This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
If there is a growing gap between the Navy’s capabilities and the requirements imposed on it in furtherance of policy commitments, Congress itself is a candidate for the role of scapegoat. But finger-pointing can only distract from the continuing in-house reassessment of the Navy’s composition, structure, and operations. The waters, however, become muddied when we talk as if the Nimitz were the equivalent of a patrol craft. In discussing fleet size and missions, it is not whether we need 600, 550, or 500 ships, but how many ships of each specific type are needed—and what the characteristics of their weapons and other component systems should be.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Johns Hopkins University, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Seminar on Defense Policy and Anns Control. The author is indebted to Robert G. Weinland, also of the Brookings Institution, who contributed many of the ideas expressed here.
I begin with a simple thesis: Unless present policies governing the Navy’s composition, structure, and operations are altered in a fundamental way, U. S. naval forces will become increasingly inadequate for the burdens placed on them by the nation’s foreign policy. For a variety of reasons, the Navy has not come to grips with a rapidly changing technological and political environment. Some of the factors have been beyond the Navy’s control and some beyond anyone’s control, but others are inexplicable except in terms of shortsightedness, vested interests, or, worse, the dead hand of inertia. The service’s responses to dramatic shocks have repeatedly followed familiar patterns. And while it has become a sophisticated and relatively successful bureaucratic player in the Washington arena, we see the increasing danger of the U. S. Navy losing its potency on the global stage.
Thus, despite the fastest growing budget of the three military services, a common perception has arisen in Washington, and abroad, that over the past ten years or so, the U. S. Navy steadily has lost ground to its principal potential adversary—the Soviet Navy. And despite projected budgetary growth of about 6% a year—quite apart from the effects of inflation—there are few signs that this apparent trend vis-a-vis the Soviet Navy is about to be reversed. Indeed, the evidence of past behavior strongly supports arguments that unless there are drastic revisions in present policies, even the planned budgetary growth will be insufficient to alter the current prospect in relative naval capabilities.
Within the past several years, a number of disparate voices on Capitol Hill—Senators William Proxmire, John Stennis, and Robert Taft; the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and the Members of Congress for Peace through Law; the Federation of American Scientists and the Navy League; retired Admirals Gene LaRocque and Elmo Zumwalt—have all drawn attention to the severe difficulties the Navy is now encountering. Nonetheless, despite the legislators’ serious and deeply-felt concerns, the Congress has refused to take the politically difficult steps needed to deal with the problem. It has not mandated the changes in U. S. defense policy and weapon system acquisition programs necessary for the Navy to be able to perform its missions at present budgetary levels. Nor has it funded the very large real increases in military spending made necessary under current foreign policy assumptions and military planning factors. A partial exception was the defense request for fiscal year 1977. Whether this year’s treatment of the budget signaled a new congressional attitude or simply represented the exigencies of a Presidential campaign year remains to be seen. If it was the latter, the results will continue as they have in the past: a growing gap between actual military capabilities and requirements theoretically posed by policy commitments. And even if the current increase is the manifestation of a new attitude in Congress, it is far from clear that under any realistic projection of available funds that present policies will yield a Navy appropriate for the nation’s needs in the last decades of the century.
Who is to blame? Who cares? The important question is what can be done now to improve the situation.
Manpower: Military and civilian personnel pay and allowances accounted for nearly one half of the Navy’s outlays in fiscal year 1976. Although the proportion is less than that for the other military services, it seems evident, given hardware cost problems (discussed below); that manpower costs must be reduced if budget growth is to be curbed.
Since 1968, there has been a sharp rise in the price of Department of Defense employees—military and civilian. That year, legislation—the so-called Rivers amendment—was passed which guaranteed comparability between federal pay scales and wage levels for equivalent work in the private sector. Wasteful uses of manpower, a legacy of the time when military personnel were extraordinarily cheap, became an intolerable burden on the defense budget.
The Army and Air Force have embarked upon programs to reduce the number of people serving in support units and to use the personnel spaces saved that way to man additional combat units. The Navy, however, maintains that it can make no further reductions in support manpower. Indeed, the Navy intends to add perhaps 30,000 people as the size of the fleet grows over the next few years. Yet, the same period that witnessed the sharp rise in the price of manpower also witnessed a more than 25% increase in the ratio of Navy personnel to ships: It went from about 800:1 in 1968 to considerably more than 1,000:1 in 1976. Thus, the Navy would seem to have become less efficient, just when it should have become more efficient. And still, however, the Navy is plagued by chronic shortages in key personnel specialties.
The increase in the ratio of people to ships is more a warning signal than evidence of inefficiency. Newer ships (and aircraft) tend to be more complicated technologically than the ones they replace. This trend
not the master
in its own house, bases being an obvious
creates greater demands for shore-based support person- t*e ^ People repairing, learning to operate, and fac in§ others to operate equipment). Moreover, of °se ships that have been retired and not replaced, m°st ^ave been relatively small, specialized ships that equired few men, rather than large, multipurpose, Manpower-intensive vessels. And Navy air power, lch demands a lot of people, has not been cut nearly S0 much the size of the fleet itself.
Cl , growth in the ratio of people to ships is so large to warrant more detailed investigation. In this re> attention might be directed at the policies gov- n>ng personnel assignments, the way the Navy sup- °tts its combatant units, and the efficiency with which ersonnel are managed. More specifically, it might be suggested that: ► p C Navy has too many bases.
ormal classroom training periods are too long and ^ uning methods too expensive.
eadquarters staffs are too large and populated by too ^ any high-ranking officers.
rrent maintenance practices and overhaul policies ^e wasteful of manpower.
Centralized personnel management is inefficient.
'TM • .
ls is not the sort of stuff that makes headlines or ^tracts che attention of any but a few members of the ngress. Moreover, in some of these areas, the Navy is
ample. Still, these factors strongly influence budgeted nCeds> anc^ thus they require careful scrutiny by both tjcutive and legislative authorities.
, u WCre ^etcrrniried that reductions could safely be k 1 e 'n Navy manpower, the Navy itself would know CQidWh’ch specific billets might be eliminated. And, of all fSe' an^ changcs would be best implemented gradu- how OVCr 3 num^er years- The question would be to get the Navy to take the necessary steps. One ce)pr0ach would be for the Congress to announce a am reduction in uniformed naval manpower over ed next huur years. The Congress might decide, for a rhat by 198I it wished to reduce currently
]cd °r'Zcd strength by 10%. Such a measure would c3 ’ ln foa*1 year, to savings of about 84,000 people as ^ mpared to present plans to increase the size of the $l7-ork force. In dollar terms, it would save perhaps eno dd°n at ^976 prices. This would be nearly n £ to huy, for example, one of the proposed Ujdar'Powered strike cruisers, pow* S^°rt’ tde best way to reverse the trend in man- ti utdlzatlorl might be to create persisting incen- w i°r reform wasteful personnel practices. It preU useful for the Navy to have to cope with ssures similar to those generated by market forces on
American industry. Although the 10% figure mentioned previously is strictly an arbitrary example, a four-year program to reduce total Navy manpower by some analytically-derived amount might be just the ticket.
Shipbuilding: Hardware cost problems are more familiar than those of personnel. All four military services are plagued by the skyrocketing cost of new military equipment. The shipbuilding budget is no exception; indeed, it might serve as the paradigm for the problem.
Navy force levels have varied widely over the past 30 years. Near the end of World War II, there were more than 5,000 ships in commission. All but 600 had been decommissioned by 1950. The fleet doubled in size—to 1,200—during the Korean War, dropped back to 800 by I960, and then increased again, to a peak of 976, during the Vietnam War. As we are all aware, force levels have since declined again, reaching the postWorld War II low of less than 500 in 1976.
These historical comparisons, however, provide no obvious basis for judging the adequacy of today’s Navy. New ships, after all, are far more capable than their predecessors.1 More importantly, the international political system—and U. S. foreign policy along with it—has been altered rather dramatically over the past 30 years. The number of ships necessary to defeat Germany, Japan, and Italy has nothing to do with the number that would be required to defeat the Soviet Navy. Nor do the requirements to fight a protracted war in Southeast Asia have much to do with U. S. naval requirements in the future.
Yet, there is widespread discomfort with the present size of the Navy. Essentially, during the mid-to-late- 1960s, as large numbers of ships constructed during World War II came due for retirement, the Navy was forced to trade quantity for quality. Given relatively tight limits on defense budgets, at least for expenditures not directly related to the war in Southeast Asia, and the high unit cost of new ships, it simply was impossible to replace the vessels due for retirement on
1For example, consider a few gross indices of changes in naval capabilities between 1970 and 1977:
| 1970 | 1977 | Percent Change |
Number of ships | 769 | 489 | -36 |
Standard displacement (million tons) | 6.67 | 5.44 | -18 |
Shaft horsepower (millions) | 23.87 | 18.68 | — 22 |
Electrical generating capacity (megawatts) | 1,949 | 2,029 | + 4 |
Although the number of ships has declined by more than one-third, the Fleet’s capability—at least to the extent that capability is measured by tonnage and horsepower—has dropped by only one-fifth. In fact, in terms of electrical generating capacity, which might be the best single index of a modern Navy’s capability, there actually is an increase over these seven years.
•. , '~B£WS-
*2f9jUktts*•*?
U. S. NAVY <COM6THFLT
Two carriers are visible in this mid-1976 photograph of Sixth Fleet ships steaming back to their Italian anchorage following a fleet exercise. The longstanding deployment of two carriers in the Mediterranean needs reexamination since, while there are times when two are two too many, there are other times when the volatile politics on the Mediterranean littorals can create situations where four would not be nearly enough.
anything near a one-for-one basis.
There are limits to such trade-offs, however. No matter how capable an individual ship may be, she cannot be in two places at the same time. Thus, many fear that with fewer than 500 ships, the U. S. Navy already has become too small. Current plans call for an expansion of the fleet; the announced goal is 600 ships. That objective, however, given the enormous cost of the types of ships which the Navy is now building, would require spending for shipbuilding in magnitudes that seem most unlikely to gain the approval of Congress.
The shipbuilding appropriation began to decline in fiscal year 1968. It remained depressed until fiscal year 1972, when it began to grow slowly, reaching $3.2 billion in fiscal year 1975, and $3.8 in fiscal year 1976. The original fiscal year 1977 request for 15 new ships was $6.3 billion. Let us assume that the Congress was willing to sustain it at that level, through 1985. In real terms, that would mean even larger appropriations would have to be voted in order to compensate for inflation. Of that amount ($6.3 billion), about $1-2 billion would be used for the strategic submarine program, leaving $5.1 billion for general purpose forces. Under current plans, a nuclear-powered Nimitz (CVN- 68)-class, or similarly large aircraft carrier, costing about $2 billion, would be requested every other year. A nuclear-powered strike cruiser, costing at least $1.4 billion, would be requested each year. That would leave $2.7 billion to build the 16 or so ships that must be replaced each year just to keep the fleet near the 500 level, and to build the ten or so additional ships necessary if the fleet is to increase to 600 ships. The average would be about $100 million per ship. With the prices of frigates running near $100 million, those of oilers more than $100 million, destroyer tenders near $200 million, destroyers over $200 million, attack submarines near $300 million, and almost any nuclear-powered warship in excess of $750 million, that amount simply is insufficient. Moreover, past experience would indicate that the premise underlying these calculations—sustained congressional support for shipbuilding appropriations more than double those of the recent past—may not be a realistic one.
What can be done?
First, and here this writer is obviously as guilty as the next person, the size of the fleet should not be discussed as if the Nimitz were the equivalent of a patrol craft-
Pro 1,alUITe better, and yet less intrusive oversight DefC UrCS °n t^C Part tke Navy an<^ Department of sh-officials; more continuity and stability in the ^ould* ProSram itself, an improvement which restr . rccIu*re the cooperation of the Congress; and a*nt on rhe part of the trade unions. And, one tjtjoeCCs’ rr toight also require inducing greater compe- by ex am0n^ shlpbuilders. This might be accomplished Dm Pan<Jm8 now'°pen, or reopening now-closed gov
ern m . • t > U1 reopening now-ciosea gov-
yardsCnt f^’Pl,ar<^s’ and> perhaps, by permitting foreign not t01 ^ ^or contracts. This last suggestion is near y so radical as it seems. Even the Soviet Union
Wn • .
at is important is not whether the United States s 600, or 550, or 500 ships, but how many ships of 0fC fPec^c type it needs—and what the characteristics shouMb WCaPons an<^ other component systems
Second, nuclear power should not be treated as a
ves/1)1011 the°l0gy- tssue °f whether a particular SQSC sf'ould be powered by a nuclear reactor or by otf'er propulsion system is one of the few military metl-wf^ amena^^e to solution through the arcane not ° S t^le systems analyst. For the most part, it is me 2 rfatter frangible, subjective political judg- cosntS’ Ut a case °f clean trade-offs between relative sho^l^k re^at*ve effectiveness. These questions can and a(j U e ff'ff to technicians. When nuclear power is ffitle^V^0115’ ^ SC^ *tse^‘ Legislative fiats, such as nu ^ to help the technical case for
invCar Power.2 What would help would be added nu(^nt 'n research and development of light-weight utip 3j react°rs and hybrid systems, such as one which and ZC 1 Sma^ nuclear reactor for sustained operations a gas turbine system for burst speed.
j-roHej ' t^C soar*n§ prices of new ships must be con- jnn C ' ^art °f the past sharp price rise was due to to ^tlon' ^° other sector of the defense budget seems cau ;lJek°Cen struck quite so hard. Another part was missil ^ Characteristlcs demanded of new ships: tj01 C ^fSterns *nstead of guns; detection, communica- tech’ a? other electronic systems at the leading edge of n°0§y> much larger than traditional spaces for nucle°^ magazines, fuel storage, and crew quarters; All ai, ratl'er than conventional propulsion systems. °f t^ C ^°r.^ar more expensive ships. Still another part °f th ^nCe r*se *s ^ue to fhe structure and management [3lljlj.e American shipbuilding industry. Naval ship- eco ^ 1S °nC t^e ^ew sectors of the American •0rn^ which has experienced a decline in productiv- ty ln ^cent years.
WjU n^n^.tke trend in ship prices will be difficult. It
a]] m ■ ^ment to the 1975 Defense Authorization Act which required that ornbatants for U. S. strike forces be nuclear powered.
permits some of its naval ships to be built abroad. Finland, East Germany, and Poland have built support and amphibious warfare ships for the Soviet Navy.
Fourth, the notion of a high-low mix in ship procurement needs to be revitalized. Readers will recall that this was a strategy suggested by the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., for dealing with the growing cost of ships. It envisioned building some very capable (and therefore very expensive) vessels for the most demanding contingencies—those involving combat with the Soviets in regions close to their shores—and larger numbers of less capable (and therefore less expensive) ships for the many less demanding contingencies. Obviously, one does not have to send the Nimitz every time a show of force is desired to impress a Third World politician.
Unfortunately, the high-low mix seems to have gotten caught up in politics—both electoral and bureaucratic. Of the two vessels first proposed for the low side—the sea control ship and the patrol frigate—the first has been killed and the second given additional equipment. The latter’s pricetag was rewritten along with its name. A similar fate befell the aircraft carrier suggested by former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in 1974 as the replacement for the Forrestal (CV-59)-class carriers built during the 1950s. Schles- inger’s suggestion that nuclear power and 90,000 tons might not be necessary for future carriers has been rejected. The next carrier authorized will be similar to the last, only more expensive. And a cheaper substitute for Trident, also tenuously put forward in 1974, has not been heard from since.
If renewed attention is to be paid to the high-low mix, the following might be considered:
► A key question involves the design of future carriers. We are already committed to four ships of the Nimitz class, and there will probably be one more beyond those. But at $2 billion or so apiece, do we really have to build eight more? Added investment now in research and development on light-weight nuclear reactors and vertical or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft might provide additional options for the next decade.
► Also of particular importance, will be the building of a large number (perhaps 80-120 over ten years) of conventionally-powered destroyers and frigates, many with surface-to-surface missiles. These will be essential for any expansion of the fleet to the 600 level.
► High priority should be accorded to the development and construction of small carriers (around 20,000 tons) as a supplement to the attack carrier force. These vessels, equipped with helicopter and V/STOL aircraft, would be important additions to U. S. capabilities to defend the sea-lanes and for various activities in remote regions.
► More attention needs to be paid to support ships. These have been long neglected, but the Navy will be effective only so long as it can operate for protracted periods, in hostile environments, far from U. S. shores.
► Emphasis must be placed on the development of advanced technologies, such as those employed in surface effect ships, which potentially would permit the Navy to carry out its vital missions in the high threat environments which are likely to characterize the international system in the next century.
Finally, the Navy must come to grips with inevitable increases in the vulnerability of the surface ship. This is not at all to say that warships are useless or obsolete. But clearly, in some regions, against some opponents, reliance on surface vessels at the onset of a conflict is not a viable proposition. Obviously, for example, the United States would not attempt to maintain a surface force in the Black Sea during a conflict with the Soviet Union. And as the fruits of the revolution in military hardware ripen (precision-guided munitions, for example) and are disseminated to a wider group of nations, these potentially non-viable situations are likely to grow larger in number.[1][2] [3]
One obvious strategy for dealing with this problem is to spend a lot of money on defensive systems—air defenses, submarine defenses, electronic countermeasures—and hope to stay some steps ahead of the offense. A second would be to substitute other forms of naval power for surface ships in some missions. Submarines, for example—if certain technical obstacles are overcome—may be able to provide better antisubmarine defenses for carrier task forces than do destroyers.
A third strategy would be to shift to greater emphasis on land-based weapon systems in U. S. military planning for certain contingencies. B-52S carrying air- to-surface missiles (with conventional explosives) may provide a more effective way of dealing with the Soviet surface fleet in certain situations than does carrier-based aviation. And in some contingencies flying land-based tactical air squadrons into Israel may be a better way of protecting U. S. friends and allies in the Middle East than deploying aircraft carriers into the Eastern Mediterranean.
The best answer to the problem is not obvious. All three possibilities listed above have their drawbacks. And in many situations, there just is no good substitute for surface warships. The optimum solution probably incorporates some combination of these and other choices. What is clear is that closing our collective eyes to the present situation, as seems to be the case evidenced by the United States’ continuing propensity to invest extraordinarily large sums in a very small number of platforms whose survivability in certain contingencies is suspect, is a foolish strategy on its very face.
Navy Missions: At long last we come to the heart of the problem. The answer to the question of the size and composition of the Navy most appropriate for the military, technological, political, and budgetary realities which the United States is likely to face in the years ahead must be founded on a review of the Navy8 missions. What purposes does the nation wish its Navy to serve this year, next year, and—because investments in naval forces tend to be with us for a long, long time—at the end of the century?
Nuclear deterrence: It seems indisputable that for as far as can be seen, the only way to ensure against a nuclear missile attack will be to deter it by maintaining an unquestioned capability to withstand a first strike and retaliate, with devastating destructive power, against the attacker’s armed forces, industry, and population. While this is far from an ideal situation, neither disarmament nor active missile defenses look like viable prospects. It seems equally certain that the strategy submarine force will remain the main repository of the nation’s secure retaliatory capabilities. And the only questions are technical and political ones: the necessary characteristics of missile systems and submarines, the requisite pace of modernization, and so forth.
War-fighting missions: Three kinds of missions are important here.
► Projection of power ashore: The first question lS where the nation might wish to intervene ashore with troops, gunfire, air power, or even just the judicious supply of military equipment. It seems likely that Southeast Asia is not among the top choices. Mot£ viable candidates include, in rough order of likelihood the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the flanks of the NATO nations. The second question is hoW, given the potential vulnerability of surface vessels ard developments in the capabilities of potential adversaries, this mission is to be accomplished.
► Denial of interventionary options to others: The other side of the projection coin is the mission of denying a capability to intervene, in the Middle Eas1 and elsewhere, to the Soviet Union. This mission poses lesser requirements than does the projection of powef ashore. The latter demands the establishment of positive control over specific ocean areas. The Soviet Navy has had an advantage for many years, because denial requires only the capability to disrupt the other side’s surface and air operations.
► Defense of sea-lanes of communication: Exotic scenarios are always fun to discuss—for example, guerrilla attacks on oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf or arriv- lng at Bantry Bay, Ireland. But in terms of overall force ^quirements, the most demanding scenario involves t e support of U. S. forces in Europe during a NATO- arsaw Pact war. And this question is but one part of g e broader issue of the degree to which the United fates should hedge, in its military planning, against C.e possibility of a protracted war in Europe, when- given ceilings on overall defense spending—such le ges detract from preparation for short and intense conflicts. If one believes, as does this writer, that protracted war hedges must be given a relatively low priority, then requirements specifically directed at sea- ane defense are reduced to the needs to move rein- orcements to Europe at the very onset of the crisis. n in this regard, one suspects that the pre-positioning of equipment, people, and supplies, and the acquisition of capable airlift forces, might provide alternatives more viable than sea control.
olitical missions: Two kinds of activity fall into this category. First, it is no secret that both superpowers ave become fond of signaling their intent, warning potential adversaries, bolstering the confidence of allies, communicating various other messages to friends an ^oes alike, during crises, through the deployment of naval forces and the use of various naval maneuvers and operations. Second, even in normal peacetime situations, the presence of naval forces in distant regions is ai to help make U. S. policies and commitments Cre *kle to various foreign audiences.
eaders are cautioned that empirical knowledge as to e consequences of naval activity for the perceptions an behavior of foreign decision-makers is virtually n°nexistent. Thus, there is a priori reason to question current judgments as to the political utility of naval pioyments. This writer’s biases run in two directions. Experience during scores of incidents since 1945 w°uld seem to indicate that naval deployments during crises—gUnb0at diplomacy, if you will—constitute an •mportant instrument of policy. Reinforcing naval rces in a crisis region, causing warships to leave or to Ietutn to port, establishing a blockade of a trouble spot °r en8aging in other operations, even moving warships lnto a zone where they are likely to be vulnerable to attack, serve as tangible evidence of the seriousness of • S. intent. Such activity has scored dramatic successes ln the past. The Cuban Missile Crisis may be the best example of the sophisticated use of naval forces to affect ^ adversary’s decisions. This is not to say that the avy can shoulder the policy burden alone. Obviously, *p omatic policies are as much, if not more important, ut the Navy can give weight and pointed meaning to r e President’s words. It has done so many times.
On the other hand, the political consequences of standing naval deployments during peacetime are less clear. Certainly, these deployments do demonstrate U. S. capability to project military power into a region. But without the benefit of an immediate conflict situation to force specific decisions, what are the targets of the deployment to make of U. S. intent? After all, the naval forces could be withdrawn once trouble began just as easily as they could be moved closer to the source of tension. The suspicion of many observers is that in peacetime, naval deployments are simply overwhelmed by diplomacy and economic instruments as salient elements in the panoply of U. S. foreign policy tools.
If this assessment is accurate, it suggests that a more flexible approach might be adopted for naval deployments. Such a change would have very real benefits. It would ease the operational strain on the fleets. And it would make crisis signaling more effective. It suggests further that the role of the Navy in supporting U. S. foreign policy generally requires closer scrutiny and greater emphasis in peacetime operations. Here, the U. S. might take a page from the Soviet book. Soviet Navy exercises, port calls, and deployment patterns all seem to be relatively sensitive to changes in international politics and the potential consequences of naval operations for Soviet interests and images abroad. The United States, on the other hand, seems to be driven almost solely by planning for the "worst case”—the big war. This often ties our hands when it comes to lesser, but more likely, cases. And, more to the point, it deprives the nation of an important instrument in its quest to prevent war and protect its interests around the world.
Nowhere is this dictum more important than in the Mediterranean. When one is imagining how the United States and the Soviet Union might come to military conflict, time and again his attention is drawn to this troubled sea: a new Arab-Israeli war, a succession crisis in Yugoslavia, a war between Greece and Turkey for any one of several reasons, turmoil on the Iberian Peninsula, a coup in Italy, etc., etc. If such conflicts are to be avoided, and friends of the United States protected, then Soviet intervention in these potential crises must be deterred. And the Soviets will be deterred only so long as they perceive that the United States has the will and the military capability to control the Mediterranean in a conflict with conventional weapons.
Given the structure and disposition of U. S. forces, this task falls largely upon the Sixth Fleet; but the fleet is likely to need help to carry it out successfully.
Changes are necessary in U. S. carrier deployments so that more decks can be made available to the Sixth Fleet quickly, during crises. During both the 1970 Jordanian Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the difficulty of mustering reinforcements for the Sixth Fleet was apparent. Yet, extra decks are mandatory if the fleet is to defend itself and still have sufficient aircraft available to do what needs doing, whether ir is intercepting Soviet airborne troops or projecting air power over the land. Besides, the psychological effect of deploying four, five, or even six carriers into the Mediterranean at the onset of a crisis would be awesome, thus, perhaps, preventing the conflict to begin with.
To beef up the Sixth Fleet’s capabilities, three kinds of changes are necessary in present practices:
► Roughly one-half of the Navy is now deployed in the Pacific, but the threat is far less there, and the contingencies are less compelling than on the Atlantic side. If war broke out in Europe, a large portion of Pacific Fleet ships would shift to the Atlantic anyway. Shifting them in peacetime would help to dispel perceptions of growing Soviet dominance in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and even the North Atlantic, and it would make reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet far easier. The United States retains important interests in the Pacific—primarily maintaining a close connection with Japan—but the risks of a Pacific draw-down are far less than those of continuing to maintain a weak position on the Atlantic side.
► Current practice is to keep two carriers in the Mediterranean almost all of the time. This pattern, a holdover from the days when carriers played a key role in strategic nuclear strike plans and thus had to remain near the preplanned launch points for their aircraft, has acquired symbolic political value. Yet, it results in little slack in carrier operating schedules, more frequent breakdowns of aircraft and ships’ systems, and the previously mentioned difficulty of reinforcement.
Shifting to flexible carrier deployments would have important benefits. Sometimes, there should be two carriers in the Mediterranean, but at other times there need not be any. At still other times, perhaps four carriers could transit the Strait of Gibraltar in connection with an exercise. And at all times, the size of the deployments should be tailored to the requirements of politics on the Mediterranean littorals.
► At present, the United States often acts as if the large attack carrier were its only conventional repository of naval strike power. Yet, such warships are not required for every show of force. Nor are they needed each time it is desired to outgun a Soviet destroyer in some remote region. Greater use of task forces not including attack carriers in low-threat regions, like the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, would increase the availability of more potent forces for more demanding contingencies. Task forces comprised of amphibious assault ships (LPHs and LHAs) carrying V/STOL aircraft, accompanied by several destroyers with surface-to-surface missiles and antisubmarine and antiair systems, would constitute a potent threat in most parts of the world.
Increased cooperation between the Navy and the other services might help to improve the outlook in the Mediterranean. As noted previously, land-based tactical air squadrons, flown from the United States directly to Israeli bases, could augment U. S. air power should a new Arab-Israeli war escalate to the point at which U. S.-Soviet conflict seemed imminent. U. S. Air Force units deployed in Italy, Greece, and Turkey could help to defend the carriers by intercepting Soviet land-based strike aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles before they came into range. And Marine Corps squadrons might be used independently of Marine divisions in situations where an amphibious landing appeared unlikely.
None of these steps can be accomplished merely by writing about them. They require tough bargaining with Mediterranean littoral nations with whom the United States has alliances or defense commitments, and serious planning by joint staffs. Most importantly, they require many more joint Navy-Air Force exercises to make such operations plausible.
This article has raised many questions and answered few. Those solutions that have been suggested are obviously tentative approaches that require much more detailed study. But a serious debate on these matters is long overdue. For too long now, the United States has acted in recognition of the risks associated with proposed changes in the basic structure or disposition or internal policies of its Navy but without recognition of the perhaps even greater risks associated with perpetuating the status quo. The risk, in brief, is that because of the conflicting budgetary trends—increasing costs for each unit of defense (both people and hardware) but relatively constant ceilings on overall spending—the present apparent gap between the capabilities of the Navy and the purposes which it is supposed to serve can only grow larger over time. This is not a prospect that the nation can face with equanimity.
HDr. Blechman holds a Ph.D. in political science from Georgetown University. He is now a senior fellow and head of the defense analysis staff at the Brookings Institution. Before joining the Brookings staff in 1971, he was affiliated with the Center for Naval Analyses for nearly six years. During that time, he participated in studies of U. S. antisubmarine warfare forces and strategic policies, in addition to directing a study of U. S. military options in the Indian Ocean. For the past several years, Dr. Blechman has coauthored Brookings’ annual review of the federal budget, Setting National Priorities. His other writings published by Brookings include Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies, The Changing Soviet Navy, and Controlling Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities. He was coauthor of "Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba,” published in the September 1975 Proceedings.
[1]In this regard, the Soviet Union’s efforts to develop the SS-NX-13—a
tactical ballistic missile apparently designed to be used in conjunction with a
satellite-based detection system—are potentially very troubling.