Personnel of the U. S. Navy have always preferred using active verbs rather than passive ones. In the Navy’s infancy, sailormen spoke, for example, of “repelling” boarders, not “resisting” them. And today, commanders speak of “fighting” their ship, not “deploying” her. No military man likes to envision a situation where the initiative, the option, is the enemy’s rather than his, where he cannot act but must, instead, react.
Thus, the phrase “civil defense,” and all that it connotes, has a vaguely distasteful sound to Navy men. But civil defense is one of the realities of 20th century warfare and, like it or not, naval personnel must think about it.
This paper will attempt to define the civil defense problem, to demonstrate the specifics in which civilian defense operations are basically different from military operations, and to outline a system by which civil defense can be made to operate.
There are potential wartime and peacetime disasters which require organized, heroic civilian efforts. This paper is addressed only to the situation of wartime attack on the United States.
In the event of nuclear war, two related problems are present. First is the human problem: how are we to minimize casualties? Here the accent is on protecting the individual and on supplying his animal needs. Second is the problem of restoring the political, economic, and social structure of our society so that this country can continue to function as a nation. Here the accent is on the greatest good for the largest number. Solutions to the two problems will usually be compatible, but not always. With the foregoing in view, the mission of civil defense in wartime can be taken to be:
To minimize civilian casualties and to maintain at effective levels the functioning of our political, economic, industrial-agricultural, and social systems.
Mention a thermonuclear war and most people immediately think of the creeping, silent menace of radioactive fallout. While the problem of fallout is major, it is probably not the greatest problem. Consider a hypothetical situation in which nuclear weapons had never been invented. Now, let us assume someone had developed a chemical bomb equivalent to ten megatons (MT) of TNT and the means to deliver it. Assume the radii of destruction by blast and thermal effects are the same as for a thermonuclear weapon, but that there is not the equivalent fallout problem. Consider the cities of Detroit and Ann Arbor, Michigan, which are about 25 miles apart. Suppose the chemical weapon were detonated over Detroit.
For these assumptions, insofar as direct damage is concerned, Ann Arbor will be little affected. If central Detroit is destroyed, however, Ann Arbor acquires immediate, enormous problems. First, Ann Arbor receives its electrical power from generating stations in Detroit. Lights go out. So do municipal and rural water pumps, almost all of which are electric. So do all of Ann Arbor’s radio stations. So do gasoline pumps at filling stations, food refrigeration equipment, and countless other essential labor-saving devices.
There are other problems, too. An audit of wholesale and retail outlets in Ann Arbor shows that they normally carry in stock only a three-day food supply for the city; almost all food comes from Detroit wholesalers. Drugs come primarily from Detroit jobbers. Fuel oil is distributed from Detroit.
Purely economic problems also are present. Ann Arbor bank checks clear through and obtain specie from Detroit. Many Ann Arbor citizens work in Detroit; and a large Ann Arbor employer is a division of a Detroit corporation. There will be no pay checks in either case.
If Ann Arbor is to survive the hypothetical chemical bomb attack on Detroit and continue to function, action must be taken rapidly and decisively. Electric power must be drawn from new sources and rationed, if needed. Water distribution points must be set up locally. Food supply lines must be organized from—let’s assume again—Indianapolis, Columbus, or Battle Creek, as must drug supply. Means of exchange—the monetary system— must be restored.
These same kinds of non-radiation problems exist in all cities near potential target areas. The nearer it is to the potential target and the more dependent it is on goods and services from the target, the greater is the outlying city’s problem.
Blast |
20 KT |
10 MT |
50 MT |
Wood-frame building |
|||
House collapses |
1 .3 miles |
10 miles |
18 miles |
Interior partitions down |
1.9 |
16 |
25 |
Interior partitions cracked |
4.5 |
35 |
60 |
Light steel-frame industrial building, single story |
|||
Severe frame distortion |
1.7 |
7 |
13 |
Frame distorted |
1.3 |
10 |
20 |
Light siding buckled |
4.8 |
38 |
62 |
Multi-story reinforced concrete building Interior walls cracked or blown down |
0.8 |
9 |
13 |
Interior partitions cracked |
4.8 |
38 |
62 |
Thermal (clear day) Skin 1st degree burn |
1.5 |
21 |
43 |
2nd degree burn |
1.7 |
23 |
60 |
3rd degree burn |
2.8 |
31 |
70 |
Fine grass burns |
1.7 |
22 |
~45 |
Unpainted wood chars |
1.2 |
16 |
~30 |
White-painted wood chars |
0.8 |
~13 |
~24 |
Direct (not fallout) radiation Unshielded Half die (450 roentgens) |
~0.8 |
~2.2 |
~2.8 |
Little or no acute effect (100 roentgens) |
1.9 |
2.6 |
~3.4 |
In the area of bomb damage in Detroit, the problem of medical care of injured and disposal of the dead are superimposed on the other acute problems. After the explosion, Detroit’s survivors will look to Ann Arbor for help.
Thus, even if we ignore radiation, there are still formidable problems that must be solved. These non-radiation problems are more complex than the nuclear radiation ones; and ultimately the non-radiation problems are probably the more difficult.
But, for a moment, let us leave Ann Arbor and its calamitous—but not catastrophic— problems, and turn our attention to Detroit. How many of Detroit’s citizens have been killed by our hypothetical chemical bomb? While one must not minimize the damage a megaton-yield weapon would inflict, it is also important not to over-estimate damage. The over-all destruction any one weapon will cause is a function of many variables: weapon design, weapon energy, yield, burst height, terrain, smoke and water content of the air, air temperature, thermal atmospheric inversions, individual resistance of personnel to traumatic stress, and details of construction of individual structures. It also depends on the state of preparedness of targets for attack: the use of bomb shelters, the absence of stray objects to become missile hazards, the removal of potential combustion hazards, the wetting down of combustible surfaces. Thus, no precise predictions can be made of radii of damage.
Average probable damage radii can be developed, however, from sources such as the Atomic Energy Commission’s The Effects of Atomic Weapons. Table I was constructed from this publication and shows effects in a flat terrain for a low air burst on a clear day. For a surface burst the radii listed are somewhat smaller.
With respect to blast, the average human body can withstand immensely more overpressure than most structures. Thus, for survival of personnel, the problem is to prevent a falling beam or flying glass from striking the person, or to prevent his being lifted bodily and dashed against a wall. Even if a house collapses, a well-constructed basement shelter will probably protect the individual. Therefore, referring to Table I, and a map of Detroit, many Detroit residence areas will survive blast with only elementary precautions; most will survive blast with inexpensive home shelters. Further, at a distance of ten miles from a surface burst, there are about 33 seconds between the time a ten-MT bomb explodes and the blast wave arrives; there is time to take shelter.
Thermal effects are the phenomena in a megaton weapon which probably would cause the most damage. First, more explosion energy goes into thermal radiation at high weapon yields; second, thermal damage radii scale about with the inverse square of weapon energy (blast damage scales as the inverse cube of yield); third, the probability of a large area fire storm—a secondary slightly delayed effect which consumes large areas, generates hurricane-force winds, and starves the area of oxygen—is large; fourth, the thermal energy travels at the speed of light.
Nevertheless, thermal radiation probably will not result in complete destruction of Detroit. For a ten-MT weapon, 50 per cent of the thermal energy arrives in seven seconds and 80 per cent in 28 seconds. Thus, there is time for individuals in the open at, say 20 miles, to take evasive action and reduce a first-degree burn to a third-degree burn. Anything which casts a shadow generally protects against direct thermal effects; thus, trees and other buildings will protect many structures, as does smoke and fog. Buildings with fireproof exteriors (and protected against entry of heat through windows) will resist burning to relatively short ranges. Although most combustible materials will flame within the radius at which 12 calories/cm2 is received, it will require appreciable quantities of combustible material close by to cause a significant fire. A frame house painted white does not burn with 25 calories/cm2 incident. Further, the extent of fires will be delimited in U. S. cities because of the dispersion of structures in outlying areas. Fires will not spread as readily from one house to another in suburbia and the rate of consumption of oxygen per unit area may not be as great as for widespread fires in European and Asiatic cities.
Casualties in target areas due to non-radiation weapon effects will be enormous, but personnel can and will survive. The better prepared, the better chance the individual has.
Now, let us replace the hypothetical chemical weapon with a thermonuclear device. There are now two new weapon effects: direct nuclear radiation and fallout. Direct nuclear radiation (as used here) is that which is given off during the process of explosion of the nuclear weapon plus that which is given off by the fireball as it rises. For hardened shelters within a mile or two of ground zero, it is an important contribution to the total dose of radiation received at these ranges, but most personnel within such ranges will be killed by other causes (Table I). Compared to other effects, direct nuclear radiation usually can be ignored.
Fallout is the bugaboo. Consider the development of a typical mushroom cloud. For a surface burst, a quantity of surface material is vaporized. As the fireball rises, it sucks up dust and debris to form the “stem.” Above a certain altitude, the density of the fireball equals that of the surrounding atmosphere; it ceases to rise and expends its kinetic energy in lateral expansion. The atomized fission products from the weapon explosion now condense with evaporated earth and with dust; this is what constitutes “fallout.” The radii of the stem and the mushroom cloud, and the altitude of the bottom and tops of the cloud are shown in Table II.
|
20 K.T |
10 MT |
50 MT |
Stem Diameter (Fireball diameter) |
~0.25 miles |
~3.5 miles |
~17 miles |
Mean cloud radius |
~2.5 miles |
~28 miles |
|
Mean cloud top |
35,000 feet |
~105,000 feet |
|
Mean cloud bottom |
15,000 feet |
30,000 feet |
|
The ground area under the stem receives an enormous fallout radiation dose, particularly if the weapon is detonated on, or near, the ground. After full development of the mushroom cloud, remnants of the stem drift downwind, giving extremely heavy fallout in an area downwind having a width about the diameter of the stem and length dependent on the wind.
Fallout patterns from the mushroom top depend on many factors. Most particles are small enough that they diffuse downward. The time to reach the ground depends on the initial altitude, particle size, ambient air temperature, etc. The time of fall from 80,000 feet is shown in Table III.
TABLE III |
||
Particle Diameter |
Time of Fall |
Cumulative Percentage of Initial Cloud Activity |
(Microns) |
(Hours) |
(Cumulative) |
340 |
0.75 |
3.8% |
250 |
1.4 |
16.4 |
150 |
3.9 |
30.9 |
75 |
16.0 |
59.0 |
33 |
80.0 |
— |
16 |
340.0 |
— |
The point at which fallout strikes the ground depends on the initial height of the particles, the rate of fall, and the wind. Consider Ann Arbor and Detroit. In 94 per cent of the time, lower winds do not blow from Detroit; i.e., in this 94 per cent of the time no fallout will reach Ann Arbor from Detroit. Six per cent of the time lower winds are flowing toward Ann Arbor from Detroit. But consider a ten-MT weapon. The base of the mushroom cloud is at about 30,000 feet and the top at 105,000 feet. At high altitudes wind is westerly a very high per cent of the time, and these high winds carry fallout away from Ann Arbor. Re-examination of data from Pacific nuclear tests has shown that whereas the mushroom cloud for a ten-MT weapon has a radius of about 28 miles, fallout in middle latitudes generally will extend upwind (of the 40,000- to 60,000-foot wind) only nine to ten miles.
Thus the chances are much better than 99 per cent that Ann Arbor—only 25 miles from a probable Detroit target area—will receive no fallout from Detroit. On the other hand, the chances are high that a community east of a target area will receive high fallout.
Ann Arbor is about 200 miles east of Chicago. Assume a 20-knot average wind and a ten-MT explosion over Chicago. The fallout would arrive at Ann Arbor about ten hours later; it will have an initial rate of about 20 roentgens per hour, and a person in the open would receive a total exposure of about 1,000 roentgens. For a 50-MT weapon, the comparable number is 5,700 roentgens. About 700 roentgens will kill almost all personnel. However, personnel in Ann Arbor having fallout shelters will survive, and even personnel who only prepare basements have a chance of surviving even 50-MT fallout from Chicago (5,790 roentgens).
When fallout arrives, two events must occur if personnel are to survive: (1) they must receive a warning to take shelter, and (2) they must have a shelter. A typical Civil Defense- approved basement shelter reduces dose by 100-200. A below-ground basement in a frame dwelling may reduce dose by a factor of 10-20. The basement of a two- to three-story industrial building with concrete floors may reduce dose by a factor upwards of 50.
Each community has its own fallout threat. With well-publicized, sensible advance preparations (food, water, etc.) most U. S. citizens will probably survive fallout. Without advance preparation, a large number will die needlessly.
Civil defense is similar to a military operation in that it requires planning, discipline, flexibility, and decisive, organized action.
In a military operation there is a theater commander who assigns missions to task force commanders, who further assign missions to task group commanders, and so on to individual combat units. By this cohesive organization, the theater commander is able to meet his over-all objectives in the most efficient manner. Furthermore, since decisions are always based on the task and its purpose, and because of the method by which purpose of task is derived, the junior’s effects always support the senior’s mission.
Civil defense logically is organized into national, regional, state, county, and community tiers. To provide assistance and direction in the making of advance plans, the civil defense hierarchy correctly should operate as does the military. State and national areas can provide training aids and sophisticated technical personnel not available to the county or city, and they can co-ordinate plans between adjacent units. But operations in event of war are different.
The fact that civil defense operations are different is based upon the assumption of simultaneous attack on many targets. If only one community or metropolitan complex were affected by an attack, the state organization, for example, could direct recovery operations. If many communities are simultaneously affected, state CD staffs would not be sufficient to cope with local problems, and local communities or counties (or major metropolitan complexes) must fend for themselves.
Thus, it is the contention of this paper that each local community faced with non-nuclear problems is fighting an independent battle of survival and the role of higher civil defense echelons is to support these local units. The upper echelon is not directing the efforts of local units as in the military; it is supporting them. Suppose Detroit were destroyed so that Ann Arbor’s usual food supply channels were destroyed. Ann Arbor and/or Washtenaw County authorities must determine food need, arrange distribution points and times of distribution, and enforce rationing. It appears logical that the role of the State of Michigan civil defense organization is to furnish the food needed (hopefully from agricultural stock piles) and the means to transport it. Drugs are a similar category. So is fuel oil. So is temporary housing, when needed. Electric power may be an exception; it could be handled centrally.
Fallout protection also requires local operational control. In most cases, Ann Arbor will not receive fallout until three to ten hours following a nuclear attack. A great deal of effective action may be taken by home owners during this period (e.g., cover basement windows with dirt), and civil defense workers, for example, can walk to their posts from anywhere in Ann Arbor. We must take advantage of these last precious hours; so we must be able to predict with some accuracy and advise personnel when fallout will arrive in the area.
It is not feasible for the state organization to predict time of arrival of fallout for each local area in a multi-weapon attack. Upper echelons must support local fallout prediction (time, location, and yield of bursts; upper winds; flash fallout reports at various upwind stations). It is too vast a problem for the State to make predictions for each community.
Once fallout has arrived, determination of when local civil defense teams can emerge from shelters to make control area surveys, assessment of the local contamination problem, advice to citizens, direction of initial decontamination (e.g., areas around power, water sewerage, and medical facilities and food distribution points) and direction of final cleanup also must be handled locally. The state and federal efforts are in support of these local actions—higher echelons just do not have the personnel to undertake it.
Thus far, operations for the survival of the individual have been treated. Provision of the animal needs of personnel during time of stress is a basic need if anarchy is to be avoided. Firm action by local authorities in implementing emergency powers insures that breakdown does not occur. Again, aside from the enabling legislation from higher government echelons necessary for local authorities to act, this is a local problem that must be dealt with as necessary by local authorities. If there is a multi-weapon attack on the United States and local political organizations deteriorate, generally there are not enough state government personnel—including National Guard—to restore order, but if local organizations continue to function, state and federal organizations can also continue to be effective.
Restoration of economic stability following attack and the patching up of our industrial- agricultural complex are not primarily local problems. These tasks are similar to the familiar concept of military operations. While there are aspects to both of these problems which must be dealt with at local levels, the basic problems are nationwide and must be directed from the top down.
Thus, the thesis has been advanced that, when war commences, civil defense direction will be a local function and state and higher echelons must support these local, individual efforts. To this extent civil defense operations are the reverse of military operations. The exceptions are prewar training, the post-attack reorganization of our industrial and agricultural complex and the maintenance of economic stability.
Current civil defense organization divides the nation into regions composed of states, with the latter subdivided into local government organizations. The national and regional organizations are both composed of federal employees; the remainder are branches of local civilian government.
Provided local governments have the legal authority and the will to. act in an emergency, the existing organization appears eminently logical. Local authorities need to be bolstered with specialists in weapon effects and radiation—by additional training for local government employees or by using local industrial or college specialists. But local government is the logical framework for handling the local problems. Law enforcement, fire fighting, health, welfare, and highway agencies can be trained to handle radiation monitoring and decontamination assignments, and they should be competent to handle non-nuclear problems. In addition, they have legal requirements and the dedication to remain at their posts—something lacking in purely volunteer organizations. They are already organized and controlled.
Because of the magnitude and uniqueness of the various problems, it is not enough to decide that local governments will handle problems. As in a military operation, there must be adequate planning and training. At all levels, this must include recognition of both the radiation and non-radiation problems, flexible plans for dealing with all of them, and practical exercises.
To implement civil defense, some concepts foreign to most local governments must be adopted. One is the “operations center.” It will be essential for the executive head of local government to have an operations staff in one location competent to run all essential phases of local government. This staff must include all executive agencies as well as the unique radiological hazard staff. From this protected operations center, survival and recovery will be directed.
A second is the “greatest good for the largest number.” A man overboard from a naval vessel is often sacrificed in wartime to avoid the submarine hazard to his ship. Similarly, civilian doctors must ignore hopeless cases to save those who can be saved, and they must abandon hospital inmates (who cannot be moved to safety) when fallout occurs. Firemen will not fight fires until after fallout hazards are small. Doctors and firemen—all personnel —must save themselves for post-attack work.
A third is the “succession to command.” Each local executive agency must be backed up by a legal chain-of-succession in depth, so that authority to act is retained.
A fourth is decisive action. Local civil government is often carried out in an aura of precedence, legal limitations, and politics. These encourage indecisive avoidance of issues—the opposite of the action needed in emergencies. However, civilian leaders are the local leaders who must be looked to in an emergency. An overwhelming majority very probably will act, when necessary.
To be implemented effectively, the nature of civil defense must be understood, the problems it faces recognized, and realistic plans to deal with these problems made ready. At any cost, it must not be abandoned due to misinformation, nor can we allow it to be misdirected. Civil defense can be a potent deterrent to an aggressor and our means of national survival in a thermonuclear war.