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one production base analysis indicates that “material quirements to support Navy and merchant marine n ship construction would not be achievable for certain industries.”2 Thus, we would be hard-pressed to simu ^ neously repair battle-damaged ships, replace losses, add to our combatant inventory. We must also strong ^ our ability to salvage damaged ships in forward areas return them to duty, retrograde them for depot rePair'nts salvage hard-to-replace weapon and system comp°ae from hopelessly damaged units for use on other sn'F This is now called the “triage” function. “The Adm^ trative History of the Bureau of Ships During World II” states:
“The importance of the Ship Repair Unit and ^ vanced Base Functional Component as an integral of any overall war program cannot be stressed ^
Despite commendable team efforts to patch the Stark and keep the Samuel B. Roberts (inset) afloat, these operations exposed shortcomings in the Navy’s damage repair and salvage capabilities in forward areas.
In a major conflagration, we would be hard-pressed to replace losses and return battle-damaged ships to action.
The advent of the U. S. Navy’s maritime strategy, which envisions protracted conventional naval engagements with our principal adversary, has prompted a wide-ranging review of both our operational tactics and the readiness of our domestic industrial base to support this type of war. Improved prospects for major reductions—or even elimination—of nuclear arms has given further impetus to industrial preparedness concerns that were irrelevant to a “come as you are” war. Major damage to the Stark (FFG-31) and the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) has lent new urgency to the need to examine our preparations to deal with major damage in forward areas.
Our ability to fight and win a protracted conventional war with our current industrial and logistics base is being examined in a series of “Global War” games at the Naval War College. These games are being supported by production base analyses conducted by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy systems commands.
The war scenarios employed in these analyses anticipate serious battle damage to 20-30% of the engaged Navy and merchant marine hulls, with most of the damage sustained in the crucial early months of a war. While there is a wide range of opinion regarding the accuracy of the scenarios, it is generally agreed (and confirmed by the Stark and Samuel B. Roberts incidents) that damage from precision- guided ordnance, conventional bombs, mines, and torpedoes would be extensive. This is consistent with our World War II experience. The Navy Salvage Service answered more than 500 calls for assistance, 398 of which were major salvage jobs.1
The ability of our shipyard base to restore damaged ships and construct new ones to replace losses and expand the fleet depends heavily on secondary suppliers. At least
vrvuan wai piugiain camiui uc
strongly. The tremendous advantage of patching UP servicing a damaged ship in the battle area is gaine' only by the elimination of a time-consuming trip mainland port but also in some instances by the ac ^ saving of the vessel through temporary repairs- .|, the continental facilities taxed to capacity during j„ ities in the production of new units of the fleet all^r. the handling of vessels unable to be serviced in a ^ ward area, this advanced repair force provides a ^ ance for the Allies’ overall production, maintena11 conversion and repair facilities.”3 ^
When Japan capitulated in August 1945, about 33, .f enlisted men and 1,700 officers were serving in ship reP, units on repair ships and tenders, and in advanced functional components overseas.4 These numbers pre bly do not include personnel in the diving and sa teams, SeaBee units, heavy-lift craft, light-lift craft, c bat salvage boats, repair salvage tenders, and drydocks—all of which worked closely with the f°r repair units. . ^
The attacks on the Stark and Samuel B. Roberts ^ Persian Gulf have highlighted several weaknesses 113 current state of readiness for dealing with major ship d^f, age in a combat zone. Despite the commendable Pefg{ mance by the personnel of both ships, certain asPeC|jCa- this operation do not lend themselves to wartime rep t tion on a large scale. The damage assessment teams
ptates and do not arrive on the scene until several days. ersonnel and material from many activities must be trans- °hed through an 8,000-mile airborne pipeline to the rePair site.
. a mobilization scenario, other priority tasks for the rv*t'an personnel and air transport could be expected to P er this approach unworkable on any significant scale. hQtUre operations that anticipate possible action against a ^stile force should be supported by repair forces that can ^oved forward quickly to sustain the combatants. rg ^'gnificant differences of opinion exist within the Navy ^garding the feasibility of repairing damaged ships in for- j.^d areas. Most of these differences are the result of ^ fering understandings of the term “repair.” Previous rr,t'ng on the subject of ship salvage and battle damage ^.pa'r makes abundant use of the terms “ingenuity” and 1^ovation,” (such as that performed by the crews of the
PlO’
pn'ts that can “fight, [or] float and [or] move,” as op- ^Sed to repairing to design specifications. During World car II, severely damaged ships were often used as de- ^s> for limited missions, or to confuse the enemy about e actual strength of the force.
Y | °ntemporary planning for conventional war must pro- v! e ^r a highly trained and forward-deployed ship sal- §e and repair force capable of husbanding and quickly rning to action our valuable high-tech combatants and
ark and the Samuel B. Roberts). The purpose of a de- °yed repair force is to maintain the maximum number of
retu
shipping—where logistics and technology permit.
ls force must be well equipped with tools and materials
^af foster ingenuity and innovation, and be capable of: Rendering damage-control and fire-fighting (salvage)
(kn kink raop n in o m nkikinilC IcinHlfKT
?reas
stance on the high seas and in amphibious landing
^ t .
^ ‘owing damaged ships and craft to a safe haven Restoring lightly damaged ships and craft to action
► Restoring hull integrity and mobility to ships that must be retrograded to a depot for repair
► Clearing and maintaining a safe haven for repair and logistics operations in the face of enemy attack, sabotage, and mining
Salvage Assistance at Sea: An adequate advance repair force must be served by salvage ships or fleet tugs and mobile salvage teams capable of providing rapid assistance to heavily damaged ships. During World War II in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, rapid action by afloat salvage teams often saved and returned to service badly damaged ships that would otherwise have been lost.5 During the 137-day Okinawa campaign in 1945, the battle area was served by 16 fleet tugs and three ocean rescue ships, which rendered aid and towed damaged ships to the forward repair base. Of 402 ships damaged, only 34 were sunk; 274 were repaired in the forward area and returned to action. The remainder returned to the continental United States for repair or to be abandoned.6
Lessons learned from the Falklands Conflict and the Stark and Samuel B. Roberts attacks confirm the need for the rapid arrival of rescue and salvage units equipped with extra fire-fighting gear, pumps, auxiliary power units, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists. HMS Sheffield was probably lost from the lack of such assistance. The Stark had a close call despite the close proximity of U. S. Navy ships and a Dutch salvage tug, while the Samuel B. Roberts was assisted by helicopter lifts in the vicinity.
The extended formations of today’s battle groups, convoys, and amphibious forces dictate that mobile rescue and salvage teams and their equipment cover long distances rapidly to aid a stricken ship. This means that they must be transportable by helicopters or vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft based on tenders, salvage ships, or advanced logistics-support bases. Portable
the
sign, planning, and estimating personnel accompany
communications gear is essential for managing salvage operations on ships that have lost all integral radio communications capabilities.
Our Persian Gulf experience confirms that future salvage ships and tenders must be designed to accommodate multiple vertical-lift aircraft and material-handling equipment for rapid staging of salvage gear for air transport. Air-lift capability will also be useful to the tender for rapid dispatch of medical assistance and for transport of specialized repair teams to ships that do not require alongside support.
Battle-force commanders should be provided with a rapid, accurate assessment of the damage sustained and the estimated time needed to repair and return the ship to action with full or reduced combat capability. This will require that a damage-assessment team consisting of de rescue and salvage team or—more likely—come on boat after conditions have stabilized. Repair and salvage teams must work together to take full advantage of their comp|e' mentary capabilities. Air transport and reliable commun1' cations will be required to expedite this phase.
Towing operations: The Chief of Naval Operations has determined that the future salvage ship force will consis of three Edenton (ATS-1 (-class and four Safeguard (AR 50)-class ships.7 This inventory is obviously inadequate t0 service the probable battle areas of a confrontation with3 multi-ocean navy. In the absence of a major acquisit'j’11 program, tugs and suitable service craft would have to jjf requisitioned from commercial towing companies,
‘Gol durn you constructors
In an ora/ history interview with John T. Mason, Jr., Rear Admiral Ralph K. “Jimmy” James, U. S. Navy, who retired in 1963 as Chief of the Bureau of Ships, recalls his days in the Pacific in late 1944, as the repair officer of Service Squadron 10. As the war moved westward, the Navy established a forward repair facility at Seeadler Harbor, Manus Island, in the Admiralties:
Manus was right on the Equator—close to Ulithi, the big operating base, but remote enough [900 miles south] to be relatively protected. It was a fabulous harbor: 26 miles of deep water completely surrounded by a coral reef, right at the crossroads of traffic from Pearl Harbor to Australia and New Guinea, and from the Solomons to the Philippines. I’ve seen more than 600 ships moored or anchored there, with no congestion problems at all.
The Japanese had occupied Manus before us, and many were still there, harassing us from the jungle, all the time we were there. I moved in with some of our ships from Espiritu
In late 1944 three badly damaged cruisers—the Canberra (CA-70), the Reno (CL-96), and the Houston (CL-81)—limped into Ulithi for initial repairs. I arrived there on board the repa<r ship Hector to assess the damage. The Houston was hardest hit. We were fearful of losing her at any moment. We got her inside the torpedo nets and I lam the Hector (AR-7) alongside to begin repairs to the flooding areas. We got warning of a severe typhoon approaching, and I didn’t think the Houston would make it through. I said, “Let’s
Santo, loaded to the maximum with ship repair supplies. In the meantime, a large floating dry dock, ABSD-3, had been moved there, along with smaller floating docks. The work in Manus was very much the same as in Espiritu, repairing major battle damage.
take her where there’s shallow water, and if she sinks, she’ll g° down only a matter of a few feet. Salvage will be simplified.” As we towed the Houston to the lower anchorage, I put my people to work trying to patch holes below the water lme to reduce flooding. From the
shoi
on
^ oil rig operators, etc.
^ne possible alternative is to restore mobility to the ship
Slte- During World War II, a surprising number of >y damaged ships regained propulsion and steering hooding and fire problems were stabilized. Our latest
bad]-
Subm;
Pollers
onnes and frigates have steerable “take-home” pro
ton
abie
s,oam
positioned some distance from the primary propul-
and steering gear. If power can be restored or a suit- Unit placed on board, a damaged ship may be able to (o a repair haven without towing assistance. Stable out-board propulsion units recently have 1^°Vecl into designs of substantial size and flexibility. ,e adaptation of this technology to air-transportable units able to propel damaged ships without power and/or ering to a repair haven could partially compensate for
shortfalls in the number of tugs and salvage ships and expedite movement to a logistics base.
Restoring Lightly Damaged Ships and Craft to Action: The first priority of an advance repair base after stabilizing damage and removing vessels from the hazard of further combat damage is to quickly restore scarce naval assets to the order of battle with as much capability as possible. The commander of a tender or an advance repair base must be numbered among the area commander’s logisticians, and thus must constantly appraise the area comander of how much operational capability can be restored, and when.
The determination of what constitutes “light damage” that can be repaired in the forward area will depend upon the judgment of repair officers and the senior members of
hu.
some severely. One of my repair ships, the Mindanao (ARG-3), was hardest hit of all. My own repair office—a quonset hut on a barge—had been knocked flat. There was lots of speculation about the cause of the blast. Some thought that a Japanese submarine had lain outside the harbor, and when the torpedo nets were opened for ships to transit, she just pinged a torpedo down the channel, catching the Mount Hood in the line of fire. Something similar occurred about the same time in Ulithi, but an oiler was hit and the
we used dozens of t0r ?*n§ machines, burning $te | s» and pumps, a lot of ty e Plate, and all the shoring thrC°U'A 8^t. We labored f%°ru§h the night. By three or ip 1 ln the morning, the Hous- |aterSt°Pped settling. Two hours tj0 ’. We were getting a reduc- j>leln draft. After a hard strug’ ,VVe had a reprieve, bad to return to Manus in a it< The ammunition ship Up Unt Hood (AE-11) had blown 5re.'n harbor, devastating an flp'1 °f 1,500 yards radius. y ships were damaged,
damage was less severe.
We repaired all the ships, including the Mindanao—putting some back on the line in a few days, and the worst-hit back in two or three weeks. Later, the three damaged cruisers and a number of destroyers pulled into Manus, and we started repairs on them. By and large, we were able to put the destroyers back into full service. This did not always sit well. One skipper spoke in jest, but 1 think he was serious: “Gol durn you naval constructors—we thought we were going home for a Navy yard repair and a rest. Now you bastards have put us back on the line and we don’t love you for it.” Well, my function was to do just that.
Other skippers were eager to get back into the war. I had given the Canberra the low repair priority of a badly damaged ship. Her captain kept bugging me, sending for me, sending messages to my boss, and finally sending messages to Admiral Halsey—saying that he was getting lousy treatment from the repair officer at Manus.
Couldn’t they do something for the Canberra in a hurry, to get her back into the war? I’m sure everybody applauded his enthusiasm, but I can’t believe that anybody believed seriously that he was going to make a major contribution to the war for one hell of a long time.
""Ss/ June 1988
37
Depot Repair: Ships that receive moderate-to-be^, damage, but are still worthy of salvage, will require sU cient repair for retrograde to a repair depot for restorat' These ships will have sustained the most severe dania^.._ thus this function is by far the most demanding and 1 -(e cult task performed in the forward area. It will red j heroic efforts by large numbers of the most skill01 ^ experienced personnel, large quantities of material’ heaviest equipment, and close coordination and c°°P tion among explosive ordnance experts, salvage Per‘ nel, and the repair trades.
damage assessment teams. Their judgment will be based upon:
► The needs of the operational commander
► Repair assets available in the forward area
► The “repairability” of the damaged ship
The Stark’s “repairability” assessment was done by personnel from Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, who had to be flown to the scene. This process was repeated for the Samuel B. Roberts. The Stark assessment team had to proceed from a “cold start” with respect to drawings and material specifications, industrial capability, and available on-site material. Damage assessment and/or repair planning teams should be organized, equipped, and trained to deal with the wartime repair environment in which they must operate. This environment logically should be a tender or an advanced logistics-support base. The numerous on-going projects directed toward digitizing material inventories, drawings, technical manuals, and computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) data should be exploited to provide these teams with rapid access to vital planning information.
The planner’s judgment as to what constitutes repairable damage will be heavily influenced by the availability of basic materials such as steel plate, structural beams, welding materials, and the numbers of skilled metal trades available to undertake the work. Recent experience indicates that the load lists of our tenders are woefully short with respect to the range and quantity of materials needed to deal with significant battle damage.
Owing to the heavy structural damage inflicted on our ships by Kamikaze attacks during World War II, we began to outfit tenders (ARBs) specifically provisioned and manned to deal with structural damage. Our experience with forward-based structural repair since World War II clearly demonstrates that restoration of mobility and structural integrity often can be handled effectively by appropriately staffed and provisioned mobile repair facilities.
Contemporary estimates of what constitutes adequate staffing and provisioning need to be developed and used as a basis for evaluating the adequacy and readiness of our intermediate maintenance activities (IMAs). We have several sophisticated mathematical models and the computational software capable of modeling the blast and shock effects of a wide range of weapons on our ships. We should make immediate use of this capability to determine the range of personnel, material, and industrial capability that could be forward deployed profitably to cope with combat damage.
The available information from the Stark experience indicates that restoring combat systems and electronics damage in a forward area is more formidable than structural repair. However, a hard-pressed area commander may wish to make use of any residual “fight, float and/or move” ship capabilities, or authorize the installation of alternative modular combat systems that could be staged in tenders or advanced base functional components for emergency use.
The MEKO frigates being built for export by West Germany’s Blohm & Voss feature containerized weapon and electronics systems and palletized operator and tactic3 display consoles that can be interchanged on a basic hul 1 fit the needs and budgets of a variety of customers. T‘ie!’ modular systems are installed in specially designed ha > with power and utility systems designed to accommod2 them. The MEKOs’ formidable and useful combat cap2 bilities appear to lend themselves to rapid replacement - mobile repair facilities with standard 50-ton cranes an adequate staging areas.
The builder has designed and built 48 weapon fuaC tional units (guns, antiair, antisubmarine, and antis r missiles), 85 electronic functional units, and 76 Pa*jet'zes control units composed of operator and tactical disp^ and auxiliary equipment. These units have been—°r being—installed on 11 MEKO ships.8 Designs are a* available for containerized ventilation and air-condit' ing systems to support other modular equipment in 3 cific space.9 . j
The installation times claimed for these container'2^ combat systems are impressive. All six weapon functi00.^ units fitted on the first MEKO-360 frigate were install® ^ eight days. Seven electronic functional units also requ|r^j eight days; the palletized operator control stations requ,r three days (in the Blohm & Voss yard).10 . c.
Blohm & Voss notes that the acquisition “of spare tional units adds to the flexibility of the FES System. 2 that spare units “with suitable simulators may be used shore training.” If the U. S. Navy adopted a similar 00 ^ tainerized design concept, our sizable investment in s training equipment could serve a dual purpose as war serve spares. ,. s
The Royal Navy experience in the Falklands pr0'' t no dramatic examples to support the thesis that sign’1'0 repair of battle damage to combat systems can be acc° plished in the forward area (although significant for^2a support was provided by converted oil rig tenders, an . frantic effort to outfit an additional ship as a stru®1.2s repair tender was reportedly under way when h°st'.' e- ended). They did, however, use a variety of modular fa tional units, such as desalinization devices and Harrier2 ^ craft support components, to rapidly convert ships ta up from trade to militarily useful assets. (jal
Historical precedent and careful analysis of the poten.at capability of our existing mobile repair force indicate extensive battle-damage repairs can be accomplish0 ^ the forward area. Our capability to restore combat syst^n2 and electronics can be further enhanced by acceler3 j the current trend toward modular design of ships weapon systems, and by investing in spare modules.
^he limited efforts in the forward area will focus on sj°ring hull integrity so that the ship can endure the sea p .leather conditions en route. Restoration of at least H propulsion capability is desirable, to avoid towing. ejtorati°n0f minimal crew habitability and navigation to communications capability is also necessary if a tow is , e avoided. Partial self-defense capability is also highly Arable.
%
restoration of hull integrity will first require the elimi-
°n or gross reduction of the causes of flooding. This
in#
anc
^'res control of progressive flooding, controlled pump
°ut of solid flooding of spaces to restore reserve buoy
ant]
reinforcement of damaged strength members, pre-
i°n of further loss of strength in the ship’s girder, and ^nation of potential hazards, such as unexploded ord- !jfe and liquid combustibles, in flooded spaces.
S|j 0 accomplish these actions, the forward repair force pr°uld be equipped with collision mats, salvage mats, and f abricated patches modeled after those used extensively ?n§ World War II. These should be containerized for air
elii
pp. Surface transport, and carried on board repair tenders salvage ships. Tender personnel should also be trained Cqc°nstruct and install large and small tailored patches (h„tI'P°sed of wood, metal, concrete, or combinations Tender and salvage team personnel must study Practice improvisations, such as the use of portable to /arnes to install portable patches, doors in large patches tQ Militate diving operations inside the hull, and concrete ^eal patch perimeters.11
| Coring mobility will require the use or reactivation of ppl^st one main engine, its vital auxiliaries, and its pro- tl, er and rudder. The range of actions required to restore br °Perability of a damaged propulsion plant can be very fe . • As in the case of weapon system components, the ab',- I'ty of many actions will be determined by the avail- ...y of replacement units, time, and manpower. In vir-
to
tlt
Of
a,1y all
cases, the repair/salvage activity must be capable
^storing electric power and communications cable ’’ Piping systems, and the structural work attendant to
Modular weapon and electronic systems and palletized operator and display consoles, such as those featured in the West German MEKO frigates, facilitate rapid, inexpensive damage repair both in forward areas and domestic shipyards.
these tasks. In most cases, it will also be necessary to flush, dry, and lubricate equipment contaminated by smoke and/or salt water.
This will require large numbers of diving, salvage, and metal trades personnel working in concert. The U. S. Navy has not undertaken a combined salvage and repair operation involving multiple ships and using only military personnel and equipment during the last 40 years. A major investment in material resources, coordinated planning, and personnel training will be necessary to reestablish a serious deployable military capability.
Safe Havens: Battle-damage repair in forward areas will require one or more havens—existing ports or protected anchorages. The use of an existing port may require extensive harbor clearance operations like those during World War II at Bizerte, Palermo, Naples, Cherbourg, and Manila, or the development of advance bases, requiring advanced base functional components, ships, craft, and equipment—as was done at Noumea, Ulithi, Guam, Espiritu Santo, Florida Island, and Kerama Retto.12
The ability to obtain and use safe havens will involve political-military considerations attendant to the use of a foreign port or protected anchorage, and will require extensive logistics planning and coordination. Historically, the establishment of havens involved Navy salvage and repair units, the Army Corps of Engineers and Transportation Corps, and close coordination of the local area commanders of each of the services. The activities associated with the repair of the Stark and the Samuel B. Roberts indicate that ship repair in forward areas is still a very complex process, even on a single ship.
Repair and salvage ships, however, can be designed to
b,
1 An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships in World War II. vt?1 section XII, page 283. ffaCi
First report of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense: Finding 0 ^ and Conclusions (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 30 Scp!e 1987), executive summary. ,, y0|.
’"An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships During World War II.
m, P. 68.
%id, p. 61. ,68.
^Joseph N. Gores, Marine Salvage (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 197D[1] P' Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World ^
/T>— f r*__ ■ — --------- - ------------------- — 38z"
pp.
Mari'ime
■ Cornell
rine Academy in 1961, graduated from Naval Destroyer School in
Wash'11?
make them more efficient and self-sufficient as forward- repair bases. The vertical air-lift capability earlier indicated as being highly desirable for extending the damage assistance reach of tenders and salvage ships could also be used to reduce their dependence on surface logistics links and external combatant units for defense. Thus, the number of defensible sites suitable for use as havens could be increased. In addition, an ability to sustain and service combat helicopters and V/STOL aircraft would greatly enhance the self-defense capability of the advance repair and logistics base.
The wartime and “violent peace” threats to a forward repair and logistics base include: terrorists/Soviet Spetsnaz commandos, land vehicles, small boats, light aircraft, submarines, naval mines, and missile/torpedo boats.13 To counter these threats we must be able to employ passive measures, such as: camouflage, emissions control (EmCon) and protected voice communications; area surveillance, target detection, and classification capability; and the weapon systems to engage low- and medium- threat targets.
The defensive weapons and electronics systems for the salvage and repair forces should be portable and containerized, manned by specialized active-duty or reserve units, and placed on board deployed units in numbers consistent with the character of the threat.
The planning and doctrine development for establishing and operating forward repair base havens needs to be revised to conform to modern applications. Our repair and salvage-ship designs should also be revised accordingly. Most important, ship repair and salvage operations must remain complementary functions. The ships must incorporate the ability to exploit the capabilities of modern aircraft and provision must be made for the stowage or installation of containerized material and weapon systems.
Naval doctrine, confirmed by experience from Mahan through the present, dictates the need to establish forward logistics and repair bases in support of naval operations. The history of opposed naval operations from World War II through the Falklands Conflict indicates that we can expect 10-30% of the engaged combatants to sustain significant damage during the critical first months of war. Given our smaller force of high-cost combatants, the ability of the salvage and repair units to sustain a combat force can have a major influence on a favorable result.
Forty-three years have passed since our last practical experience in handling multiship battle damage at a forward salvage and repair base. The Navy Bureau of Ships (BuShips) battle-damage repair books assembled and distributed to the ships after World War II are obsolete and have not been replaced. Battle-damage repair training for our IMAs is conducted infrequently and only superficially addresses the critical interfaces with salvage assistance, damage assessment, triage decisions, and the logistics and industrial bases. The doctrine, organization, and command structure have also deteriorated as have the skills necessary to implement it. We need to revise our battle- damage repair doctrine to complement current tactical doctrines and to exploit the technology advances of the intervening years.
Repair ships, salvage ships, ocean tugs, and floater dry docks must be designed for complementary empl°> ment, and should train and exercise together in peacetime The ship design and organization of the salvage and repalf force must recognize the implications of the extended fuf mations of modem naval warfare and the necessity 1 rapid response to the assistance calls of damaged ship*- The ability to handle two or more heavy-lift helicopters V/STOL aircraft is an essential design feature. RePa ships must be configured to receive, stow, and trans ABS standard shipping containers, large modular weap° and electronic components, and other large equipment a^ semblies, such as gas turbines, diesel generators, a other auxiliary equipment modules. Provision for exten sive container handling and stowage will enable the rep' ship to be rapidly reconfigured and reprovisioned to sUP port an infinite range of specific operational requiremen • The current era of standoff, precision-guided weap° and the uncertain loyalties of indigenous populations L mand that the repair force be provided with some reside capability to defend the safe haven. Modular weapon terns, infantry weapons such as the Stinger surface-to- missile, and reserve harbor defense units lend themse'v to this purpose. _
A lessons-leamed report on Royal Navy damage control deficiencies during the Falklands Conflict e pressed regret “that earlier lessons learned at such gre^ cost should have proven so ephemeral.”14 We shou^ apply our learning now, without waiting for instruct* from a well-armed and determined adversary.
. ------------------------- , . y yjj oiuicj iiuvui iiuurij «
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), vol. XIV, appendix II,
7Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88, p. 776.
The Blohm & Voss MEKO/FES System, company brochure.
Robin Burnett, “The Federal German Naval Defense Industry,” fense, page 334.
10Blohm & Voss brochure.
"Edward N. Brady, Marine Salvage Operations (Centerville, MD time Press, 1960), pp. 98-114. £
l2Rear Admiral W. R. Carter, Beans. Bullets and Black Oil (Washingl011’ Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 331. , 5.
‘ '“Submarine Tender Perimeter Defense Force,” presentation by Naval Sea terns Command, May 1987. , p
l4“Lessons Learned from the Falklands Conflict,” Jane’s Defence Weekl)' gust 1987.
[1] • of &
A previous Proceedings contributor, Captain Rogers is Director
Intermediate Maintenance Activity Support Office in the Naval Sea
terns Command. Fie served in the Hartley (DE-1029) and , »c-
(DD-829), and as logistician for the Spruance (DD-963) Class St»P ^
quisition Project, the 1,200-psi Steam Propulsion Plant Impr°v<;
Project, and the Ship Support Improvement Project at the Nava
Systems Command. He received a B. A. degree from the Merchan^ received an M. S. in 1968 and M. B. A. in 1977 from George ton University, and graduated from the Naval War College in