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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our ‘ ‘Nobody asked me, but . . .” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
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Isn’t turquoise a shade of Navy blue, too?
Officially, amphibious warfare is important. In the fleet, however, the perception persists that amphibious forces are somehow less equal than other surface warfare forces. Regardless of its source, the roots of the unofficial pecking order are deep. Ask any ensign and he’ll tell you that his first choice for duty is anything with a “G” in her name. Perhaps the gadgetry of the modem missile systems fascinates us, or the old war movies on late-night television have convinced us that hunting submarines is more glamorous than crossing the line of departure on time.
After conducting a thorough investigation of this mystery, I believe I have identified the culprit for creating the current misperceptions concerning “gator” warfare: our training. Curricula at the Navy’s most important schools give short shrift to amphibious warfare. The amphibious syllabus at our general warfare schools for officers is usually limited to an overview of amphibious force assets and the rudiments of amphibious warfare doctrine. Often missing are the fundamentals of Marine Corps landing force organization and the problems of loading and landing amphibious forces. Such crucial subjects are left largely to specialized schools and on-the-job training. An appreciation for the difficulties in amphibious tactics is limited generally to those who have served as gators.
More disturbing than our shallow amphibious warfare formal education is the disparate approach of underway training. Unfortunately, gators train by themselves. Until recently, combined exercises integrating amphibious forces with cruiser, destroyer, and carrier forces were very infrequent. Fleet exercises are beginning to feature an amphibious assault as a major part of the exercise—an admission that naval strategy is a synergistic mix. Still, amphibious groups routinely train and deploy without escorts or carrier battle group support, which ignores the lessons of recent crises when all naval capabilities, including amphibious, have been employed.
Regular integration of amphibious task forces (ATF) with other naval forces is needed to refine our proficiency at amphibious warfare. Destroyers may practice naval gunfire support on their own, but operating in a restrictive fire support area near an actual boat lane is far different from the range at San Clemente Island. Carrier air wing pilots drop tons of ordnance preparing for a deployment, but it’s a different ballgame when an ATF forward air controller calls the shots. Issues such as the amphibious task force commander’s role in the composite warfare concept are unresolved, and the combined operations we have done clearly indicate that there are several navies in the U. S. Navy when it comes to operating procedures. The lack of integrated operations has left gaps in our doctrine that only can be resolved by combined operations.
Because training time at sea is undeniably precious these days, large combined training operations cannot be worked into every at-sea period. But there are some possible small-scale actions for enhancing interoperability of amphibious and other naval forces:
- Officers from amphibious and cruiser, destroyer, and carrier forces can “crossdeck” for individual Pr0^eS sional development. Clearly, the key working together is understanding eaC other’s problems.
- Short training periods for ships can be arranged to include a mix of un*ts (amphibious and nonamphibious ships in basic exercises, such as the comp°s ite unit training exercises, for connn°n drills: maneuvering exercises, replen' ishment drills, and flight deck service Such mixed-type training periods also would facilitate officers’ cross-training
- During in-port upkeep periods, 'v0 ing groups hosted by squadron or gr0 commanders of naval professionals from amphibious and non-amphibi°uS ships can be established to meet on j* regular basis to discuss common pr0 lems and share operational expert*se'
As a goal, a permanent “sister sqt*a ron” arrangement of regular joint ses sions could be established among anl phibious squadrons, destroyer , squadrons, air wings, and cruiser an carrier groups.
Amphibious warfare is a vital con cem to both the Navy and the natio*1^ Proficiency at this overlooked cap31 ity is essential to our naval strategy- _ Particular concerns must be to lea*11 proper integration of amphibious ; other naval forces and to realize tha . modem naval action combines amp1 ous, surface, subsurface, and naval forces in power projection. We h2'^- allowed our common understanding^
the amphibious portion of this mi* wane. flf
Between the “blue” water p°^c^ our battle groups and the “green ater of land action lies an importan area of naval operations at which must become more proficient. Unti turquoise becomes a more fashions shade of blue—and it’s high time 1 ^ did—the naval community will hav poor understanding of modern sea power and the role of our naval f° in today’s world.
102
Proceedings / Novem*>er