the various witnesses from the Titanic and Californian at the U. S. and British inquiries. The book, written, “ ... in the cold light of 50 years afterwards,” is a revelation and should leave no doubt in any reader’s mind that Captain Lord has been unjustly charged with being responsible for the loss of more than 1,500 persons in the sinking of the Titanic.
This article deals with only a few of the most relevant points brought out in Mr. Pad- field’s book. These substantiate the contention that the Californian was never in a position to render assistance to the Titanic's passengers before the ship sank.
Every statement quoted herein is taken from the extracts of the findings of the official British Inquiry and can be found in the testimony of the witnesses. After a careful study of the full testimony, however, it appears obvious that Lord Mersey lifted these statements out
of context. Consequently, he presented an er roneous version of the facts. In context, theS® extract statements present a picture which ^ foreign to the one shown by Lord Mersey- should be noted also that this testimony given before there was any inkling of 'v l charges, if any, might arise at a later da against any of the witnesses.
has
As far as the Titanic was concerned, h been established that on Sunday n’& ’ 14 April 1912, the ship was traveling vve* bound at about 23 knots. At 11:40 p-nl- 1 j ship collided with an iceberg. Two hours 40 minutes later the ship sank and with about 1,500 persons went to their deaths- 712 survivors were picked up by the Carpa which arrived at the scene a couple of n° after the Titanic had sunk. About an ^ after the collision the lights of a ship aPPeatj:e from over the horizon. It was then that Titanic started sending up distress roChf ^ >s, an effort to gain the ship’s, or any s *^uj attention. In addition, the Titanic's powc ^ blinker light (known in those days as a M ^ Lamp) was put into action. Every en°
Officer %ht. T ^he str; these re ^aptair Where 1 lhey si: that, h **°Pped 'kfter i calling
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Shortly
J atnes i
z°n. The Captain then left the upper bridge, ^t about 11:30 p.m., the 3rd Officer reported to Captain Lord that the light was actually a ship and that she was approaching the Cali- hrnian. Captain Lord instructed the 3rd ^fficer to call by Morse code with the blinker yght. This Mr. Groves did for several minutes. 1 he strange ship, however, did not respond to h^se repeated calls. Shortly after 11:40 p.m., ^'aptain Lord returned to the upper bridge ''’here he rejoined his 3rd Officer. Together hey sized up the situation and concluded
that.
like St°Pped 'kfter
gain attention failed. The ship eventually approached close enough to the Titanic for her Port and starboard sidelights to be seen with the naked eye. The stranger then gradually closed out her sidelights, showing only her stern lights as she slowly sailed away and disappeared into the night.
The SS Californian, under the command of ^-year-old Captain Lord, was also west- hound on that April night. Cruising at 11.6 knots she began to encounter ice late in the evening. At 10:21 p.m., the ice conditions became so severe that Captain Lord decided to stop and heave to for the night.
At about 11:00 p.m., Captain Lord pointed °nt to Charles V. Groves, his 3rd Officer, 'yhat appeared to be a ship’s light at a conquerable distance on the Californian's star- hoard quarter. The night was so clear, howler, that they both agreed that perhaps the hght might be just a star very low on the hori-
up
themselves, the ship had now on account of the ice conditions, instructing Mr. Groves to continue filing the other ship with the blinker light, aptain Lord returned to the chartrooin one eck below the upper bridge. Here he fetched out, fully dressed, on the settee. q ^hortly after midnight, Herbert Stone, the ^ifornian's 2nd Officer, started for the bridge relieve the watch. On his way he en- t^Uljlered Captain Lord who advised him of tee conditions and of the other ship. Mr. °ne then continued on to the upper bridge th ^ rc‘heved the watch after discussing j e Conditions with Mr. Groves. Mr. Stone Immediately began calling the other ship by er light. But like Mr. Groves, he reno acknowledgement of his signals. Ja°rtly thereafter the Apprentice Officer, rtles Gibson, appeared on the bridge with
coffee for Mr. Stone. Mr. Stone discussed the other ship with the Apprentice, who then tried his hand at calling the ship by blinker light but without success.1
At about 12:45 a.m., Mr. Stone observed a flash in the sky in the direction of the other ship. Shortly thereafter he observed another flash which he made out to be a rocket. Between then and about 1:15 a.m., three more rockets were observed in the same general direction. Neither Mr. Stone nor the Apprentice noticed any flash from the other ship’s decks nor did they hear any sound of detonators which usually accompany distress rockets. The rockets, they said, did not appear to rise above the horizon any higher than the other ship’s masts. This caused the men on the Californian's bridge to believe that the rockets were rising from some point well beyond the other ship.
At this point, Mr. Stone called Captain Lord by voice tube and informed him of what he had seen. In reply to a question by Captain Lord, Mr. Stone said the rockets had all been white in color. The Captain then instructed the 2nd Officer to continue calling the other ship by blinker light and to let him know when he received an answer. The other ship never did reply. During this interval three more rockets were observed. Also, the other ship was now slowly closing out her red sidelight, and showing only her stern light, as she slowly got under way in the opposite direction. By 2:00 a.m., Mr. Stone noted that the ship was now steaming away fast in a southwesterly direction. This was the same direction from which the ship had initially appeared. At the British inquiry, Mr. Stone commented that he was somewhat puzzled by the fact that the rockets appeared to change their bearings as the other ship moved away.
At 2:05 a.m., Mr. Stone sent the Apprentice to call the Captain and inform him of the additional rockets and the actions of the other ship. In reply to a question concerning any color in the rockets, Gibson replied that they all had been white. Captain Lord then asked for the time, to which Gibson replied, “2:05.”
1 Many of the smaller ships were not equipped with electricity and still used oil lamps. Without electrical power a ship would not have the means to communicate with a blinker light. Also very few ships had wireless sets as means of communication.
With no further word from the Captain, Gibson returned to the bridge.[1]
At 2:45 a.m., the 2nd Officer again contacted Captain Lord by voice tube. He informed the Captain that there had been no more rockets and that the other ship had now completely disappeared in a southwesterly direction.
At the inquiries, Captain Lord disclaimed any knowledge of conversation with anyone between 1:15 a.m., when Mr. Stone spoke to him through the voice tube, and some time after 4:00 a.m., when the Chief Officer, George F. Stewart, awakened him. He said, however, that he did have some recollection of someone being in the chart room with him during this period. Evidently, Captain Lord was in deep slumber and had not been sufficiently aroused to understand clearly what was being said. Vital as Captain Lord’s actions may appear at this juncture, they have no bearing upon what is being proved in this article. The point is that the Californian could not possibly have reached the Titanic's side to offer assistance before the ship sank.
Returning to the light that Captain Lord pointed out to Mr. Groves at 11:00 p.m., five men on the Californian testified that they saw this ship’s lights. They all agreed that the Californian had been stopped for a considerable length of time when they had first observed the ship. There is, however, a vast discrepancy in their opinions as to what they actually saw. Three men, Captain Lord, 2nd Officer Stone, and Apprentice Gibson, said that the ship was moderate in size or comparable to the Californian and that she was showing about half a dozen lights from her masts and decks. At the same time, Mr. Groves and Ernest Gill, the Californian's Donkeyman, claimed that the ship was a large passenger liner illuminated with many lights about her decks.[2]
Let us now consider the testimony of Mr. Groves, the Californian's 3rd Officer, and Donkeyman Gill. These are the men who
claimed that the ship seen by them was the
Titanic.
It will be recalled that at 11:30 p.m-i Mr. Groves reported to Captain Lord that a ship was coming up on the Californian's starboard quarter. Following is Mr. Groves’ testimony concerning this ship and her lights as given at the official British Inquiry.
Mr. Groves said, concerning his conversation with Captain Lord by voice tube, that, “Captain Lord said to me, ‘Can you make anything out of her lights?’ I said, ‘Yes, she is evidently a passenger steamer coming UP on us’.”
Mr. Groves continued that Captain Lord instructed him to call the ship by blinker ligM' This he did but received no answer to his repeated calls. At 11:40 p.m., Mr. Groves noted that the ship had stopped and, at the saifle time, Captain Lord joined him on the uppe^ i bridge. Again I quote from Mr. Groves I testimony.
Mr. Groves said, “When he came on the | bridge he said to me, ‘That does not look like a passenger steamer.’ I said, ‘It is, sir. Whe|j she stopped her lights seemed to go out, a'1 I suppose they have put them out for *he night.’ ”[3]
Mr. Groves resumed his testimony by sN ing that, in his opinion, the other ship’s lightS would appear to go out if she altered h* course and presented more or less of a hea° on exposure to the Californian.
Mr. Groves concluded his testimony saying that he remained on the upper bridfl for another half-hour, when he was relief of the watch by Mr. Stone shortly after m1 night. During this period, he said, the otn ship continued to remain in her darkened c0,1j dition with only a few lights showing her open decks. Thus we have the picture the situation as given by Mr. Groves himsej 1
Yet, in the face of his own testimony 3,1
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4 At this juncture, Lord Mersey exposed a ®a ignorance in naval and maritime operations- ^ argued at considerable length with various coo . that the lights, except for emergency lighting, ®° out when a ship’s main engines are stopped. Th cussion became quite heated even between j Mersey and his nautical advisors sitting at his ^ He was adamant and said, “At some time the pi which was produced by the main engines did g° ° . There the matter apparently stood and the que ing of the witness continued.
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e known facts of the case, Mr. Groves lowered a question put to him by Lord ersey as follows: “Speaking as an experi- ^nced seaman and knowing what you do now, t> you think that steamer that you know was towing up rockets, and you say was a ^sscnger steamer, was the Titanic?'" k ^r- Groves replied: “Most decidedly I do, UtI do not put myself as being an expended man.”
P
or several reasons it is difficult, if not im- sstble, to go along with Mr. Groves’ testify and contentions. In the first place, the ^ ltan*c was ablaze with hundreds upon ■j, Odreds of lights both inside and outside. 1} .ese lights did not fail until a few minutes ^eore the ship sank, which was after 2:00 q.1*1-’ and more than two hours after Mr. tj^°Ves had left the Californian’s bridge to re- 0tie ‘0r the night. And, even if viewed head s’*ese lights would have cast off a glare of sjj. Clent magnitude, from both sides of the PaT' t0 malce lier identity as a tremendous t0 ®n8er liner unmistakable. Yet, according Ojjj r- Groves, this ship which he identified ,as a “passenger steamer” remained in arkened condition after 11:40 p.m. He
On the voyage immediately preceding that in which his ship was involved with the Titanic, a relaxed Captain Lord and his Chief Officer, Mr. Stewart, posed with two young passengers while, behind them, stood Second Officer Stone, left, and Third Officer Groves.
Captain Lord’s Private Collection said he was able to pinpoint the time at 11:40 p.m. when the ship stopped and put the majority of her lights out, because this happened just as the quartermaster struck one bell for the lookout to rouse out the men to relieve the watch at midnight. Mr. Stone, the 2nd Officer, and Gibson, the Apprentice, testified that the ship remained in this darkened condition and close enough for her sidelight to be seen with the naked eye until she finally sailed away sometime after 2:00 a.m. which was more than two hours after Mr. Groves had left the bridge. Under these circumstances how can anyone accept Mr. Groves’ contention that this ship was the Titanic?
The following narrative has been produced from the pertinent facts in the sworn affidavit of Donkeyman Gill, of the Californian. The affidavit was read to him at the U. S. Congressional Investigation, and Gill agreed that this was his statement.
Gill stated that he was working on a piece of machinery in the engine room when he checked the clock and noted that the time was 11:56 p.m. He immediately left the engine room to rouse out the man who was to relieve him at midnight. The Californian, he said, had
then been stopped for about an hour and a half. During the moment that he was on the open deck en route to the quarters, he looked over the Californian’s starboard rail and saw the lights of a very large steamer at a distance of about ten miles.
At the British Inquiry, Gill elaborated on this remark by saying, “I could see two rows of lights and several groups of lights which I took to be saloon or deck lights.”
Continuing with Gill’s affidavit, the steamer, he said, was traveling at full speed. After waking his relief, Gill went to bed but could not sleep. At about 12:30 a.m., he decided to smoke a cigarette. Because of the ship’s cargo, he continued, the crew was not permitted to smoke below deck. Therefore, he went out on the open deck to smoke. When he had been on deck for about ten minutes, he claimed he saw a white rocket at a considerable distance away on the starboard side. Although the very large steamer was no longer in sight, the rocket did come from the same general direction relative to the Californian’s heading, in which he had seen the ship some 40 minutes earlier. Seven or eight minutes later, he said that he distinctly saw a second rocket in the same area. He then disposed of his cigarette and went back to bed.
In his affidavit, Gill was extremely critical of Captain Lord before he concluded his statement concerning the night’s events with, “I am quite sure that the Californian was less than 20 miles from the Titanic, which the officers report to have been our position. 1 could not have seen her if she had been more than 10 miles distant, and I saw her very plainly.”
All one has to do is to compare Gill’s story with the irrefutable facts of the case to realize that his story will not stand up under examination.
It has been established that, at the time o the collision, the Titanic's clocks were operating 12 minutes ahead of the Californias clocks. Therefore, when Gill said he sa"'
" • . . a very large steamer going at full speed after 11:56 p.m.,” it was actually 12:08 a.m. °n the Titanic. The Titanic had collided with the iceberg at 11:40 p.m. and did not move again.
Another weak point in Gill’s story is that nobody could have determined with a glance Over the rail, whether or not a ship about 10 miles away was actually stopped or moving— *et alone running at full speed. And, even at less than half the distance he claimed the ship "'as away from him, the hundreds of lights glaring from the Titanic's, decks and portholes "'Quid have fused into one tremendous glow and he would never have been able to dis- boguish, “ . . . two rows of lights and several groups of lights which I took to be saloon and beck lights.”
Does it not seem strange that Mr. Groves, jl*c Californian's 3rd Officer in charge of her bridge, never saw this “very large steamer” 11 up with two rows of porthole lights and going at full speed? Remember, Mr. Groves bad firmly established that his “passenger ^earner” had stopped and put out all but a ey of her lights at 11:40 p.m. which was 16 minutes before 11:56 p.m. the time which Gill as firmly established as the time that he left be engine room.
There are those who believe that Gill had an ulterior motive in giving these statements. 1 'vas brought out at the Congressional instigation that Gill had given his story to a °ston newspaper and had told Cyril F. bvans, the Californian’s wireless operator, that, \ think I will make about 500 dollars on mis.” in those days 500 dollars would repre- .er*t about a year’s wages for a person serving ln Gill’s capacity as a donkeyman.
before entering into the navigational asPects of this disaster, there are a couple of Points, relative to the physical actions of the rngedy, which simply cannot be reconciled. Gne point is, how could two ships, stopped °se enough to each other so as to be able to entify each other’s sidelights and with ex- fenced officers on their bridges, flash their °'verful blinker lights, which could be read j a distance of ten miles, with the Titanic us. „ 8 her light for the better part of an hour and [ Californian using hers for even a longer t s- r‘°d of time, without these blinker light S^als, being seen from or by either ship?
Another point, which I believe cannot be reconciled is that at 11:40 p.m., when the Titanic collided with the iceberg, there was no other ship in sight. About an hour after the collision, the masthead light of a ship was sighted from the Titanic’s bridge. The ship approached close enough to the Titanic for her sidelight to be seen with the naked eye. The ship then gradually reversed her course and sailed away in the opposite direction. The following testimony given by Frederick Fleet, one of the Titanic’s lookouts stationed in the crow’s nest, serves to substantiate this contention.
Court: Before you left the Titanic, did you observe the lights of any ship in your neighbourhood?
Fleet: Well, there was a light on the port
bow.
Court: Did you see this light on the port bow before you left the crow’s nest?
Fleet: No, it must have been about one
o’clock.
Fleet was on lookout duty in the crow’s nest with another lookout named Lee. It was Fleet who first sighted and passed the word of the iceberg ahead at 11:40 p.m. He remained in the crow’s nest until he was relieved by another lookout at midnight. He finally left the Titanic at about one o’clock in a lifeboat.
How can these facts be reconciled to the fact that the Californian had stopped in the ice field at least an hour before the Titanic collided with the iceberg and, she did not move again until a considerable length of time after the Titanic had sunk? The Californian’s actions in this respect have been corroborated by every witness appearing from this ship at the inquiries and by the ship’s bridge and engine room log books.
One final point: If the lights seen by the Titanic had been the Californian’s, then these lights simply had to be in view of the Titanic at the time of the collision. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is more than reasonable to believe that Captain Edward J. Smith of the Titanic would have moved his ship over close to the Californian when he found that his ship was doomed and while he still had ample power remaining in his engines to make the move. As it was, when the first lifeboats were launched more than an hour after the collision, they were instructed to row over to the
Carpathia about five miles away; deliver the passengers and return to the Titanic for more survivors.
In considering Captain Lord’s contention, that his ship was never close enough to the Titanic to render assistance to her passengers before the ship sank, we must also consider the navigational phases of the tragedy. These are set forth on the plot depicting the area in which the Titanic was lost.
Point “B” is the position at which the Californian had stopped for the night at 10:21 p.m. because of the ice conditions. This position was fixed by Captain Lord and his navigators as being 42 degrees, 05 minutes north latitude and 50 degrees, 07 minutes west longitude. This was done by projection from the ship’s noon position fix at her normal rate of speed calculated from the patent log and engine revolutions. The ship’s track of 270 degrees true was verified at 7:30 p.m. by a Pole Star sight worked out under ideal conditions. This 7:30 star sight proved that the ship was still making due west in a latitude of 42 degrees, 05 minutes north, which was the same latitude as in the ship’s noon position fix. The Californian’s latitude was further established by the fact that earlier in the evening Captain Lord had sent a general message to all ships warning them of three ' large icebergs as illustrated at point “A” on the plot. It is ironical that the Titanic was one of several ships that picked up this warning message. It is highly significant that the SS Parisian had broadcast an earlier warning message about these same icebergs- And the positions given by the Californian and Parisian were within a few miles of each other, with both ships being north of the icebergs.
The Titanic's second, or corrected, distress position was 41 degrees, 46 minutes north latitude and 50 degrees 14 minutes west longitude. This position is shown at point “C” on the plot. The straightline distance between points “C” and “B” is 19.75 miles.
Point “D” is the position that the Califor' man would have been in according to Lord Mersey’s contention that the ship was n° more than eight to ten miles away from the Titanic while she was sinking.
The following narrative has been produced from Captain Lord’s testimony.
At about 5:20 a.m., the Californian heard from the SS Mount Temple that the Titanic had sunk. The Mount Temple also gave the Cd1' forman the Titanic's distress position. It vv'aS
42 N
Californian's Route to Lifeboats 0410-0640 1 5 April
P-
• B
Pole Star Sight, 1740
Californian's Track 14 April (270 , 11.6 Knots)
D.R
□
Miles
50 W
£ Califor"iaP [ Report
50'
\
ICE
BELT
Titanic?
'*"(266C2~'-5 K'»>
I
! E
i—
A Parisian's Report
CHART OF THE AREA IN WHICH THE ‘TITANIC’ WAS LOST
A The group of three icebergs reported by the Californian and the Parisian
B The Californian's dead reckoning position at 2021 New York Time
C The officially accepted position in which the Titanic struck the iceberg at 2140
D The position in which the Californian would have been if 10 miles northwest of Position C
E The actual position in which the Titanic's wreckage and lifeboats were found
b,
Af.
u.°Unt Temple, Almerian, Birma, and Frankfurt. Pen these ships arrived at the distress posi- n, they found nothing of the Titanic nor any feckage. Shortly thereafter, the Carpathia as observed on the eastern side of the ice- u. The ships worked their way through th around the icefield to the Carpathia where cy found the rescue operations had been ^Pleted.
‘hia
said that he felt that the Titanic's distress
now daylight and Captain Lord pushed the Californian, in a southerly direction, through the icefield. At about 6:30 a.m. the Californian was through the icefield and in clear water. Captain Lord then set his course and ran the Californian at top speed to the distress Position that had been given to him. When he arrived at this position, he found only the Mount Temple, which was stopped. By now, Captain Lord had heard that the Carpathia "'as at the scene of the disaster and was taking the survivors on board. Continuing at full speed in a southerly direction, Captain Lord finally found the Carpathia on the other, or eastern, side of the icefield. Eventually he found an opening in the icefield when he "'as just about abeam of the Carpathia. Remossing the icefield to the Carpathia's side, he °und that all of the survivors were now safdy on board the Carpathia. The Carpathia hen set her course toward New York with the Panic's survivors. The Californian remained ltl the area for several hours searching for any additional survivors.
There is substantial evidence to indicate at the Titanic's distress position was not en- !rely accurate. It will be noted, on the plot, at the Titanic's distress position placed her l11 the western side of the icefield. This fact has confirmed by five ships, the Californian,
P •
aptain Arthur H. Rostron, of the Carpa-
°sUion was correct. The only reason to ques- is n, ^aPtain Rostron’s opinion in this respect .Pat for the last hour or so he had been fr to the scene by the flares being shown Vv°'P the Titanic's lifeboats. Consequently, he CUrl d have had no reason to check the actio ^lc Thame’s broadcast distress posi- P during the final hour. teaPtain Rostron also gave the following jiin'"n°ny at l^e Bribd1 Inquiry: “He [a be-101, °hicer] counted 25 large ones, [ice- Ssl 150 to 200 feet high, and stopped counting the smaller ones; there were dozens and dozens all over the place; and about two or three miles from the position of the Titanic's wreckage we saw a huge icefield extending as far as we could see, northwest to southeast.”
The Carpathia, which approached the distress area from the southeast, would have been required to pass straight through this icefield that Captain Rostron has described so graphically in order to reach the Titanic's given distress position.
The westbound Titanic would also have been required to negotiate this same icefield before the collision in order to reach her given distress position. This is highly improbable. Because, from the testimony of the lookouts in the Titanic's crow’s nest, nothing had been seen until they actually sighted the iceberg with which the Titanic collided.
It will be remembered that the westbound Californian stopped for the night on the eastern side of the icefield. After she received the Titanic's distress position, she crossed to the western side of the field to approach the position; she found nothing and was then required to recross the icefield, from west to east, in order to reach the Carpathia then in the process of picking up survivors. This west-to-east crossing of the icefield by the Californian was verified by Captain Rostron of the Carpathia.
The Californian continued searching the area until about 11:20 a.m. when she resumed her voyage toward Boston. In order to lay out the ship’s new course, it was necessary for her navigators to obtain an accurate position fix. This was done at 12 o’clock noon. From this fix, worked out by all of the bridge officers, Captain Lord placed the Titanic's wreckage at 41 degrees, 33 minutes north latitude and 50 degrees, 01 minutes west longitude. This was actually a distance of 33 miles south of the position that the Californian was in at 10:21 p.m., the previous night when she stopped because of the ice conditions.
In their summation of the facts, Senator Smith and Lord Mersey apparendy chose to ignore the fact that there were any ships in the area other than the Titanic, the Californian and, slightly further away, the Carpathia. Whereas, in reality, there were several more, two or three of which were seen by the Californian, Mount Temple, and Carpathia. To this day these ships have never been identified.
Whether these ships were attracted to the area by the distress calls or rockets or, like the Californian, they had stopped for the night because of the ice will never be known. The Mount Temple sighted a schooner very close to the SOS position. It is also known that at least one poacher, which had been illegally hunting seals, was in the vicinity. Naturally, a poacher would not want to be detected.
In view of all the evidence, it does seem strange that Senator Smith and Lord Mersey chose to ignore these highly significant and relevant facts in the summation of their inquiries. The testimonies of highly qualified and respected men were disregarded in favor of two witnesses, Mr. Groves, the Californian!s 3rd Officer, and Gill, the donkeyman, whose accounts of the facts and circumstances so obviously lacked validity. On the basis of this
testimony, nevertheless, both Courts concluded that the Californian was at a distance of between five and eight miles from the Titanic while she sank. They also concluded that, because of Captain Lord’s inaction during this vital period, 1,500 lives were fit1' necessarily lost in the disaster.
There has been considerable controversy over whether the rockets seen by the Califof nian were actually those sent up by the Titanic Many contend that it would have been i®' possible for the Californian to have seen these rockets because of the vast distance between the two ships, which to their satisfaction, had been proved. And, although the Titanic fired about eight rockets and the Californian sa'v eight rockets, the timing and sequence of the Titanic’s firing as compared to the Californians sighting is so far apart that it is impossible f°r them to believe that the Californian actually saw the Titanic’s rockets.
Those who believe the Californian did scC the Titanic’s rockets counter with, “If it vvaS not the Titanic’s rockets that the Californian saw, then whose rockets were they or what were the rockets all about? After all, the sigh* ing of rockets is rare and unusual.”
In an attempt to clear up this difference i opinions, let us assume that the rockets see'1 from the Californian by her 2nd Officer, Gi son the Apprentice, and Donkeyman Cf > were actually the Titanic’s rockets. At the th,lC it was obvious that at least the 2nd Off>cer
J «c*
and Apprentice did not recognize them as o tress signals. The testimony of the three men,111 describing what they saw that night, is fiul similar. Their claims were that the rock rose no higher than half a ship’s mast heig above the horizon. It was eight miles to t horizon from the Californian’s bridge (elevf tion 49 feet). The known capability of 1 ^ rockets was that they: “ . . . burst from to three hundred feet up with an exp1 sion . . . .” Calculations show that a roc ^ fired from the Titanic’s deck (elevation least 70 feet) and rising to a possible heigh1 300 feet above the deck could have been se^ at the horizon, on a clear night, at a dista’ of better than 22 miles. Thus, it becomesc ^ that, under the ideal weather condit1 which prevailed on that night, the Califof'1 ^ ^ could have observed the Titanic’s rockets distance of more than 30 miles. Of 11111
q his book entitled, .................. ........... ........ ....
a tfornian, Peter Padfield said, in his con-
c>ud:
The Titanic and the
lng remarks concerning the U. S. Con-
§res:
heater importance is that the sighting of the r°ckets as described by these men proves that they were fired from a distance closer to 30 Rules away rather than the eight-to-ten-mile distance claimed by Lord Mersey at the British Inquiry.
In further consideration of the rockets seen y Mr. Stone, the Californian’s 2nd Officer, he testified that after observing a couple of pockets he notified the Captain about them at about 1:15 a.m.” This would have been about 1:27 a.m. on the Titanic, or about 53 RRnutes before she sank. Assuming that the ^a‘ifornian had disregarded the dangerous ice c°nditions and had gotten under way at her Rtaxirnum speed of 13 miles per hour, or one Rule every 4.6 minutes, at the instant that the aptain was notified or at the instant that the .11 d Officer sighted his first rocket at about ^•45 a.m., simple mathematics prove that it 'v°uld have been impossible for the Californian have reached the Titanic’s side before the shiP sank.
. The Californian’s 2nd Officer has been crit- jClzed by some because it is felt that if he be- Ieyed the circumstances warranted calling fe Captain, he should have been more force' ln his approach, perhaps going to the artroom and rousing him out himself. It is s° felt that natural curiosity should have paused him to awaken the Marconi operator. e all this as it may, it did not alter the out- j. 1116 of the tragedy in any way and the hard act still remains that the Californian could not ssibly have reached the Titanic’s side before e ship foundered.
sional Investigation:
. The evidence from this Inquiry examined 111 *he cold light of fifty years afterwards brings Rut oniy one undoubted fact about “the ulifornian incident”: Captain Lord was
framed.”
He was “framed” either consciously or subconsciously for one of three reasons. Either all leading actors in the construction of the ePort were natural idiots, or the edict had Sane out that a scapegoat had to be found and i V tvere doing the best they could to make it j!'ausible, or the very magnitude and shock of e tragedy so unhinged them that they were
incapable of examining the evidence with
clear minds.
Clear and unbiased consideration of the sworn testimony and the circumstantial evidence cannot but help to bring agreement with Mr. Padfield when he claimed that Captain Lord had been “framed.” The reason being that most probably it was felt that a scapegoat was necessary.
Thus, the seed which propagated the Captain Lord-Californian legend was originally planted at the U. S. Congressional Investigation, which convened less than a week after the tragedy. A few weeks later, the British Inquiry, conducted by Lord Mersey, got under way in London. Obviously, the British Inquiry had the findings and conclusions of the American investigation at its disposal and apparently it lost no time in capitalizing on them.
There are several factors that back up this scapegoat theory. Shortly after the tragedy, tremendous adverse public opinion was leveled at the British Board of Trade, Bruce Ismay, the managing director of the White Star Line, owners of the Titanic, and Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon, both of whom were passengers on the Titanic. These men were saved, and many unsavory stories concerning their behavior during the sinking spread like wildfire. The lifeboat in which Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon left the Titanic with his wife and a few other lady passengers was dubbed, “The Millionaire’s Special.”
Bruce Ismay felt the heat of public opinion after stories had circulated that he had ordered Captain Smith, of the Titanic, to continue at full speed in spite of the repeated ice warnings. According to the rumors, Mr. Ismay issued this order in the hope that the Titanic would set a new speed record on this, her maiden voyage. It was also rumored that he left the sinking ship with all of his baggage. None of these stories about Bruce Ismay, however, have ever been substantiated. In fact, from the evidence given by some of the responsible survivors, it appears that Mr. Ismay did all that he could to help before leaving the sinking ship in one of the last lifeboats.
The British Board of Trade, under whose auspices the British Inquiry was conducted, also felt the heat of public opinion. It was this body that had permitted the Titanic to sail
vyas
for the more than 1,500 lives lost. This
with a lifeboat capacity that could only accommodate approximately one-third of the ship’s potential carrying capacity.
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to believe that because of all this adverse public opinion it was felt necessary to find a scapegoat to draw the focal point of this bad publicity away from the members of the Board. Captain Lord filled the bill.
The wheels of injustice, at both of these investigations, turned most unfairly against Captain Lord. He appeared only briefly at them, just long enough to give his testimony and leave. While at the inquiries, he never once heard any mention of the charges that were to be brought against him by Senator Smith and Lord Mersey.
To be found guilty of such heinous conduct without being formally charged with the offense and without recourse to defend himself against the charges is contrary to the concept of justice both in the United States and Great Britain. This miscarriage of justice caused Mr. C. R. Dunlop, an attorney at the British Inquiry, to say, “It is manifest that Captain Lord has been treated here in a way which is absolutely contrary to the principles on which justice is usually administered.” Yet, with irresponsible testimony, Senator Smith and Lord Mersey held Captain Lord responsible for the loss of 1,500 lives. The disgrace of their actions is compounded by the fact that Captain Lord has been refused, time and time again, any opportunity to defend himself against these accusations.
As a result of these charges, Captain Lord was forced to give up his command of the Californian. A director in his organization threatened to resign if Captain Lord was retained as an employee of the company. Many of his contemporaries and immediate superiors in his own company, however, knew he had been used as a scapegoat, and they went to bat for him elsewhere. Consequently, within a few months, Captain Lord again had a command with a highly reputable steamship company.
Every subsequent attempt made by Captain Lord to be heard by the authorities who had convicted him of gross dereliction of the first law of the sea was thwarted. After nearly two years of total frustration, and with the advent of World War I, Captain Lord ceased
A surveyor in the construction and repair division of tl# , Matson Navigation Company) San Francisco, during Woi'b War II, Mr. Carrothers has sailed as a chief engineer with the Matson Company and aS a watch engineer with the United States Lines. He has also been an inspection eng1" neer with the Vitro Corporation of America. He was chief engineer, Overlook Hos" pital, Summit, N. J., before returning to sea as chie engineer of the Moore-McCormack Line’s SS Brasil
his attempts to be heard and devoted his h1^ energies to the war effort.
During the four-year World War, Cap©111 Lord lost none of his sense of outrage at th® damage done to his professional and person3 reputation. This injustice, however, did n°j affect his life adversely; therefore, he decided not to pursue the matter further.
In March of 1927, Captain Lord, at the ag® of 50, retired from the sea. He had given 1 years of “invaluable service” to the steamship company that had placed its faith in him.
Forty-six years after the tragedy, in l^3 ’ Captain Lord’s wound was again laid 'vld open when he was once more pictured to M world as the captain who slept while his ship’ a few miles away from and in full sight of ^ sinking Titanic, did nothing. As a result of h^ inactivity, Captain Lord was again blame
done through the publication of Walter Lor * book entitled A Night To Remember. The ho°^ was rated as one of the best sellers of the dcC ade and a motion picture was produced trCj the text. To this day, the motion picture 3 entitled, “A Night To Remember,” is belllj shown in theaters throughout the world, a° in recent months it has appeared on televis'0^ Although nearly 80 years of age at the tn of the book’s publication, Captain Lord sought the legal assistance and guidance i the Mercantile Marine Service Associat1^ an organization of shipmasters of which had been a member in good standing , 1897. The Association’s council careh1 •. studied the evidence and testimony j agreed unanimously that Captain Lord been crucified at both inquiries. jp
The Association’s latest effort in Cap
Lord’s behalf was the petition presented in February 1965 to the British Board of Trade, requesting a re-hearing of the evidence against Captain Lord. Among the opening Paragraphs in the “Text of the Petition” are the following statements:
Although since 1958 the M.M.S.A. at Captain Lord’s request has done all that it can to defend him by publishing the true facts of the case, it is now quite clear that so long as the findings of the British and American inquiries remain on record there will be writers who will ignore the evidence in Captain Lord’s favour, and will continue to publish what are often grossly defamatory attacks upon him.
In the opinion of the Council of the M.M.S.A. the findings cannot be upheld and the failure pf the courts to give proper weight to the facts ln Captain Lord’s favour and to give him Proper legal protection constitutes a miscarriage of justice which permits the Board of Trade to order a re-hearing.
As stated earlier, the Board of Trade turned
down this request for a re-hearing on the grounds that the, “ . . . petition does not suggest that there is any new and important evidence which could not have been produced at the formal investigation . ... ”
Granted, the Board of Trade is correct in their statement. This fact has never been disputed or challenged by Captain Lord or the Mercantile Marine Service Association. All that is being asked for now—and all that Captain Lord asked for in 1912 and 1913—is that the existing testimony and circumstantial evidence be reviewed in the light of common sense and decency; that all of the facts remain in context; and from this a fair evaluation of the facts be produced by qualified and experienced men. Had this been done in the first place, we who have found the subject fascinating and have written about the tragedy could not possibly have produced the articles and books which for these many years have spread the defamation of Captain Stanley Lord of the Californian.
★
Charge!
For a single day during the winter of 1942-43, I served as a platoon commander at Dartmouth Naval Training Station, Hanover, N. H. En route from classroom to quarters, I ordered my column through a defile in the drifts onto the main artery of the town and gave them “by-the-left-flank,” so that our three ranks stretched across the cleared roadway from one white wall to the other.
A hundred yards down the street, but on the opposite side, a similar passage through the snow gave access to our barracks. To my dismay, another platoon emerged therefrom and performed the same maneuver. We marched toward each other implacably, with no Way to pass if we maintained present formation, course, and speed.
The Fifth Platoon’s honor was at stake. What to do, without being accused of appeasement? As the whites of the enemy’s eyes came into range, the answer came to me. In a voice that could be heard a quarter of a mile, I yelled, “CHARGE!”
My boys reacted with spirit. We literally mowed ’em down, scattering books and papers over a wide sector of frozen slush.
Unfortunately our Naval Science Professor had witnessed the whole blitz from atop a Pile of snow in front of the barracks. When we did a by-the-right-flank and filed past him, he remarked caustically that there was no such command.
But I had tasted victory. Without breaking stride, I said, “Well, it worked, didn’t it—sir?”
---------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Colin G. Jameson, U. S. Naval
Reserve (Retired)
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
[1] Different companies used different colored flares to identify themselves to other passing steamers. Apparently this is what Captain Lord was trying to determine.
[2] In my original article, I was under the mistaken impression that all but Captain Lord had identified
this ship as a large passenger liner.