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"Exercise Match Maker”
(See pages 139-143, January 1966 Proceedings)
Captain E. F. Gallagher, U. S. Navy— Evidently the recommendation of Commodore Macleod that “There should be annual opportunities for other NATO units to do the same,” i.e., participate in a MATCH MAKER- type exercise, received a fair wind, for the four nations which took part in MATCH MAKER I, have, from January to June 1966, participated in MATCH MAKER II.
While the MATCH MAKER I squadron consisted of four ships and emphasized logistic and repair support under NATO standardized procedures, the MATCH MAKER II squadron consisted of six ships and was keyed to the formulation of new NATO tactics and the evaluation of existing tactics.
Commencing 22 January, the squadron engaged in intensive training at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range near Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and participated in the U. S. Atlantic Fleet’s annual training exercise, Operation SPRINGBOARD. The SPRINGBOARD training was most beneficial in developing the squadron’s capability to operate as an integrated team and as a tune-up for special NATO exercises conducted in June. The concept of cross-pollination where crew members of ships of different nationalities are exchanged in order to give the officers and enlisted personnel an opportunity to familiarize themselves with how the other men live,
A new horizon for NATO operations is presented as a contributor to this month’s forum urges regular exercises and cross-pollination of certain ship types from Atlantic Alliance navies. The proposal calls for an extension of the 1965 and 1966 Match Maker exercises which brought together destroyer-type ships from the United States (left), Britain (center), The Netherlands (right), and Canada.
work, operate, and think, has been continued and expanded from the scheme employed in MATCH MAKER I.
Cross-pollination is a favorite idea with the men and the concept has heightened their interest and enthusiasm in the exercise. It also pays off in a better understanding of mutual problems and develops co-operation, team work, and mutual respect.
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The six ships participating in MATCH MAKER II were HMS Agincourt, a British radar picket destroyer; HNethMS Drenthe, a Dutch antisubmarine destroyer; HMCS Annapolis, HMCS Skeena, and HMCS Restigouche, Canadian destroyer escorts; and the USS Garcia (DE-1040), a new U. S. escort ship. This year’s commodore of the MATCH MAKER squadron
was Captain Parker B. Armstrong, U. S. Navy, whose flagship for the most part was the Garcia. Like its predecessor, the MATCH MAKER II squadron was particularly oriented toward antisubmarine warfare training.
Not only has MATCH MAKER II again demonstrated the feasibility of the concept of ships of different nationalities operating together as a group, but it has come to represent a NATO sea force in being. There is a tremendous growth potential here which could encourage greater participation by other NATO countries than in the past. This is particularly so at this time because of the forced revisions to NATO resulting from the French decision to withdraw from the organization. Fortunately, there is sea room to the west and north which facilitates the natural expansion and development of NATO toward the sea.
Perhaps there should be an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLant) Mobile Sea Force —built upon the MATCH MAKER concept— to complement the existing Allied Command Europe (ACEur) Mobile Force. The NATO maritime nations could provide forces according to the availability of their assets and in phase with a schedule of varying types of ships, including destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, and patrol craft, each type to operate together for from four to six months.
In this way the MATCH MAKER squadron could become a permanent unit of ACLant and could be the nucleus of the Mobile Sea Force. Depending on the availability of re-
sources, the ships of one period might be mine sweepers, next submarines, then fast patrol boats, and finally destroyers. The cycle could then be repeated or be varied if necessary. By varying the types from time to time, the crosspollination concept could be extended and nations could be brought more in tune with each other than ever before.
But most important, a permanent MATCH MAKER would foster the development of NATO forces at sea, in being—the ACLant Mobile Sea Force. The sea has a great deal to offer toward the future growth of military strength in NATO. The land and air spaces of continental Europe are filled to the point where new training areas are needed. Yet the sea is wide open and offers no national barriers or problems of sovereignty. Here is the place for NATO to grow.
"The Submarine’s Long Shadow”
(See pages 30-39, March 1966
and pages 117-118, June 1966 Proceedings)
Commander L. E. Zeni, U. S. Navy (Center for Naval Analyses of the Franklin Institute)—I congratulate Commander Smith for a well-written article, but wish to temper his pessimistic philosophy. Only once before in my 20 years in the Navy have I encountered such resignation to defeat. In that instance the entire faculty of an ASW school began to believe in the inevitability of the submarine and it was a submarine officer, from another Navy, who reneged on his code to the “Silent Service” and gave away trade secrets in the hope of instilling confidence in the military values of training, perseverance, and experience using the best weapons available at the moment.
In the case of “The Submarine’s Long Shadow,” as with similar writings, limiting the semantic parameters can create a situation which appears to have no solution. This is fallacious analysis, and Commander Smith has described and interpreted an environmental context which emphasizes the submarine.
First is the commonly stated conviction that “the German U-boats almost defeated the Allies in both World Wars.” Almost means only a little less than “nearly” which in turn indicates measurement from some base or static situation. Hypothetically speaking in terms of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, the static situation could be today—a day of “peace” with merchant ships plying the world’s oceans at will; submarines leaving and entering their pens quite safely during broad daylight and quite secure in the knowledge that the concepts of international law will, in most cases, prevail; nations with productive capacity and budgets oriented away from military preparation; and so on. But tomorrow this static situation becomes dynamic— tomorrow is a day of war. Yesterday, submarines, armed with the knowledge of a thousand-fold observations, were lying in wait in the ocean’s most strategic locations. Today, on signal, the torpedoes are fired and the submarines proceed to port by the shortest navigational routes without concern for minefields or the few enemy ASW forces rushing to the scene of the sinkings.
The situation is now a dynamic one and the quantum jump in the situation with respect to the relative position of the submarines as against the ASW forces is a derivative of the political-military-economic policies prevalent during the static situation. The signal, which launched the situation off dead center and caused the pendulum to swing violently toward the submarine’s favor, now allows the ASW forces to become active. Yesterday, the the static situation of peace and international law of the seas was modus operandi for the ASW forces. Today, dependent on the rate of supply, these forces can mine their enemy’s channels and harbors, crush the submarine pens, destroy the capacity for building submarines and torpedoes, and increase the number of ships on ASW patrol and screening convoys.
The dynamic situation is definitely one of growth for the ASW forces. The submarine today, in the dynamic situation, finds that intelligence becomes less frequent and more subjective, that mines get in the way, that torpedoes are not so plentiful, that there is less
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Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
Comment and Discussion 117
and less space in the surviving pens, and so on. The dynamic situation appears to be one of decline for the submarine. The rate of change in the growth and decline of the ASW forces and of the submarines respectively in the dynamic situation depends on how well the belligerents pursued a program of research and development during the static situation. Whether or not the “gap” described by Commander Smith is big or small is most difficult to measure by analytical techniques.
This difficulty of measurement provides another parameter in which Commander Smith’s environmental context does not present both sides of the problem. Today, the “gap” is obtained during the static situation through a continuing series of controlled ASW exercises. The author contends that the artificialities of these exercises are, in reality, an added capability for the ASW forces.
Yesterday, in equilibrium, the exercise submarines left port with their crews well rested and scheduled to be back in port on Friday afternoon for recreation and family life. The navigator’s track to the exercise area skirted only rocks and shoals; the exercise area, only an infinitesimal part of the ocean, was still several hours away and there was no pressing requirement to quiet the submarine; and location of a hunter-killer group or exercise convoy should be easily found since discrimination from singly-travelling merchant ships was not difficult. The establishment of operating areas close to the home ports certainly aided morale; most of the crew on deck could wave to their families and sightseers along the shore as they left port. Exercise schedules permitted orderly departure during daylight hours; the location of the operating areas did not require long transits over thousands of miles through ASW defenses. Problems of refueling, of the human considerations during long patrols, and of the need for continuous secrecy were not part of the exercise planning for the submarines.
When the exercise area is reached there are additional differences in the environmental context in the static to dynamic situation model, the most significant being that the submarine will not be conditioned to or take into its planning the use of live ammunition. Even the firing of practice torpedoes is carefully controlled to ensure complete peace of mind to those in the submarine. Upon location of the exercise surface group, most likely by passive means, and upon reaching the area of where active sonar contact by the ASW forces is probable, the submarine can increase speed and barrel in. When the ASW forces do make contact, the need for positive classification before any exercise weapons can be launched provides the submarine with sufficient time to reach her torpedo launch point safely.
The submariner, in a dynamic situation, besides the fear of encountering live ammunition in the attack area with its related effect on plans, modus operandi, crew morale and so on, rmist transit to his attack point after fighting with nets, minefields, defensive barriers, coastal watchers, and patrolling ASW forces. Upon departing base, the submariners must also wonder if the base will still be available for rest and replenishment when and if the submarine returns.
The change in the weapon systems themselves, when the static situation becomes dynamic, has not been considered, ft is possible that even with weapon systems, the growth and decline concepts were also factors which ensured the victory of the ASW forces in World War f and in World War II.
"Surface Ship Overhauls”
(See pages 26-33, February 1966,
and pages 132-133, April 1966 Proceedings)
Captain John R. Newland, U. S. Navy (Planning Officer, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard)—The article by Lieutenant Madouse was particularly timely in view of recent retention board recommendations to reduce repair work assigned to ships crews during overhauls. We who make a career of building and repairing naval ships are often appalled by the major difficulties that ship’s force faces during overhaul and by the unfortunate impact of those difficulties upon our efforts to plan our own work and complete it in an orderly fashion.
I feel that a lot of waste heat is generated by failure to appreciate that dialog between ship and yard is inevitable, even desirable. I can see nothing “ironic” in the fact that buyer and seller are dependent on each other. There is a prevalent misconception, stated as dogma by Lieutenant Madouse, that the junior
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skipper of a ship under overhaul “is being cast in the role of the amateur . . . against a team of professionals.” Why not substitute
the words “assisted by” for “against”! We Engineering Duty Officers who run the naval shipyards can hardly claim even amateur status as ship operators. But it would be false modesty to deny that we are professionals in ship repair. As professionals we expect that the “amateurs” will question many of our perfectly valid ideas. And, as human beings we occasionally find it harder than it should be to profit by such “monitoring.” Nevertheless, an experienced shipyard officer usually takes great satisfaction in being assigned to the overhaul of a ship with a hard-nosed, hard-driving skipper who knows what he wants—and who will listen to the ideas of the “professionals” on how to get it!
Lieutenant Madouse has a mature concept of the Eternal Triangle of ship repair work: the Ship, the Yard, and the Type Commander. I think his suggestion that the type commander be represented more adequately at the shipyard is excellent. The type commander’s representative should be experienced in engineering afloat, and he should have ready access to the decision-makers in the maintenance and operations sections of his staff. Otherwise, he will represent merely an additional source of friction and delay in problem solving. A sharp type commander representative, authorized to put his boss’s money where his mouth is, could be a great asset to the yard and the ship.
Some day the bulk of ship’s force repair work may be eliminated if the retention planners have their way. Until that happy event, I cannot see the alternative to formal submission of an integrated ship’s force work list prior to beginning a shipyard overhaul. In order to plan its work intelligently, the yard has to know as early as possible which vital repairs affecting yard work are designated by the type commander as ship’s force jobs. Adequate planning by both ship and yard is necessary to minimize the “crises to meet cardinal dates” deplored by Lieutenant Madouse. The “creation of . . . nasty interrelationship problems during the later stages of the overhaul” feared by Lieutenant Madouse is to a large extent avoidable. After each unforeseen demand on the crew’s time
and talent, the ship’s force should promptly reappraise its ability to carry out its planned work. Supplementary work requests to cover planned work found to be beyond the capacity of ship’s force should be submitted by the ship, and acted on by the type commander as soon as possible. Here is one point at which a strong type commander representative at the yard could do great service.
Not only do I agree with Lieutenant Madouse that ship-to-shop jobs should be eliminated, but I should like to see banned forever the kind of job where ship’s force has to repair the transmitter, the yard takes on the antenna, and everyone forgets the waveguide or the multicoupler. In such circumstances testing becomes a nightmare of recriminations. Splitting the responsibility for scheduling, repairing, adjusting, de-bugging, and testing the interrelated units of a single system is poor economy.
A word about quality: “quality assurance” is a valid touchstone of the Space Age— a watchword that seems new, hot, and glamorous; it is. Also, like electronic data processing and all other high-cost innovations, it is very expensive when misused. I suspect that one example with which Lieutenant Madouse illustrated inadequate quality assurance actually served better to illustrate the pressure °n the shipyards for wasteful misuse of the quality assurance concept. The replacement of piping in an older ship (even extensive replacement) would hardly justify calling out the big guns—the radiographers, the ultrasonic testers, the magnetic particle inspectors, the “chem labbers.” Quality assurance is normally obtained in a shipyard through the nionitoring on a sample basis by quality assurance department personnel of production techniques and of in-process inspections carried out by production workers. In the case Lieutenant Madouse cited, a single visit by quality assurance personnel probably served quite adequately to spot-check production’s shipboard procedures. In the case of vital systems operating at high stresses or carrying dangerous fluids, painstaking non-destructive test procedures with voluminous documentation may be required. But to specify excessive quality assurance requirements where the e*pense is not justified by the service is wasteful of time, money, and hard-to-get talent.
Finally, a remark about scheduling industrial work: Lieutenant Madouse takes a dim view of the “crash program to finish on time” that is typical of shipyard overhauls. I will be the devil’s advocate and say that the apparent “crash” effort is a logical way to complete a ship and that it is practically unavoidable. The early part of an overhaul is devoted to the rather quiet processes of rip-out, structural prefabrication, and opening and inspecting equipment to determine what repairs are necessary. The middle part encompasses shop work and putting into the ship basic structures, foundations, piping, and wireways— also a quiet phase. The very last part of the overhaul is devoted to testing and trials. Only a few critical weeks, in the latter part of the overhaul but necessarily preceding the test period, can be allotted economically to the installation phase. During this phase comes the detailed, demanding work of installing repaired machinery and equipment and hooking it up; closing temporary accesses; installing or patching hull insulation, pipe covering and deck tile; restoring vent, berthing, and lockers removed as interference; removing temporary welding, lighting, oxygen and acetylene leads; and painting out as required. Obviously, during this period there will be mechanics of many trades on board, all trying to finish their jobs on schedule. Without unduly prolonging the overhaul and increasing costs, this type of work cannot be scheduled otherwise.
Lieutenant T. F. Murphy, U. S. Navy—- Having recently served as chief engineer of a FRAM II destroyer during her overhaul and because I am currently serving as aide to a shipyard commander (in a different yard), I read Lieutenant Madouse’s article with considerable interest.
Although I find myself in almost total agreement with the points emphasized in the article, I would like to emphasize some additional factors. The success or failure of an overhaul is for the most part determined quite early by the relationships established between ship’s force and the yard workers. This relationship is a direct reflection of the attitude of the ship’s commanding officer. While Lieutenant Madouse’s point concerning the responsibility of the skipper is widely
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agreed on, too often it takes the form of the captain bypassing his own chain of command to ensure that his ship gets his idea of a good overhaul. The captain who feels he must personally monitor jobs from start to sign-off will soon create the impression in the yard worker that the ship’s officers and petty officers do not have the confidence of their skipper. In some cases this direct involvement of the captain may be a result of frustration: the idle, cold, torn-apart condition of his ship leaves him no other way of exercising authority. But the primary cause is the lack of experience on the part of junior officers in small ships. With most of the ship’s officer billets being filled at least one rank below allowance, it must often seem to a captain that his unknowing officers will be exploited by the yard’s “pros” unless he personally steps in. While it is possible for a commanding officer to carry out such a direct policy successfully, it more often leads to catastrophe. Officers and petty officers will be quick to sense this lack of confidence and will refer the smallest details to the commanding officer, and since squadron and division com-
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manders find their commanding officers with ships in overhaul prime candidates for school quotas, courts-martial, etc., the commanding officer might find an overhaul out of his hands with no one on board to take up his load.
Of course, even with the best ship’s force- shipyard relationships, some current policies and practices lead to unsuccessful or only partially successful overhauls. These are generally caused by the current severe shortage of funds available to type commanders for funding overhauls. The tendency to “cut away the fat” in a work package becomes apparent early in the submission of the ship’s work requests. The ship’s officers, feeling that work which cannot be funded is still necesssary, decide that perhaps a direct approach once the ship arrives in the yard will get the work done without ever being directly charged to overhaul funds. This person-to-person approach, with suitable inducements involved, can be summed up in the word “cumshaw.” The current widespread practice of condoning, or even encouraging, those who can eke out these extra little jobs through statements such as “Get it done but don’t tell me what you had to do” with a knowing wink and smile leads to poor overhauls. The ship involved may escape without unhappy results, but the damage done by “cumshaw” will haunt the ships to follow. Unfortunately, since habitability items are often the first cut from a work list, they become the object of most “cumshaw” attempts. It is not uncommon to hear even executive officers and captains point with pride to a panelled wardroom or newly covered mess deck chairs with such statements as “only cost five foul weather jackets” or “30 pounds of coffee.” While this may be human nature, such practices lead to work being done at considerably greater cost since the yard worker “contracting out” to do a cumshaw job is still being paid for what he is not doing at the time. A ship that encourages cumshaw does itself a disservice no matter what the immediate gain.
Another unfortunate attempt to save overhaul funds, even more foolish than the ship-to- shop fallacy cited by Lieutenant Madouse, is the concurrent tender availability. This practice, especially common in the destroyer forces, can prove of value when the ship overhauls in homeport, but with geographical separation
of ship and tender this system becomes totally unworkable. The tender is usually taxed to capacity by ships alongside for regular availabilities. These jobs rightly take priority leaving the overhauled ship’s equipment to be Worked on as time permits. There is no opportunity for ship’s force to keep close check on progress or deal directly with the tender’s repair department. Job orders and even equipment have a way of getting mislaid between leaving the ship, being brought to a central pick-up area, loaded aboard by the tender’s driver, being transported to the tender, and finally getting to the right destination. In addition the weekly or even twice weekly truck schedule of the tender often imposes costly delays in the overhaul when a vital piece of gear is not delivered on time. The small savings involved is easily lost when delays and overtime result because of frequent late delivery by an overworked tender remote from the problem.
Finally, since the tender is a mobile support unit, an emergency could cause a sortie on too short notice to ensure offloading of all gear belonging to the ship in overhaul, particularly when the ship’s force is not present to see that it is done. Give the tenders back to the ships they should be servicing and leave the overhaul to the ship’s force and shipyard.
I fully agree with the desirability of the type commander having a representative available during the overhaul. Both the ship superintendent and the type desk representative have a vested interest in the shipyard. Decisions are made at the type commander level. Thus, the ship superintendent is sometimes viewed by the ship merely as someone who makes daily visits to get job orders signed off. This down-grading of the ship superintendent’s position is mainly due to two factors. Ship superintendents of small ships (destroyers and below) are often assigned to more than one ship simultaneously, forcing ships to compete with each other for their ship superintendent’s time and effort and because the ship superintendent has no direct access to the type commander who is funding the overhaul. The ship superintendent should have some access to a type commander representative, cither the commander’s material officer, or at least the squadron or division material officer. In addition he must be relieved of the burden of having to run several overhauls at once. This clarification of lines of responsibility is necessary if our ships are to have complete, successful overhauls.
Rear Admiral Floyd B. Schultz, U. S. Navy (Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard)—Lieutenant Madouse presents some very cogent thoughts on the ways and means for improving this very vital period in the life of a ship. While I have not had much experience with small ships, which seem to be the primary subject of his discussion, many of the points he presents are pertinent to overhauls on all ship types.
I contend that “the inescapable friction between shipyard and ship’s force,” is not “inescapable.” It does arise from time to time and sometimes prevails for an entire overhaul. When it does arise, it stems from personalities rather than from the system. Most important in this area is the attitude of the senior officers in the shipyard and those on board ship; the commanding officers of both do much to set this attitude.
The shipyard-ship’s force relationship is pretty well established before the ship arrives in the shipyard and certainly is fully established within one week after her arrival. The manner in which the ship receives the initial contingent of engineers and the interest displayed by the commanding officer in the prearrival conferences set the tone. If the ship approaches the overhaul with the attitude that these “yard birds are a bunch of bums,” the ship’s personnel are likely to find resentment. If the commanding officer receives the yard personnel as men sincerely wanting to do their best for the Navy, so will his officers and men, and, consequently, the response will be a sincere desire on the part of shipyard employees to do their best. Mutual respect means as much here as it does in any other human relationship. And, the commanding officer must display his confidence and respect for his own officers and men if he wants the shipyard to work with them. If the skipper is the only one who is permitted to give answers his subordinates lose their usefulness. This is well known, but it is surprising how often it is forgotten.
I realize that the author’s comment in this regard refers basically to the problem which a
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junior commanding officer has in getting along with his contemporaries in the shipyard. The young officer does not like to appear to put them on the report when things are not going to his liking. The relationship between the commanding officer and the shipyard commander must be maintained and the communication chain kept open by frequent visits to the ships by the yard commander to see the work in progress and to obtain on-the- spot briefings.
With regard to quality assurance, attention from the shipyard quality assurance organization does not put quality into the work. These people may assure quality but they do not produce it. Quality goes in when the work is being done and the best way to secure this is to follow the work as it is done. Quality assurance is not as universally required on surface ships as in submarines. Therefore, the surface ships do get less attention from the quality assurance division.
"Soviet Operations
in the War with Japan, August, 1945”
(See pages 50-63, May 1966 Proceedings)
Dr. Clark G. Reynolds (Assistant Professor, U. S. Naval Academy)—One of the fascinating “what-might-have-been-ifs” of the Pacific War is the question of combined Russo- American naval operations against the Japanese had the war lasted into the fall of 1945.
After the Yalta Conference in February 1945, at which the Soviet leaders promised to enter the war against Japan within three months after the defeat of Germany, American naval leaders began to give attention to the Russian entry into the Pacific war.
In April 1945, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, directed Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander Third Fleet, to prepare an operation plan establishing lines of communication across the North Pacific between U. S. bases in Alaska and Soviet bases in the Russian Far East. This line would bisect Japanese waters at Soya (La Perouse) Strait which separates Sakhalin Island and Hokkaido, northernmost of the Japanese home islands, and which joins the Sea of Okhotsk on the east with the Gulf of Tartary on the west.
The redeployment of European naval and
military forces to the Pacific began with the surrender of Germany in May 1945. With the anticipated entry of the Soviets into the war late in the summer, the logical U. S. base of operations to support the new “Russian front” was Adak Island in the Aleutians. The local theater commander was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander North Pacific Force, and veteran of the early sea battles against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher was faced with the task of opening the sea lanes between Adak and Vladivostok.
Allied merchant ships would have to be escorted from the Aleutians through the Kuriles to a point near Soya Strait. U. S. warships would cover the convoys that far; then Russian escorts were to take over. However, since the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s largest ships were two cruisers, any significant Japanese interference would probably become the responsibility of Admiral Fletcher’s forces. Although Russian Pacific Fleet Aviation and the U. S. 11th Army Air Force could easily command the air over northernmost Japan, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, their effectiveness depended on the weather.
With this realization, Admiral Nimitz began collecting warships to support the anticipated convoys to the Russian Far East. As Usual, the convoy escort forces would be built around escort carriers. However, unlike the convoy system in the Atlantic, where the CVEs had had only destroyers and destroyer escorts to work with, the Northern Pacific naval force would require cruisers as well. The Japanese might produce surface and probably air opposition.
Late in July 1945, Rear Admiral Harold M. Martin, Commander Carrier Division 23, was ordered to proceed to Eniwetok to organize Task Force 49. Eniwetok was the new base of both the fast and escort carriers for Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of Japan. Admiral Martin, whose “jeep” carriers were resting and replenishing at Leyte-Samar after 44 consecutive days in support of the landing forces at Okinawa, departed Leyte on 28 July for Eniwetok via the fleet anchorage at Ulithi. His flagship, the escort carrier Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75), was accompanied by one destroyer escort.
As the Hoggatt Bay passed the Marianas on 31 July, Admiral Martin flew ashore for three days of conferences with Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Martin was informed that Task Force 49 would probably consist of eight escort carriers and 12 destroyers. Admiral Fletcher, was also receiving other additional surface units, notably Cruiser Divisions One and Five under Rear Admirals John H. Brown, Jr., and Francis C. Denebrink, respectively. When combined operations commenced with the Russians, Admiral Fletcher would co-ordinate strategic planning while Admiral Martin would be the U. S. tactical commander.
Task Force 49 was formed at Eniwetok on 4 August, the day after Admiral Martin arrived there. The ships were then transferred to Admiral Fletcher’s authority. At Eniwetok, the crews got their last look at the tropics and readied their cold weather gear. On 9 August the Soviets declared war against Japan, and the following day Admiral Martin was ordered to Adak. He departed Eniwetok with three escort carriers and five destroyers on the 11 th. Each flattop carried the standard escort carrier air group of 20 FM Wildcat fighters and nine TBM Avenger torpedo bombers. Rear Admiral Ernest W. Litch, Commander Carrier Division 26, followed with two additional carriers on the 16th.
Meanwhile, Admiral Fletcher attempted to open discussions with the Russian naval commanders, but he made little headway, most likely because of the substantial gains the Soviet forces were making without American assistance. On the 15th, Japan announced its surrender and the plans for the Russian convoys were suspended. Three days later Admiral Martin arrived at Kuluk Bay, Adak, where he conferred with Admiral Fletcher over the prospective combined operation. Since Japan had in fact ceased hostilities the operation was cancelled altogether. Nevertheless, Operation CAMPUS-BELEAGUER—the occupation of Japan and China—was instituted, and on succeeding days Admiral Litch’s carriers and other warships continued to arrive at Adak.
With the Russians in the Kuriles and Sakhalin, but with northern Japan unoccupied, Admiral Fletcher hoisted his flag in the amphibious command ship Panamint (AGC-13) and sortied from Adak with two task forces. Task Force 42 under Rear Admiral Brown
led the way with Brown’s own light cruisers Concord (CL-10) and Trenton (CL-ll), and Rear Admiral Denebrink’s heavy cruisers Chester (CA-27), Pensacola (CA-24), and Salt Lake City (CA-25). Following was Task Force 44 (formerly TF 49), still under Rear Admiral Martin, with the escort carriers Hoggall Bay, Kitkun Bay (CVE-71), Nehenta Bay (CVE-74), Manila Bay (CVE-61), and Savo Island (CVE- 78). Admiral Fletcher’s forces also included 24 destroyers, three destroyer escorts, 12 minesweepers, and six auxiliaries.
The force missed the official day of Japan’s capitulation, as it crossed the International Date Line on 2 September. Although troubled by arctic fog and wary of Japanese trickery, Task Forces 42 and 44 hastened toward Ominato on the northern tip of Flonshu. As they neared the coast, the weather cleared and the carriers launched combat air patrols. On 8 September 1945, the ships entered Mutsu Bay and the next day, at Ominato, Admiral Fletcher took control of northern Honshu and all of Hokkaido.
The U. S. Navy had come close to joining Russian naval forces in facing another common enemy, but the quick end of the war was perhaps timely. The continental nation got the mainland; the sea power got the islands.
"A Critical Moment”
(See Cover, May 1966, Proceedings)
Ross A. Dierdorff—As Proceedings readers have now seen a “before” picture, I thought they might be interested in an “after” one from my father’s photograph album.
On the early morning of 9 October 1918,
Crossing the bow of a fast transport—as shown on the cover of the Proceedings for May 1966—can lead to this: the USS Shaw (DD-68) as she appeared on 11 October 1918, two days after the transport Aquitania knifed through her.
as the USS Shaw (DD-68) and four other destroyers were escorting HMS Aquitania into the English channel, the Shaw’s steering gear jammed on the inward leg of her zigzag and the British transport, laden with 8,000 troops, knifed neatly through the destroyer at 26 knots. A painting of the Aquitania under escort similar to your cover illustration (and by the sarne artist, Burnell Poole) hangs in the U. S. Naval Academy Library.
The Shaw survived the catastrophe with the loss of 12 of her crew, and for several years after could be distinguished from the other ships of her squadron by the patent anchors the British supplied along with her new bow during repairs in Portsmouth. A more detailed account of the collision, written by my father, appears in the July 1956 issue of the Proceedings, on pages 700-709.
I was a little puzzled that the destroyer on Your cover, the Stockton (DD-73), should have three stacks instead of the usual four, until Captain Walton R. Read, U. S. Navy (Re- hred), explained that about five flush deckers °f that era were built with the two center boilers vented through a common stack.
On 7 December 1941, a little over 23 years later, I witnessed the new Shaw (DD-373) lose her bow in Pearl Harbor.
Officer Personnel Management”
tSee pages 138-139, April 1966 Proceedings)
Captain R. E. Stivers, U. S. Naval Reserve—While it undoubtedly would be beneficial to some officers to learn why they had lailed selection for promotion, the suggestion aiade by Lieutenant Commander Simmons Seems at present to be impractical for the regular Navy. On the other hand, it should be noted that a way has been found to pro- Vlde the Naval Reserve officer with precisely '•he same information in great detail.
A. comprehensive evaluation of the shortfalls whicli led to the reserve officer’s failure to be selected for promotion or, much more Usefully, competent advice as to what he ’eight do to more reasonably assure promo- h°n is available to the reservist who is enough lnterested to find out. The regular Navy ’eight advantageously learn how this is done.
Lieutenant Commander Simmons’ idea aults on the premise that selection boards, as now established, would have the time and manpower to prepare a record analysis for each of the hundreds of officers they must pass over. It is quite likely that only an enlarged, permanent selection board for each grade advancement would be able to accomplish such a task meaningfully, and the practicality of even this is subject to question. For example, a permanent board might quickly produce professional career evaluators, thus introducing a rather undesirable bureaucratic hue to what is now at least the pertinent and timely judgment of one’s peers.
It is also possible that over a period of time a permanent board would reveal its procedures, which are now both justifiably secret and varied by temporary boards, and that the membership of a permanent (or long continued) selection board would become widely known, with the generation of concomitant pressures and politics.
Even if feasible solutions to these problems were found, or if selection boards as now established were saddled with the additional responsibility, there may still be a significant psychological hurdle to clear. Would it be possible in every case for the ten or more members of a selection board to reach a consensus on “a statement in general terms giving the reason for the failure of selection?” And, would a general statement of this nature contain information the regular officer does not already know?
When regular officers are considered, there is normally only a 40 per cent gray zone between the 30 per cent who obviously should be promoted and the 30 per cent who obviously should not be promoted. This gray zone expands to 80 per cent for reserve officers, leaving only skimpy bands of ten per cent positively yea and ten per cent positively nay. One reason for this difference is the fact that many senior reserve officers are relatively inexperienced in preparing fitness reports so as to present a clear and candid portrait to a selection board. Also, reserve officers, by and large, are subject to far less direct and continuous observation by their reporting seniors, regular or reserve. When a conscientious reserve officer reviews his past fitness reports, these two obscurants tend to produce more confusion and uncertainty than ordinarily results from a similar review by a regular officer.
The Naval Reserve Association has created for its members a record review service which provides a reserve officer with not only a sharply drawn profile of his performance record, but with a generous amount of seasoned counsel and advice. These analytic reports are prepared by retired senior officers who have served on selection boards, and who keep in touch with the personnel needs of today’s Navy. The officer concerned pays a nominal fee for the six or ten hours of work involved, and executes a power-of-attorney under which the Bureau of Naval Personnel makes his record available to the reviewer. This service has been extraordinarily helpful as demonstrated by a constantly increasing number of requests from reserve officers.
While it is doubted that most regular officers really need to be told why they fail selection, or are unable in their daily contacts in the Navy to obtain competent advice regarding their career projections, the service offered by the Naval Reserve Association may provide a hint as to a solution for the sometimes acute problem stated by Lieutenant Commander Simmons.
Our Navy’s Image
Rear Admiral Colby G. Rucker, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Last January the Secretary of the Navy invited retired officers of flag rank of the Navy and Marine Corps to a meeting in Washington. Its purpose was to acquaint these officers with the Navy and Marine Corps of today and to request their assistance in furthering the “Navy Image.” In effect, the Secretary said that American citizens do not have a correct mental picture of what the Navy is and what it is doing, with the result that the Navy’s enlistment rate is low and the retention rate is deplorable. Of course, out of sight—out of mind, and the Navy is at sea. But it seems that something more is involved: a lack of the communication of ideas between the Navy and the nation.
Let us consider the word the Secretary used -—“image.” This is a “Madison Avenue” term, but it conveys an idea, even if not a very precise idea. The Navy does not lack press officers or press releases, but in the main those releases are not news nor are they written in English. They are written in Navy lingo, with Navy abbreviations or “Pentagoneze.” No wonder civilians cannot understand what the Navy is doing. We can never call a ship a “ship.” She must be an AKA, DM, AM, AGC, and so on and on until I am certain that not even the Secretary of the Navy himself has the faintest idea of what all these letters stand for. A few, such as LST, have become common knowledge because of crossword puzzles, but the rest are gibberish.
In 1946, for my “sins,” I was assigned additional duty on a committee to write a dictionary of the abbreviations used in the armed services so we would know what the other fellow was talking about. For example, W. O. meant Watch Officer in the Navy and Warrant Officer in the Army, although in certain circumstances it means Warrant Officer in the Navy (that is WO, without the periods). The necessity for such a dictionary had been highlighted by several serious incidents in the World War II. As I recall, the committee broke up in utter confusion after six months, when we realized that the conflicts could not be resolved, nor the terms precisely defined, and also because new abbreviations were being added faster than we could cope with them. The result: chaos. And remember, all these abbreviations are promulgated in the name of efficiency.
Personally, I resent being called RADM, just to save a few letters of typing. If I had referred to the Secretary of the Navy throughout this discussion as SecNav, I believe that I would not be according him the respect his high office requires. By the same token, when the Secretary of the Navy sends me a letter addressed to RADM Rucker, I feel that he is not according me the respect to which my years of service entitle me. In truth, we are our worst enemy—we downgrade ourselves. The obnoxious term “brass hat,” for example, was a naval not a civilian invention. What do we mean by “finalize”? Do you mean the end of the task, or the end of the planning? Do you mean the beginning of the end, the end of the beginning, or the end of the end?
The truth of the matter is that we cannot write or talk about ourselves in plain, honest, straight-forward English which every man can understand. That is why we cannot reach the minds and the hearts of the nation and must now seek to improve our Navy’s image.