As threats from the war on terrorism carry over to distributed maritime operations and state actors amplify them, the counter–weapons of mass destruction mission becomes more complex. Small special operations forces (SOF) and Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units are needed to rapidly report chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) anomalies to carrier strike groups, surface action groups, task forces, or emergency operations centers. Currently, a highly mobile and flexible capability for detecting CBRNE indicators within a confined or open area in a time-constrained environment does not exist. Thus, it is more important than ever for the joint force to combine these SOF personnel and engineered systems to achieve mass effects across the battlespace.
CANARY SoS
The CANARY SoS is intended to support the Department of Defense (DoD) by finding, fixing, finishing, exploiting, analyzing, and disseminating tasks essential for countering threats of weapons of mass destruction overseas and close to home. The concept includes a Navy EOD team as part of a forward SOF element or as a standalone unit, employing single or multiple unmanned aerial systems (UASs) linked with a common control unit, a data module for intelligence analysis, and a means to transmit technical weapon information and targeting data back to the fleet or operations center.
The CANARY SoS was designed to transform operational needs into a description of system performance parameters and a system configuration. When a weapon of mass destruction is detected or suspected, the CANARY SoS will be transported to the area of operation by the user or tactical unit assigned to the task. Once at the mission site, the ground control operator will deploy the UAV or swarm of UAVs as part of the CANARY SoS. During an operation, the UAV will fly into a predetermined area to survey the site for CBRNE material/agents, create aerial video footage, and transmit the encrypted mission data. The EOD team leader then makes an assessment and communicates the situation to higher headquarters. Higher headquarters decides on a strike based on the joint targeting process or authorizes the ground team to take direct action against the threat. The target is engaged and, when able, another UAV is sent to confirm or deny that the threat is neutralized or persists.
The CANARY SoS keeps operators away from specific hazards associated with weapons of mass destruction while enhancing access and fidelity on the threat and providing the means for joint strikes. CANARY solves further issues by detecting CBRNE hazards over a large area and confined spaces, meaning it could be used for natural or manmade disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident or the 2020 USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) fire.
Exercise
The master scenario for the project was an island within the U.S. Pacific Fleet area of responsibility on which a suspected weapon or anomaly was detected. Overhead reconnaissance combined with human intelligence and signals intelligence identify the source on “Island X.” The closest carrier strike group in the area was ordered to embark a Naval Special Warfare (NSW)/EOD team and support personnel to Island X to investigate. The mission parameters were as follows: perform reconnaissance, confirm or deny the presence of CBRNE materials, and stand by for direction to detonate or render it safe for follow‐on CBRNE containment/exploitation teams. If the EOD team failed, the mission would be a directed airstrike from the carrier strike group.
An ocean jump was planned to deploy to the target area. NSW parachute riggers and support personnel loaded the team, and the aircraft flew to the drop area. Following a successful jump, the team deployed a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB), then transited to Island X, beached, and hid the boat.
A security cordon was set when in sight of a suspect structure, and the EOD team leader deployed CANARY. The small UAV entered the structure, found the source of the anomaly, and identified a weapons cache. The team leader made the decision to send a second UAV to verify identification of background CBRNE readings for redundancy.
The UAVs provided data from the CANARY data module back to the carrier strike group Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC). Because of operational necessity, the TFCC ordered the EOD team to perform a controlled detonation of the discovered cache. The team provided the TFCC with precise coordinates, and a jet was on standby to perform a strike if detonation fail. The EOD team deployed a robot and emplaced its demolition charge so that the robot avoided the risk of contamination. One of the UAVs, suspected of contamination, was placed to be engulfed in the explosion. The second UAV and robot were successfully moved to a safe standoff distance.
The EOD team leader ensured all personnel and equipment were within a safe standoff distance and informed the TFCC of the impending detonation. Once the TFCC acknowledged, the EOD team leader fired the shot. Post-blast wait times were fulfilled, and CANARY was activated again and sent a UAV downrange to verify concentrations within the crater. The EOD team leader deemed the situation safe, the team transmitted all applicable data, and the team took the RHIB back to sea for exfiltration.
The team performed simulations during the exercise with MatLab to evaluate which performance characteristics have the greatest effects on the system effectiveness. Primary measures of effectiveness included the time in which the system can detect, analyze, and confirm the presence of a threat, and the percentage of threats successfully confirmed. A MatLab script ran various system configurations throughout the scenario.
The exclusion area was broken up into different sectors, depending on the number of UAVs tested. Once at the exclusion area, the UAV scanned sector by sector until the threat was found. Analyses identified that the number of drones deployed had the greatest effect on improving threat confirmation time, followed by UAV speed and UAV battery life. For most configurations, however, no significant change was found in the percentage of threats successfully confirmed.
The biggest gain from this research is the ability to trace the operational concepts down a hierarchy to an engineered system and being able to simulate this CWMD scenario against real-world data for the first time. The team’s simulation setup allowed reliability and performance evaluation of each of the primary elements of the CANARY SoS. Information for a particular drone, for example, can simply be plugged into the notional architecture and programs for simulation. The final step is real-world testing and evaluation.
Looking Forward
Further research should focus on three areas. First, the selected UAVs must demonstrate integration with supporting systems. The ability for these UAVs to integrate with a data module and Link 16–capable systems may be possible but was not confirmed. It is essential, however, that onboard CBRNE sensors be able to collect and push out that information.
Second, the means to charge power sources in an austere environment must be developed and integrated. If batteries expire, the CANARY SoS would become dead weight. Finally, there is a clear need for a full CANARY SoS operational test and evaluation. This study analyzed components of the CANARY SoS. Their integration and use as a complete SoS could return more favorable or degraded results. The entire architecture for the CANARY SoS must be exercised and should test all available data for the systems, including propriety and classified information. Sensor and hardware data simulated is considered controlled unclassified information or classified.
The CANARY team is actively seeking further development and collaboration of this technology to full realization and work is still ongoing. If you would like to learn more about this project or would like to collaborate on some of these ideas, please contact: Mr. Ryan Cervino at [email protected], Lieutenant Commander Joseph A. Grim at [email protected], Mrs. Christy Spaulding at [email protected], or Mr. Allen Zahneigh Sr. at [email protected].
Lieutenant Commander Grim is a Navy EOD officer and expeditionary warfare tactics instructor currently assigned to Special Operations Forces Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. He earned his master’s in systems engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School and his bachelor’s in electrical engineering from the University of North Florida.
Mr. Cervino is an engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division. He has earned a master’s degree in systems engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School and a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Maryland.
Ms. Spaulding earned her master’s degree from Naval Postgraduate School and is an engineer at the Missile Defense Agency. She is also a Navy veteran, who deployed as an Aegis fire controlman.
Mr. Zahneigh Sr. is a lead engineer at the Electromagnetic measurement and Engineering Branch, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Virginia. He received a master’s of science in systems engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in 2023, a master’s in project management from Keller Graduate School of Management in 2013, and a bachelor’s in electrical engineering from the University of Minnesota in 2005.