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"U. S. Navy Colliers”
(See pages 162-164, May 1967 Proceedings)
Charles W. Schedel—The author did not mention what is perhaps the most unusual service performed by these ships. This was the carrying of small A and B class submarines from the United States to the Philippines for service with the submarine division of the Asiatic Torpedo Fleet. From information in the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. I, it would appear that colliers were used on at least four occasions for this purpose.
The first of these occurred in April 1908, when the USS Caesar (AC-16) carried the submarines A-6 (SS-7) and A-7 (SS-8) to the Philippines via Suez. Caesar made a second trip the following year carrying the submarines A-2 (SS-3) and A-4 (SS-5). These submarines were hoisted on board on 20 July 1909 and arrived at Cavite 1 October.
The next submarines to be sent to the Philippines were the B-3 (SS-12) and B-2 (SS- ll). Loaded on board the collier USS Ajax (AC-15) at Norfolk on 6 December 1912, they arrived at Cavite via Suez on 30 April 1913, and on 12 May were launched from the deck of the collier.
The final, and largest, such operation began on 16 February 1915 when the submarines A-3 (SS-4), A-5 (SS-6), and B-l (SS-10) were loaded on board the collier USS Hector (AC-7) at Norfolk. Arriving at Olongapo, Luzon, on 24 March 1915, the B-l was launched from the deck of the collier. The other two submarines were unloaded at Cavite where they arrived on 26 March 1915.
"Unification in Canada”
(See pages 64-69, March 1967 Proceedings)
Colonel Douglas Lindsey, MC, U. S. Army —Certainly the Canadian experience with unification will be observed with interest at least as far south as the right bank of the Potomac. It deserves to be appraised fairly.
I cannot see that the question of mobile force versus ASW is integral to the unification issue, even if both can be laid to the same ministerial door. We do not have unified services in the United States, but we have faced some equally disturbing national policy decisions from our civilian leaders.
Without question, unification in Canada, as anywhere, will be a painful process. Somewhere in Canada there must be a turmoil over choice of color of the new uniform which is causing even more anguish than our own “black buckle” caper. The more I think of it, the more intriguing I find the remark of Brigadier General L. H. Ginn, Jr., U. S. Army, in 1947: “Don’t establish an Air Force; just abolish the Army. The Navy already has an air force and an army of its own.”
From what I have seen of Navy flyers and ship captains, submariners and missilemen, foot marines and jet jockeys, I do not guarantee that this would have ended interservice rivalry, but it might have lessened the intensity, if not the frequency, of the bickering.
"The 60-Knot Landing Force”
(See pages 44-55, March 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant A. H. Robbins, U. S. Navy— An attack carrier carries two lifeboats, ten assorted utility and personnel boats (weighing 17,000 to 22,000 pounds each) and three SAR helicopters, plus their required special support equipment, spare parts and operating and maintenance personnel. The captain’s ground effects machine (GEM) or the crew’s air cushion vehicle (ACV), while capable of carrying a heavy passenger or cargo load in and out of port, could float high on a cushion of air for open-ocean life guard duty, picket boat duty, or be used as a torpedo boat interceptor. Whether the design^) selected were similar to the Westland (Bell) SR-N6 or the Bell Carabao, the ACVs could easily be beached on the ship’s elevators by using a ramp and winch, capable of carrying ship’s vehicles. This would alleviate existing port lighterage problems and expenses.
Even though the decision has been reached to have ACVs licensed by the Coast Guard rather than the FAA, I fear that referring to air cushion vehicles as surface effect ships tends to create a mental block. A ground effects machine (GEM) simply manipulates the equation F = PXA (force equals average pressure times area) to counteract selectively the force of gravity; an ACV is a subclass of GEM and an SES is a smaller subclass of ACV. Whether ground effects are used to suspend a burn patient over a hospital bed, to float pallets in a warehouse, as a substitute for wheels on aircraft or outriggers on boats, as a replacement for bearings, as a suspension mechanism for an overland or sea vehicle, or as a fun ride at Disneyland is really immaterial. The important point is to think of controlled air pressure as being a support mechanism.
In one of the earliest experiments in ground effects machines, a skirt was placed around a Land Rover. By varying the power supplied to the lift fan, and thus air to the plenum, wheel loading could be varied from zero to full load. How large an inflatable skirt must be attached around a Main Battle Tank to provide an air cushion platform?
"Damage Control, Ready or Not!”
(See pages 33-39, January 1967; page 120, May 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander C. R. Etcheson, U. S. Navy, formerly a damage control officer—Damage control is most often not ready. Training is certainly to blame, but training is to blame for the weakness found in every facet of shipboard life. Singularly important, emphasis must be placed on stability of personnel in damage control assignments. Command attention in this area is vital. A yeoman makes an excellent 1JV or 2JV telephone talker if his assignment is permanent. Short tours in the engineroom correct most bridge talker communication problems, and do not deprive the engineroom or the repair party of technical talent at the time it is most needed. Why is the DCA (damage control assistant) assignment made to a non-career officer or to an LDO? Why are all too many executive officers and commanding
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
officers without any engineering experience? Because there is a widely held opinion that any engineering billet is fatal to command aspirations.
The aircraft carrier is today’s most challenging or demanding DCA billet. It is one that has its own special problems. But the primary problem is one of inter-departmental communication. For this reason, it is particularly inappropriate to assign an LDO as carrier DCA. In all probability, the LDO has not had to communicate outside his own department, or limited area, in his entire career; he is not about to make a new start. Because of communication, there is good reason to assign a 13xx as carrier DCA. The 13xx training preparation should include two or more weeks with the type commander’s material staff, in addition to damage control school.
No person is or should be more interested in the repair and maintenance functions aboard ship than the DCA. It is the forced intimacy with ship and system repair that makes the DCA effective. No report system can be devised which will replace the repair request as an accurate and timely damage control status board.
The majority of shipboard repairs are handled by the divisions for auxiliary and repair. The billet title of the repair division officer on a carrier is that of repair officer. In a carrier, the experience within A and R divisions should allow the DCA to co-ordinate their activities without becoming inordinately involved. But it is the duty of repair that keeps the DCA in contact with the remainder of the ship. Repair cannot be considered a collateral duty, it is an integral part of damage control.
The DCA has a unique position as a special assistant to the command. An organizational defect is created by assigning as DCA an officer who cannot function as a special assistant and yet be subordinate within a department. Indeed, rare is the DCA who does not have the ear of the command. This, in effect, places him on the staff of the executive officer. Certainly, under the present organization, the DCA’s immediate superior is the engineer officer. But this structure does not operate as poorly as Commander Simon contends. No organizational change will improve the situation if DCA assignments continue to be made of crusty curmudgeons. Placement of the DCA on the XO’s staff, or in a department of his own, will do nothing toward improved damage control readiness. More likely, the DCA would receive less of the co-operation he so desperately needs to be effective.
The best damage control is the prevention of damage. This is best accomplished by an excellent material condition before the fact. Removing the DCA from the engineering department effectively divorces the DCA from that 90 per cent of damage control which occurs before damage. No, the only organizational tool needed by the command for an ineffective engineer officer or DCA combination is the ax.
"The People Factor”
(See pages 76-88, March 1967; page 107, July 1967 Proceedings)
Commander Eugene M. Avallone, U. S. Navy—It is indeed interesting that since 1957 there have been seven major studies conducted of various personnel aspects of the Navy. These boards were: 1957 Flatley, 1958 Dornin, 1959 Keith, 1959 Cook, 1963 Pride, 1964 Combs, and 1966 Shea.
Besides these major Secretary of the Navy Policy Boards, there have been many other studies conducted on more specific areas of the Navy. Like the results of the Secretary’s board reported by the authors, each board has duly recorded its results and recommendations. In many instances, the machinery is oiled to adopt the recommendations. Yet it seems that the authors have entitled their article appropriately, for the lack of good people most certainly is the Navy’s most serious problem. The retention of good people in both the officer and enlisted ranks is an absolute necessity for the well being of the Navy. The authors have duly recorded the endless circle that the Navy finds itself in personnel-wise. Shortages of people make for hardships and long hours for those remaining. Many capable officers and enlisted men witnessing this process decide to adopt a “passing through” attitude and leave the service as soon as they possibly can. Consequently, those who are left behind are required to work harder and longer hours, or
be passed over for not contributing.
Study ourselves as we might, the net result is that the Navy and its officers are not the captains of their fate. In a democracy run by civilians, oriented toward a dislike and suspicion of the military, it becomes difficult to bring about the drastic changes necessary to alleviate the Navy’s people shortage. Once an officer leaves the service, a replacement is not hired in at the middle management level to fill the gap. The services grow their leaders from within. If the civilian administrators don’t read the reports and adopt the recommendations, then what recourse is left to the Navy? It seems to be to conduct another study. A determination, once and for all, of service needs must be presented to Congress for adoption. The Secretary of Defense must approve and enthusiastically endorse the action. Will such a course of action be adopted? If past history is any indication, it is not likely to happen as it should.
What has happened in the past is that civil service has led the way for the military. Although poorly organized, the civil service is before the eyes of our nation’s legislators with a heavy concentration in the Washington area. The pathetic state of the quality and enthusiasm of many civil servants, plus the actions of the postal workers union and President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988, resulted in many pay raises being enacted by Congress for them. Representative L. Mendel Rivers has ensured that the military has not fallen further behind the civil service pay scale by keeping the military in line for pay raises whenever they are granted for civil service. Of course, pay alone is not the entire answer to the Navy’s personnel problem. The authors have reported on the needs of the Navy. If the results were presented to Congress, little action has resulted; service salaries have not been significantly raised, housing authorizations have not been increased in sufficient numbers, and operating schedules are still very heavy. Personnel continue to leave the service for more lucrative and apparently satisfying civilian careers. The Navy is thus building in a people and quality shortage for the future. Selections for middle and senior grades, for commands afloat, and for flag officers in the future will all be affected by the shortage. Drastic action to reverse the
people exodus is required, but not likely to occur.
Improving the public image of service personnel is the responsibility of all the people in the Navy. It behooves those remaining in the Navy to act proudly, wear their uniform with pride, and by precept and example keep the service image high. The knowledge that a life in the Navy is challenging, extremely competitive, and rich in experience is reason enough to be proud. As corny as it all may sound, improvement of the Navy must of necessity come from within, while every effort is made through the legislative branch of government to improve our material wellbeing.
Public news media are woefully lacking in reporting any news concerning service personnel. Even in the Washington, D. C., area, little, if any, commentary can be found.
Master Mariner to Master Submariner
(See pages 40-51, April 1967 Proceedings)
W. H. Willson—The Interagency Committee on Oceanography, from whose list of submergence projects Commander Oliver’s chart was made, contains also the Canadian craft Pisces.
This vehicle, developed by International Hydrodynamics, is perhaps unique in that it aims to provide an inexpensive workboat for depths to 5,000 feet. Cost is likely to be a critical factor in application of submergence vehicles to commercial tasks. I hope the U. S. Naval Institute will feature more of this type of material in the future, beyond the purely scientific scope and into the commercial and military.
"The Navy Department—The Fulcrum and the Balance”
(See pages 70-78, May 1967 Proceedings)
Commander Eugene E. Wilson, U. S. Naval Reserve-R, author of Doctrine or Oblivion—Captain Smyth’s outline could benefit from a study of my own writings on the philosophical background of the phenomenon he so clearly describes. Through this, the Captain can correlate these “many changes ranging from casual to convulsive” with certain spiritual forces induced by the eternal conflict between the Marx-Engels dogma of total war, and the Western Christian doctrine of limited war. Such a study would contribute much to resolution of basic societal issues posed by over-acceleration of research and technology and induced by the eternal conflict between the principles defined in the Mahan Doctrine and the opinions advanced in the Marx-Engels dogma. Indeed, it could even avert a catastrophe which now promises to destroy man’s native habitat, and, indeed, all humanity.
"The Ph.D. in Uniform”
(See pages 70-77, November 1966; pages 111-115, April 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth W. Ruggles, U. S. Navy—The concept of special programs within the Navy to maintain specialist proficiency is not new. A notable example is the policy governing naval aviators. In this case, the deterioration of special skills and the resultant consequences are easily demonstrated. Consequently, the aviator is given a distinct line designator, a distinct career pattern with full opportunity for unlimited advancement, and a continuing career requirement to maintain aviation proficiency either through operational flying or through proficiency flying in aircraft provided for the purpose.
Contrasted to this is the Ph.D. officer in the Navy. Since a program tailored to the special needs of such an individual does not exist, he can seldom simultaneously fulfill the requirements for professional advancement and the requirements for the maintenance of specialty skills under current touring and selection practices. The officer is faced with the difficult and discouraging choice of either selecting career-enhancing tours at the cost of becoming mediocre in his specialty, or maintaining proficiency in his specialty at the cost of accepting limited career goals. The current policy of touring the general line officer in his sub-specialty is pointed up as a solution to this problem. Such an approach does not appear to constitute a solution to the problem, however, since the policy in many cases is not rigorously followed, and while such alternate touring practices may be adequate for the officer trained to the master’s level, the technical competence implied by the Ph.D. can be retained only through a more intimate and active contact with the specialty field.
Consequently, it is suggested that a Navy commitment to a large scale Ph.D. program be reviewed, not only from the point of view of costs and requirements for providing the education, but also from the point of view of a willingness within Navy management circles to develop procedures for retaining and encouraging the skills, once acquired.
"The Escort Ship—Challenge to the Shiphandler”
(See pages 130-134, March 1967 Proceedings)
Captain J. S. Howell, U. S. Navy—Use of the starboard anchor in casting to port is somewhat self-defeating. In the USS Frontier (AD-25) we do as follows: (1) Drop the port anchor underfoot with about five to seven fathoms of chain more than the depth of water. (2) Put the rudder hard left. (3) Go ahead with turns for about four knots. (More or less may be used, but do not drag the anchor.)
The stern should walk smoothly to starboard, the ship completely reversing heading in a little more than twice her own length. (Patience, as noted, is required.) The procedure should be even more effective with a ship that has both much more power than the Frontier, as well as much better coupling between rudder and propeller action. Since some escorts may not be able to make turns for as little as four knots, it may be necessary alternately to start and stop the engines. Rather than being more difficult, the procedure is actually easier than casting to starboard.
If this doesn’t work for an escort, I would recommend: (1) Give up, and call the tugs; or (2) drop both anchors and wait for the weather to subside.
"The General Purpose Destroyer”
(See pages 126—127, June 1966; pages 112-113, February Proceedings)
Alan Lipke—The Short Seacat missile possesses insufficient range to be a trustworthy guardian of the existence of a modern warship, although useful enough in its own right. It is, perhaps, significant that the British have employed it only as either a secondary system on guided missiles ships or as an interim weapon on older vessels. The NORD SS 12 may also be improved upon. I would recommend, instead, the use of a Raytheon Sea
Sparrow system, perhaps using the Martin Bullpup B to provide a surface strike ability. Such a system would provide advantages in the fields of range, striking power, vulnerability, and procurement.
A single launcher, placed in the position of Mr. London’s SS 12 launcher, should suffice to deploy both; on the other hand, in view of the success of the dual purpose Asroc-Terrier mount, an Asroc-Sparrow (Bullpup?) mount might prove a profitable investment in terms of deck space, manning and over-all cost.
"Destroyers at the Crossroads”
(See pages 110-112, February 1967; pages 109-110, June 1967 Proceedings)
Captain Charles D. Allen, Jr., U. S. Navy, Surface Missile Systems Project Office—The authors have questioned the ability of the modern destroyer to survive by effective air defense against the contemporary high performance air threat while performing the escort, fire support, search and rescue, and multitudinous other missions characteristically assigned to the workhorse of the Fleet. The answer may soon be available in the form of the Point Defense Surface Missile System (PDSMS), appearing initially as the basic PDSMS, or Sea Sparrow system, and in a few years in more advanced form. PDSMS capitalizes on the unique characteristics of the self-defense or close-range defense mission to derive from modern weapon technology an enormously effective, yet small and low cost, surface-to-air missile system compatible with the majority of classes of ships in today’s Navy.
Originally configured to replace twin 3- inch, 50-caliber mounts and their associated fire control systems, PDSMS has remained within sufficiently low weight, cost, and personnel support constraints to suit it particularly well to installation in destroyer types.
A comprehensive shipboard test program of the basic, Sea Sparrow, system has provided very impressive results, exceeding the specified operational requirements and completely validating the concept of an economical and effective point defense missile system. Extensive operational testing of this system in the new destroyer escort USS Bradley (DE-1041) will continue through the summer of 1967, and will be followed by fleet deployment in a variety of ship classes.
During the same period, development of a more advanced PDSMS will go on, with the same goals of low cost and weight, high reliability and ease of maintenance, and vastly improved performance against the air threat of the 1970s. Both shipboard test and theoretical study indicate that for the general purpose destroyer, the pendulum has indeed reversed its swing, and that truly effective air defense will soon again be available for all destroyers, as well as most other ship classes.
"New Torque-Free Line Retrieves H-Bomb”
(See pages 146-148, May 1967 Proceedings)
Charles H. Abbott, President, Samson Cordage Works—As the manufacturer of the rope that was used to retrieve the H-bomb and one of the domestic manufacturers of double-braided torque-free ropes, we feel your readers would be interested in knowing that we now have equipment installed and in operation capable of manufacturing such ropes up to 15 inches in circumference, with breaking strengths well over 600,000 pounds. This is far greater, of course, than the maximum breaking strength of 100,000 pounds mentioned by Mr. Hollingsworth.
"Naval Gunfire Today & Tomorrow”
(See pages 52-59, September 1966; pages 132-133, December 1966; pages 109-110, March 1967; pages 106-107, July 1967 Proceedings)
Commander William C. King, U. S. Navy, Office of Naval Communications—The idea of an austere activation of a battleship may sound appealing, but it has many pitfalls. Commander Wadsworth seems to have fallen into such a trap when he suggests that there would be no real reason to install new communications equipment. Since the Wisconsin was mothballed in 1958, there have been many significant advances in communications equipment; consequently, a reactivated BB would need an almost complete new communications installation, even to perform only the gunfire mission. Anyone at all familiar with current Seventh Fleet operations knows that message traffic volume is very high. A battleship would need, as a minimum, secure ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore teletypewriter channels as well as the capability to copy the multichannel fleet broadcast. As part of these systems, modern, stable, single-sideband transmitters and receivers are required, along with improved antennas. Increased voice radio capability would be required in the HF, VHF, and UHF bands. To support even the most narrowly defined mission, this new equipment would be required to meet the growing demands of Southeast Asia operations and to achieve compatibility with other fleet and shore units.
This commentary neither supports nor opposes battleship activation, but if the decision is made to take one out of mothballs, the ship should be given the modern communications equipment needed to do the job.
"The Last Battle Cruiser”
(See pages 134-135, November 1966; pages 112-113, March 1967 Proceedings)
Kenneth D. Smith, Jr.—R. D. Layman believes SMS Goeben fired the first shots fired by a warship in World War I.
This honor should go to that famous German raider, SMS Emden, which in the early dawn of 4 August 1914 captured her first prize, the Russian steamer Rjaesan (also known as Riasan), after having fired several 10.5-cm. shells at that vessel. The Rjaesan was immediately taken to Tsingtao, where she was outfitted with eight 10.5-cm. guns, renamed Cormoran, and officially commissioned as an auxiliary cruiser in the Imperial German Navy.
SMS Cormoran operated briefly as a commerce raider with Von Spee’s squadron in the South Pacific but was kept on the run by superior Allied forces and was ultimately forced to seek internment at Guam. Interestingly, just 50 years ago last 7 April, SMS Cormoran was blown up and sunk by her crew to avoid seizure by the U. S. Navy.
"The Soviet Maritime Threat”
(See pages 38-48, May 1967 Proceedings)
Guy W. Wolf, III, Officer on board SS Mormacoak—I cannot understand the reluctance on the part of labor, management, and government to realize the singleness of purpose that should be paramount, if we are to play a successful role in international waterborne trade. It would seem that everyone realizes the economic problems created by our present gold drain, yet a potentially lethal aspect, i.e., cargo tariff rates, goes relatively unnoticed. How can we afford to sit idly by and watch the greatest trading nation in the world sink to an unrated merchant maritime power?
"Limited War—Limited Peace?”
(See pages 30-37, December 1966 Proceedings)
Martin Blumenson, Office, Chief of Military History—The weaknesses in the Korean armistice agreement, Captain Carroll says, are traceable to failures in the negotiating process, some arising from poorly defined objectives on our part, others from a lack of unanimity among ourselves and our allies. May I point out that the United Nations Security Council gave the United States responsibility for conducting the war in Korea and authority for concluding a purely military armistice. A Committee of Sixteen, composed of representatives of the nations that had contributed combat troops to the United Nations forces in Korea, met in Washington from time to time, but it was merely a consulting body to the United States, not an organ of the United Nations. We sometimes asked our allies for advice. More often we informed them of decisions made after the event. In the final analysis, as the executive agent for the United Nations, the United States made all decisions unilaterally. Unfortunately, we were not the only party involved in reaching an armistice agreement. We had to deal with the enemy. And this, rather than our allies or the definition of our own objectives, complicated matters.
If there is a lesson for our generation in the Korean experience—and I am generally dubious about the validity and value of “lessons learned”—it is that the escalation of weaponry in the world of the mid-20th century has made the unlimited application of force a dead end, literally as well as figuratively. Limited war, meaning a conflict waged with care and restraint, is the only feasible kind of war today. And limited war, given the ideological tensions in the world, together with the development of weaponry, can lead only to limited peace. This conclusion is neither questionable nor arguable, despite Captain Carroll’s title, and he sees this, too. “By its very nature,” he writes, “a limited war tends to end in a form of limited peace.” Thus, he seems to be willing to settle for a limited detente.
The salient point of the Korean armistice is that it has worked for more than 13 years and continues to do so. Captain Carroll depreciates the calm that has come over Korea and complains of the “heavy price” we pay to maintain an uneasy peace. Uneasy though the peace may be, it is palpably present. Since it exists by virtue of the will and support of both parties involved, it is likely, I would guess, to remain indefinitely.
What brought the cease-fire to Korea and what keeps it in effect, I believe, is the precondition of stalemate. A state of balance was tacitly reached. Though both sides could have escalated the war and enlarged its scope by increasing the resources committed, the opponents apparently decided, in terms of their political objectives, that additional war expenditures were not worth while. Both sustain and support the status quo. As Captain Carroll recognizes, “the real sanctions against the resumption of hostilities in Korea today are huge, heavily armed, expensive military
forces maintained by both sides, not the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement.”
Thus, Captain Carroll seems to recognize the importance of the equilibrium. Yet he prefers to believe that we won the war in Korea, then failed to win the peace through our own bungling. I prefer to believe that our representatives at Panmunjom, our command in Tokyo, and our government in Washington were not bunglers. In my opinion, they did the best they could—and performed a fine job of getting the best terms possible in a situation of stalemate. We won a limited victory, but we suffered a limited defeat in Korea. And this may be the most we can attain in Vietnam.
In this shrinking world of ours, we have no practical choice except to co-exist. Which suggests to me that Admiral Turner Joy’s dictum, that we should “negotiate not merely from strength, but with strength,” must be accepted with care and restraint. I would rather have us negotiate from understanding, and I would rather negotiate for one hundred years and more than give up in disgust and provoke an exchange of nuclear bombs.
Captain Carroll contends that the armistice agreement in Korea was less favorable to us than it might otherwise have been because of our “premature relaxation of military pressure on the enemy” at the outset of the negotiating period. This point of view has been stated before. According to Henry Kissinger, “by stopping military operations we removed the only Chinese incentive for a settlement; we produced the frustration of two years of inconclusive negotiations.” Bernard Brodie said the same thing: “no doubt the cardinal error as we see it today was the halting of our offensive at the moment the Communists first indicated an interest in opening armistice negotiations . . . we paid bitterly for that error in the great prolongation of negotiations, in the unsatisfactory terms of the settlement, and above all, in the disillusionment and distaste which the American people developed as the main emotional residue of their experience with limited war.”
The thesis is questionable on two grounds. First, the theory assumes that the Communist military power had in fact been defeated, sufficiently so as to make impossible effective resistance to a renewal of our pressure. Second, since we lack access to the documents that would reveal the intentions of the Communists, we cannot judge the validity of the proposition that by divorcing power from diplomacy we lost the ability and abdicated the purpose to force a settlement. Thus, that the absence of our military pressure explains their dilatory tactics at the conference table must remain a hypothesis rather than a statement of fact.
Assuming that a cease-fire and a negotiated armistice are indeed implemented in Vietnam, Captain Carroll would entrust what he calls the “peace keeping” duties to a “strong, neutral, independent supervisory agency, comparable to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea . . . composed of true neutrals, not satellites of each side.” The sentiment is admirable, but the idea probably unworkable.
First, Captain Carroll admits that the final form and content of the armistice in Korea reflect nothing more than the relative strengths of the belligerent parties. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were denied, by the belligerents who formulated the armistice agreement, the power to keep the peace. The belligerents themselves have been maintaining the cease-fire. The condition of stalemate or equilibrium that brought the belligerents to the conference table in the first place continues to be effective. Since the hostility of the war period remains in being and since mutual good faith seems to be a continuing illusion, the belligerents have not dared to upset the balance by turning over the direction of affairs in Korea to anyone else. The issues are too vital, the risks too grave.
Second, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find “true neutrals.” The bipolarization of power in the world exerts overwhelming pressures on nations that would rather be uncommitted. Thus, in Korea we had “our” neutral nations, Sweden and Switzerland, and the Communists had “theirs,” Poland and Czechoslovakia. I would guess that Sweden and Switzerland would be unacceptable to them as “true neutrals,” and I am sure that we could hardly accept Poland and Czechoslovakia on those terms.