Training Reservists Aboard Destroyers
(See page 502, June, 1929, Proceedings)
Lieutenant G. F. Forster (DE-F), U.S.N.R.—When naval reservists break out their sea bags and bedding preparatory to embarking for the fifteen-day training period, it is believed that articles such as “Training Reservists Aboard Destroyers” are of more than passing interest. This interesting paper by Lieutenant Commander R. S. Field, U. S. Navy, has been the subject of a great deal of discussion at the dinners held by the Seventh Battalion, Naval Militia N.J. —U. S. Naval Reserve, each drill night on the U.S.S. Newton, Jersey City, N.J. The writer will endeavor to cover briefly those phases of reserve training brought out in the aforesaid article as well as other points worthy of consideration in advancing the efficiency of the Naval Reserve.
The writer, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, served five years in the regular Navy, resigning in 1922 with the rank of lieutenant. Four of the five years were spent on destroyers, a year and a half as executive officer of the U.S.S. Schenck (159), an active fully manned destroyer attached to the Atlantic Fleet. Since 1923, he has been interested in naval reserve activities in New Jersey, and for the past four years as commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth Fleet Division, Seventh Battalion, U. S. Naval Reserve of Jersey City, N.J. As commanding officer of a division, he has noted that the most important problems in training a division are (1) getting the most benefit out of the sixty drills per year; (2) developing competent petty officers; (3) recruiting men whose civil occupations are such as to make them function well aboard ship; (4) reducing turnover of enlisted personnel; (5) training a sufficient number of men on board ship during the fifteen-day cruise to make the division of value as a nucleus of a destroyer crew.
The Seventh Battalion, Naval Militia of New Jersey, U. S. Naval Reserve, consists of the Twenty-fourth Fleet Division and Twenty-fifth Fleet Division as well as a headquarters division. Each fleet division consists of fifty-five class F-1 men who are paid for their drill attendance and forty-five class V-1 men who are not paid. The officer complement is five F-1 officers and, in certain cases, six. Officers of class V-1 are assigned at the discretion of the commandant of the naval district in which the unit is located. The class F-1 men, or fleet reserve as it is known, are the active part of the division and the class V-1, or volunteer reserve, a reserve from which men may be taken to fill vacancies in the fleet reserve. The mission of the fleet division is to man a destroyer in the event of mobilization. Since 1926 the annual cruises have been on board destroyers. This battalion has cruised on the following vessels:
1926— U.S.S. Gilmer (233); U.S.S. Kane (235).
1927— U.S.S. Hatfield (231); U.S.S. Brooks (232).
1928— U.S.S. Lamson (328); U.S.S. Bruce (329).
The greatest weakness of the plan of cruising on destroyers is the cruising allowance of but forty-five enlisted men. By reason of this not all of the paid class of enlisted men can cruise together. Many commanding officers have permitted the full fifty-five to report on board—this may be permitted by the commanding officer of the destroyer if he desires and is a great help to the reserve division. It is obvious that the division officer cannot cut ten enlisted men out of “the naval event in the peacetime life of the enlisted reservist” as Commander Field aptly terms the cruise, without arousing a feeling of resentment in the men concerned. This in all probability results in many separating themselves from the service and detracts from morale. It should be remembered that the ten affected are an appreciable part of the division.
The present solution of this problem is to assign the excess men of one division to a division that is short of men. As no one can foretell how short a division may be until it reports for duty this solution is of no practical value. The men naturally want to be with their shipmates and feel they are not getting a square deal when shifted into a strange division. On account of the uncertainty as to whether the anticipated shortage will materialize, it is particularly difficult to arrange for leave of absence with employers. Employers generally do not want to derange their vacation schedules to permit a man to perform military duty if, through no fault of his own he may be left behind at the last moment. There is no question of lack of funds as sufficient money has always been available. It is the general opinion of reserve officers that the full strength of fifty-five class F-1 men and if possible five additional class V-1 men should cruise with their reserve unit and constitute the cruising allowance.
As the reserve units have developed greater discipline and ability through their association with the regular Navy, they have been permitted to furnish petty officers of the deck in port, petty officers for shore patrol, boat crews, and with non-rated men as mess-cooks and other appropriate details. A routine amount of chipping and painting would not be objectionable and would be in line with their training. Though the battalion from Jersey City has never experienced it, a few complaints have been heard that reserve divisions have been used as “labor battalions.” It should be borne in mind that the enlisted men of the reserve are on two weeks’ leave from their civilian employment which keeps them fully occupied during the other fifty weeks of the year. This should also be considered in planning their liberty. It would be of as great advantage to a division from the vicinity of New York to cruise to Bermuda or St. Thomas as it is to a southern or western division to get liberty in the harbor of New York.
The officers of the division which the writer has commanded for the past four years are as follows: one lieutenant, one lieutenant (junior grade), and one ensign, all Naval Academy graduates and qualified for deck and engineering duties, as well as one ensign, formerly a chief machinist, U. S. Navy, in charge of engineering repairs for scouting fleet destroyers, for engineering duty only, and one chief carpenter, who was formerly a warrant carpenter in the regular service. These officers are thirty-four years of age, twenty-six, twenty-six, forty-two, and forty-four, respectively and their ages are therefore not out of line with those of regular personnel. The question of officer replacement deserves attention as there are many officers whose services must be lost within the next five or ten years. The Twenty-fifth Fleet Division has two enlisted men attending the Third Naval District officer school as a step toward possible replacement.
The writer requested the comment of a battalion commander, not an Academy graduate, as to Naval Academy graduates in the reserve and it was substantially as follows: “Our organization has been fortunate in securing Academy graduates who have generally taken a deep interest in the work of the naval reserve. We have also secured officers from the enlisted personnel of the naval reserve who have, in the same degree, taken interest in the organization. Making good as a reserve officer is largely a question of stability of character and employment which permits giving the necessary time and effort to attend drills and cruises and which is backed by sufficient professional attainment to make the effort worth while.” It is my own observation that most Naval Academy graduates in civil life do not dislike the service or show lack of interest in it but, on the contrary, they possess a lively and, often, an active interest in it and have its wellbeing and advancement at heart.
Each fleet division is allowed two chief petty officers, four first-class, six second- class, and eight third-class petty officers. Firemen first class are counted against the third-class petty officer quota. To develop an efficient engineer’s force it would be well to allow each division a “bonus” of four firemen first class who would be in addition to the third-class petty officer allowance. Our petty officers have either had service in the regular Navy or served an enlistment in the Naval Reserve. Those coming up from seaman and fireman ratings were developed by detailing them as “strikers” for their respective ratings over a period of from one to two years. The ability of the petty officers has been favorably commented on both of the last two cruises and they have carried out their duties along with their regular shipmates to the satisfaction of all concerned.
The spirit of cooperation between regular and reserve that has marked our cruises has been of considerable help in getting the full measure of benefit out of the training period. 1 here has been no petty hazing except as to newly enlisted seamen second class and firemen third class and this has been largely by reserve petty officers. In the Twenty- fifth Fleet Division all candidates for enlistment must be voted into the organization by the enlisted men of the division. A single adverse vote is sufficient to bar an applicant. A man having an honorable discharge from the regular Navy is considered to have been passed and accepted. Then, if in all respects qualified for enlistment by U. S. Navy standards, he is enlisted for four years in Naval Reserve and the Naval Militia of N.J. During the past two years six men have applied for enlistment in the Navy, one in the Marine Corps, and one in S. Coast Guard. All were accepted.
The activities of the Naval Reserve at drill during the year furnish the foundation for their active duty on the fifteen-day cruise. A division is allowed sixty drills at its, home station during the year. These drills must be so planned that the interest of the personnel is aroused and maintained. A feature of the drill season on the home station is the visit of the Navy Department Board of Inspection, which occurs once each year. The board views the reservists at infantry drill, setting up drill under arms, emergency drills, the deck force at gun drill and the engineer force manning their stations. The various schools of instruction are seen and the methods used are commented on and desirable changes suggested. The board assigns marks to each division in (1) mobilization efficiency, (2) general appearance, (3) office work and records, (4) drills and class-room instruction. The division virtually assigns its own mark in the following: (5) average drill attendance, (6) percentage of division that cruised with the division, (7) inspection attendance, and (8) procurement. It is proposed that a penalty be assessed for excessive turn-over of personnel. The 150 reserve divisions are rated and given a standing for the fiscal year.
The typical evening drill routine which furnishes the bulk of the instruction for the division and brings it to a point where it can profitably take the fifteen-day cruise is as follows:
8:05 p.m. Officers’ call, equip and assemble for muster.
8:10 p.m. Assembly followed by adjutant’s call, roll call, and battalion assembly.
8:15 p.m. Drill call
Twenty-fourth Division— infantry, setting up exercises (with and without arms).
Twenty-fifth Division — gun drill on 4-inch 50- caliber gun and loading machine, safety precautions.
8:45 p.m. Drill call—
Twenty-fourth Division— gun drill, etc.
Twenty-fifth Division—infantry, setting up, etc.
9:15 p.m. Collision drill, fire drill, provide and abandon ship.
9:30-10:00 Class-room instruction.
10:05 p.m. Quarters for second muster.
The schools of instruction provide for the division of men into appropriate groups for instruction, which may be practical or theoretical, and which are conducted by a commissioned officer or chief petty officer. To provide for continuous and effective instruction it is absolutely necessary that the officers and chief petty officers detailed as instructors shall be regular and dependable in their drill attendance. The schools conducted in this battalion are as follows:
1. Engineers’ school.
2. Deck force school.
3. Radio school.
4. Signalman and quartermaster school.
5. Gunner’s mates school.
6. Yeoman school.
7. First-aid instruction by medical officer.
Proper armory facilities are essential as little inspiration or interest can be aroused by drilling under the handicap of poor surroundings. If docking facilities are to be had, a floating armory is satisfactory. It can be fitted up with a drill shed, 4-inch gun, signal searchlights, blinker tubes, knotting and splicing board, an armory, office space, wardroom country, petty officers’ quarters, and berth-deck quarters for the crew. The former Shipping Board ships are generally converted and already have ample facilities for training an engineer force. They are not, however, suitable for cruising and a vessel of the Eagle type has been found to be the most satisfactory for this purpose. It is available for week-end cruising and is in most essential characteristics a smaller destroyer. Its armament, small boats, living quarters, and engineering lay-out are so similar that training to perform the war-time mission can be carried out under the most favorable conditions. The Seventh Battalion cruises a greater number of days on the open sea on U.S.S. Eagle 55 than it does on a destroyer during the fifteen-day cruise—more than the fifteen-day period, in fact. Some organizations have an outline of a destroyer painted on the armory floor and hold various exercises on this diagram. It is our experience that the enlisted men soon lose interest in such an artificial procedure and it is far better to hold, say, man-overboard drill aboard the Eagle 55 alongside the dock and to supplement it by frequent drills on the week-end cruises off Sandy Hook under seagoing conditions.
It is believed that the efficiency of the U. S. Naval Reserve could be considerably enhanced if the same close cooperation existed between the Navy Department and the individual state militia offices (usually the office of the state adjutant general) as exists at present and has for some time past between the War Department and these offices. Little has been done along these lines, possibly due to constant rotation in office of regular officers assigned to reserve activities. This prevents, or seems to, the necessary personal touch and knowledge of conditions, which make desirable the personnel serving simultaneously as federal and state organizations. Today, many states which formerly maintained splendid organizations have allowed them to go out of existence. At the same time their national guards are better maintained, equipped, and housed than ever. As examples, the states of Maine, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have allowed their naval militia activities to cease. Ten states maintain naval militia divisions. These are fully as valuable to the state as the army outfits they maintain jointly with the U. S. Government. They are always available as police or in case of local disaster. The advantages of state service to the naval reserve are: (1) adequate armories can be secured; (2) naval regulations can be written into state laws placing the facilities and police power of the state behind a policy of proper discipline; (3) three days’ additional active duty each year on state rifle range; (4) appropriations which supplement federal money for many purposes, notably for additional cruising; (5) state-owned docking facilities; (6) state aid and funds available for ceremonies throughout state instead of local duty only.
The foregoing lines have been written with the object of clarifying the all-year- ’round problem of training and developing the Naval Reserve, as seen by officers actively associated with Naval Reserve divisions ever since the reorganization in 1925- While ships assigned to cruising the reserve no doubt go backward it is probable that this applies only to surface appearances and, slightly if at all, to essential operating condition. These ships carry divisions which would man approximately 140 destroyers in case of national emergency and it is certainly better to become aware through practical work-outs of any deficiencies in training and to correct them than to await a time of stress before so doing. It is felt that the reservists benefit greatly from their association with the regular personnel and each year progress more and more toward their objective of becoming a well-trained and balanced destroyer crew.
Seagoing Customs
(See page 11, January, 1929, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Leonard Doughty, Jr., U. S. Navy.—The origin ascribed to the hand salute in this article, i.e., that it is derived from the custom of knights raising their visors for mutual recognition, is not only fictitious but harmful. This version has been circulated for some time in the Navy, even appearing in the Bluejacket’s Manual, until it has become an accepted tradition, and has thereby robbed the salute of much of its significance and of its value as part of the machinery of discipline.
It is even doubtful that any such custom as that described existed among knights. It is hard to imagine a knight plodding along a dusty road with his visor closed, only to open it on the approach of another knight. He would be more apt to keep it open until the approach of a potential enemy, or even to remove his helmet altogether, and put it on only upon approaching another knight. The heraldic device emblazoned on the shield served to make knights known to each other at a distance, and it is absurd to suppose that the small aperture of a visor opening would have enabled them to recognize each other at a distance to which no possible adversary would be permitted to approach unchallenged.
Even if we admit the authenticity of this custom, however, it is impossible to connect it with the salute. Such a gesture’s only significance would be that of a friendly greeting between equals, and it is precisely this interpretation of the salute which has a pernicious effect on morale. It seems clear that the only possible origin of the hand salute is that it is a substitute for removing the hat, which latter custom was well established as an acknowledgement of subordination.
The P. Larousse Dictionnaire du XIX Siecle says, “At the time, when the hat rabattu a la Henri IV was worn, politeness required that it be not removed…It is from this time that dates the habit of raising the hand to salute a superior.” And: “The ordonnance of 1788 required that lower officers, to salute a superior, remove the hat holding it downward at the right side without inclining the head or body.”
Further evidence is seen in the familiar fact that an orderly entering the captain’s cabin aboard ship does not remove his hat as all others do, but being in a purely military status performs the military substitute for that formality by saluting.
Mahan, in his essay on Jervis, says: “He wisely believed in the value of forms, and was careful to employ them, in this crisis of the mutinies, to enforce the habit of reverence for the insignia of the state and the emblems of military authority. Young lieutenants—for there were young lieutenants in those days—were directed to stand cap in hand before their superiors, and not merely to touch their hats in a careless manner.” And again: “To stand uncovered before a superior instead of lightly touching the hat, to pay outward reverence to the national flag, to salute the quarter-deck as the seat of authority, were no vain show under him.” And finally “…standing with his hat in his hand over his head, as was his lordship’s invariable custom during the whole time that any person whatever, were his rank even a common seaman, addressed him on service…” His lordship apparently had ideas of his own on the origin of the salute.
The report was current at the time of the Russian revolution that the Soviet authorities in their mania for equality had abolished the salute, considering it a mark of servility, and that the morale and efficiency of their armies deteriorated markedly. Later the salute was restored and with it came a high degree of discipline and efficiency.
The career of Jervis and the experience of the Russians teach a lesson: the forms of military courtesy have a meaning and a value. If we allow them to be sugar-coated and euphemized out of all meaning, they will cease to have any value.