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Contents:
Military Pay Problem: More Myth than Reality?—10
The U.S. Navy: A Decreasing Strategic Force—10
Develop a Joint Data Link—10 Are You Telling the Truth?—13 Do We Really Need a Third Seawolf?—13 The Sub the Nation Needs—14
Getting Navy on the Information Highway—14
Manning Sealift’s Ready Reserve—16
The Tank is Dead: But The Cavalry Lives On—16
We Can Build A Better ’Gator—19
LPD-17 ... ‘Arriving’—19 Be Careful with the LPD-17—19
Where Air Power Fails—19
Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned—20
Reopen the Kimmel Case—24
ENTER THE FORUM
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“Military Pay Problem: More
Myth than Reality?”
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, December 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander A. A. Thomas, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS Harlan County (LST-1196)—I read with some surprise Mr. Philpott’s estimate that as few as 2,000 active-duty personnel in the U.S. military are receiving food stamps. Out of a crew of 252 on the Harlan County, 20 of them—that’s 9%—are receiving food stamps. Discussion with my counterparts indicate that my ship is not unique. While I have no proof, I find it hard to believe that the Harlan County has 1 % of all food-stamp recipients in the active-duty military. The food stamp “myth” is based on factual observation.
While a discussion of how best to spend the resources devoted to maintaining military readiness is a healthy one, no one is pretending that the enlisted ranks of our armed forces are well compensated for their work. Throughout my career, I have been humbled by the efforts of the “blue shirts” under my command. I also have found that—with the exception of entry-level personnel—they are underpaid for the work required of them. 1 am sure that factual information on the financial health of the enlisted ranks could be obtained quickly by surveying commanding officers throughout the fleet.
Equally hard to swallow are the RAND Corporation’s findings that officers’ pay is 14% below that of their white-collar civilian counterparts, but the pay for junior enlisted personnel is keeping up with their blue-collar civilian counterparts. The logic required to reach this conclusion is the same brand which concludes that a squadron of B-2s based in the Continental United States is as effective at providing close air support for troops in, say, Kuwait as a carrier air wing stationed in the Persian Gulf. □
forces-—e.g., B-52 strategic bombers by 30% and strategic submarines by 22%. It also reaffirmed the importance of the strategic triad—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers—and focused on the make-up of a strategic force structure for 2003. The NPR force structure assumes implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), under which the United States would be limited to 3,500 strategic weapons. Whether there are 14 or 18 submarines, START II sets a limit of 1,750 SLBMs.
Let me set the record straight on two points, however. First, the NPR does not state that the 14 Tridents “will be placed on ‘modified alert’ rather than full-alert status.” Indeed, the NPR affirmed continued two-ocean and two-crew operations to ensure that the remaining Tridents enjoy maximum flexibility and effectiveness. Second, the NPR does not require the four remaining Tridents to be “discarded.” Under START II, these boats must be rendered nonaccountable as “SLBM launchers,” but the treaty specifies procedures which would allow the boats to be used for other purposes, if the United States were to decide to do so. These issues still are under study.
Under the category of nits. Bill Owens was not Ash Carter’s partner in heading the review, and the coded devices are due by 1997, instead of 1977. □
“The U.S. Navy: A Decreasing Strategic Force”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 88-89, January 1995 Proceedings)
Admiral H. G. Chiles, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command—Norman Polmar makes some good points. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) did reduce U.S. strategic nuclear
“Develop a Joint Data Link”
(See J. McManus, pp. 64-66, January 1995;
J. T. O'Connell, p. 12, February 1995
Proceedings)
Captain J. Barron, U.S. Navy, Head, Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Branch—Most U.S. data links go back to the 1960s and were designed for specific service missions. Mr. McManus mentions this in passing, but he seems surprised at the multitude of translators needed to operate in a joint arena. Translators are nothing more than an expedient and relatively inexpensive means of making existing equipment work in a joint environment for which it was not designed.
As its name implies, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is designed to be joint. Inarguably, it has been long in coming, but the Navy has embraced JTIDS—as evidenced by its ongoing procurements and installations. In
fact, when this article was published, the third JTIDS-equipped battle group was conducting its predeployment workups on the West Coast.
As with any complex system, land testing is absolutely necessary. But, it cannot guarantee 100% trouble-free first-time operations at sea; at best, it can identify first-order effects that need correction before going to sea. In the case of the first JTIDS-equipped battle group—with the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70)—a careful plan to test, analyze and fix secondary effects was devised. Fixing things took a little longer than planned and pushed completion into the battle group’s workups. Nevertheless, JTIDS was found to be operationally effective and suitable.
Mr. McManus’s comments regarding Aegis-equipped ships are out-of-date as well. Starting with the last Arleigh Burke (DDG-51 )-class ship bought in fiscal year (FY) 1992, all ships of this class will come out of the shipyards with JTIDS installed. There also is a plan to backfit JTIDS on all Aegis cruisers. The original plan called for two West Coast Aegis cruisers in FY 1995, but that may be increased to four ships.
With regards to cooperative engagement capability (CEC), it is well understood that CEC must work in a Link-11 or -16 environment. Complying with joint standards is never simple. Even when there is unanimous agreement on them.
it is not uncommon to have different interpretations on achieving them. Nevertheless, the Aegis program is committed—and is making good progress—to meeting joint and Navy standards. □
“Are You Telling the Truth?”
{See M. F. Cancian, pp. 37-41, December 1994 Proceedings)
Captain James Kenney, U.S. Navy (Retired)—1 was terribly disappointed to see no response in the January Proceedings to Colonel Cancian’s article. It was the most important article I have ever read in this wonderful publication and forum.
On the basic issue of honor among officers, Colonel Cancian has hit the nail on the head. His last four paragraphs— under the title “Does this concern about truthfulness really matter?”—should be required reading for every officer.
Finally, I hope Colonel Cancian still has his job. We need him working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. □
“Do We Really Need a Third Seawolfr
(See 1. Brooke, pp. 9-10, December 1994; R. B. Latchaw, p. 12, February 1995 Proceedings)
Kenneth Brower, President, Spectrum Associates, Incorporated—Dr. Brooke stated that the Seawolf (SSN-21) is faster and dives deeper than any other submarine in the world. That is obviously wrong; Russian submarines long have had the capability to move faster and dive deeper than the Seawolf.
Compared to the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class, the Seawolf will be able to run at full speed at virtually all depths while not compromising its stealthiness. The importance of that very expensive capability depends entirely on the environment, the tactical situation, and the performance of the enemy’s sensors and weapons. If we assume that the sole threat to an attack submarine is another attack submarine operating in deep water, that long-range passive sonars are the only significant antisubmarine sensor, and that the ratio of weapon speed to submarine speed is about two or less, then it is extremely important. Nonpassive acoustic sensors and/or hypervelocity antisubmarine weapons (i.e., torpedoes with speeds of 200 to 300 knots), however, change everything.
The Seawolf is a very big investment that will be around for a very long time. If the Navy cannot state with certainty that alternative sensors or high-speed weapons will not be introduced during the next 40 years, then it is time to step back and rethink the roles and missions of future attack submarines and our substantial investment in them. This is par-
The War is Over...
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The Sub the Nation Needs
By Rear Admiral Chuck Horne, U. S. Navy (Retired)
The United States needs an affordable submarine class that—in addition to being as quiet as the Seawolf (SSN-21) and as capable in open-ocean performance—is conceptualized for, designed for, and optimized for littoral warfare, to implement the presence, crisis management, and battlespace-dominance requirements of “Forward . . . From the Sea.”
Industry and the Department of Defense have worked long and effectively to make the New Attack Submarine 30% more affordable than continued Seawolf production after the SSN- 23, the needed “bridge” to the new class. To do this, they made some carefully considered tradeoffs. For example, appreciating that every increase in speed requires a concomitant increase in shaft horsepower three times as great, they relaxed the maximum speed requirement and thereby decreased the size and cost of this new submarine class significantly. Other examples include smaller but more flexible weapons stowage and a reduction to four torpedo tubes.1
There were no tradeoffs in quieting, however.
Thanks to additional technology, the New Attack Submarine will be equal to the Seawolf in this respect.
This is vital because of the quietness of the new-gener- ation Russian submarines (improved Akula and Severodvinsk classes) and of the new diesel submarines being acquired by many regional navies.
In addition to optimum performance in the open-ocean arena, the New Attack Submarine will incorporate new capabilities specially designed for littoral warfare. With premier performance in the littorals as their major objective, the top technical people in the Department of Defense developed a wide range and depth of enhancements, including:
► Built-in enhancements for antisubmarine warfare, special operations, and mine warfare
Submarines, as part of a balanced joint force structure, enable and complement other joint forces—providing antisubmarine warfare, surgical strikes, and more.
► Built-in enhancements and growth potential for magnetic stealth
>■ Major improvements in shallow-water antisubmarine warfare, including lightweight wide aperture array sonar
► Enhancements for incorporating unmanned underwater vehicles and the quantum leap in surveillance and mine avoid- ance/clearance they introduce
> Vertical launch systems for Tomahawks
> Modularity for flexibility and evolution
With an affordable and quiet submarine capable of top
performance in both the open ocean and littoral waters, the United States will have a powerful new asset for deterrence, crisis response, and winning wars. As and when future regional conflicts occur, the New Attack Submarine will be a vital contributor in the joint mix of U.S. forces, providing critical covert surveillance, direct battle group support, offensive mining, special operations, antisubmarine warfare, surgical Tomahawk strikes, and more.
For these reasons—submitted by a nonsubmariner— as well as to preserve the fragile and unique industrial base and achieve the Joint Chiefs of Staff-mandated force structure of 10-12 submarines as quiet as the Seawolf by 2012, the United States needs the New Attack Submarine. And the sooner, the better!
'“New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Independent Characteristics Review,” May 1994, prepared for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) by the New SSN Independent Review Group (INRG).
Admiral Horne commanded Swift Boats in Vietnam, and served as Commander Mine Warfare and Commander Naval Forces Korea.
ticularly true after the collapse of imperial communism. There is no potentially hostile navy existent that is a blue-water threat to the U.S. Navy. Stealth and selfdefense in transit have become temporarily irrelevant. Indeed, there are few threats that can even look over the horizon effectively.
We have the most powerful navy in the world. Quite likely, it is more capable than the navies of the rest of the world combined, but only in the open ocean.
Unfortunately, we have the wrong navy for the threats that are most probable in the future.
So, as to Dr. Brooke’s question of whether the United States needs a third Seawolf-class attack submarine for its defense, quite obviously, the answer is it does not. And to the author’s second question—Are there alternative ways to keep the submarine industrial base alive?—-the answer is equally obvious: Of course there are. □
“Getting Navy on the Information Highway”
(See T. D. Goodall, pp. 92-94, November 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Tracy M. Conroy, U.S. Navy—Commander Goodall’s position on the Navy getting on the information superhighway or present computer networks is right on the mark. The Navy is a long way off from the National Information Infrastructure, but not
just because of cabling inadequacies.
The Navy’s computer infrastructure is embarrassingly antiquated. If telecommunications or automatic data processing professionals walked into any Navy unit, squadron, ship, or local office, they probably would see a couple of Zenith 248s (286 processors) with WordPerfect 4.2 or 5.1—or even WordStar. These precious management tools usually would be located in the administration or personnel office. Even the slightest comment about a network would elicit blank, uncomprehending stares. The situation is somewhat better at the type-commander level; there, some 386 processors (by Unysis or Zenith) with Windows software installed might be found. Perhaps one of the machines would be an end node of a network from a higher level. However, it would serve mainly as an electronic-mail receiving station. A few exceptions to this rule—i.e., a unit with a full-blown network—might be found.
In a time of diminishing dollars and manpower, networks can be force multipliers. For example, the need to send the radioman to the communications station on a message run can be eliminated. Commodores can use video-teleconferencing to meet with all of their commanding officers—and do it securely. If the Navy is ever to drink from the river of information, it needs to have more than the data-flow and switching mechanisms in place—it needs the cups to drink from that river, too.
What is the ideal plan? Everyone has one, but Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle’s vision was far ahead of the “Hornblower” mentality usually found at the senior staff level: “Horatio Hornblower didn’t have a computer. Why should we?” Admiral Tuttle’s retirement—along with the recent force and budget reductions—have stalled the building of the Navy’s on- ramp to the Information Highway.
Many in the Navy recognize the need to build the infrastructure. But because the Navy lacks specific military job assignments for qualified personnel who can shepherd their service onto the Information Superhighway—e.g., as in the Army’s Signal Corps—they have a weak power base within the upper reaches of the service.
The Navy needs to identify the qualified individuals and incorporate them into a full-fledged warfare specialty in telecommunications. There are plenty of subspecialty-trained officers working as engineers, first lieutenants, conning officers, aviators, and intelligence officers and plenty of sailors with the Data Processor rate. After they complete an initial operational tour and earn a warfare specialty, those who wish should be allowed to take a telecommunications specialty.
Let’s hope that Vice Admiral Walter
Davis (the Director of Space and Electronic Warfare), Rear Admiral Walter Cantrell (the head of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command), and Rear Admiral Michael Cramer (the Director of Naval Intelligence) will form a collective vision and use their clout to bring civilian and military leaders in the Pentagon as well as the Congress to the recognition that whoever controls the information controls the battlefield. □
“Manning Sealift’s Ready
Reserve”
(See T. E. Somes, W. K. Fogety, and T. J.
Gregory, pp. 46-49, January 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael Edgerton, U.S. Coast Guard—The authors correctly pinpoint the abysmal record of breaking out Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships during the Persian Gulf War and the increasing shortage of merchant mariners to fill positions on RRF ships. As to their conclusion that the Naval Reserve should assume the responsibility for crewing these national security assets, however, don’t count the Merchant Marine out.
The Naval Reserve is geared to supplementing warships with qualified personnel, and warships function entirely differently than merchant ships. There is no redundancy of positions on merchant ships. It is common to find an unlicensed
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deck force of six seamen on a merchant ship and a deck force of more than 100 enlisted personnel on a comparable Navy combat-logistics ship. Bridge watchstanding on merchant ships is radically different from the Navy as well—usually only one mate and one able seaman stand watch. Simply put, it would require extensive training and a change in mindset for most Naval Reservists to man a merchant ship designed for a crew of less than 40.
A Merchant Marine Reserve program embracing the basic tenets of military reserve programs would fill any crew shortages. Many experienced mariners have pursued shoreside careers, but retain their seafaring qualifications and expertise. If these individuals were offered reemployment rights and commercial salaries, 1 am confident that there would be no shortage of mariners during a RRF breakout or while any RRF vessels are in service. This program would be run by the Coast Guard’s Office of Merchant Vessel Personnel, which already maintains service records for all merchant mariners. Volunteers would register at Coast Guard Regional Examination Centers and would agree to make themselves available in times of national emergency. Merchant Marine Reservists would be called to service only if the companies operating the RRF ships could not fill their crew lists from their affiliated union ranks. Many shipping companies regularly hire outside the unions if the unions cannot supply specified officers or ratings upon demand. The unions and companies are accustomed to operating in this mode and the Merchant Marine Reserve would supply a centralized pool of qualified volunteers who would fill those positions left vacant by the unions.
The Naval Reserve would have an important role in the administration of the RRF. The primary reason most RRF ships did not meet their target breakout dates was because of poor maintenance and inadequate outfitting. The Naval Reserve contains people who have extensive expertise in vessel maintenance and upkeep. The creation of Naval Reserve units— with attached Coast Guard Reserve marine inspectors—to maintain, repair, inspect, and outfit RRF ships would improve breakout times immeasurably. These units would ensure that a fully operational ship was turned over to the designated operating company on time, allowing the companies to concentrate on crewing. A company would notify the Coast Guard of any outstanding crewing requirements within 48 hours of its initial contact with its affiliated unions. The Coast Guard then would contact Merchant Marine Reservists who hold the required licenses or documents, determine their availability for service, and put them in touch with the operating company. The shipping company would pay the Merchant Marine Reservists at the same rate as other mariners and cover all their travel expenses.
Until our leaders recognize the vital importance of the Merchant Marine to our national security, the RRF and a Merchant Marine Reserve will be required. However, an active partnership between the Naval Reserve, the Coast Guard, and the Merchant Marine will ensure that the RRF can be counted on whenever it is needed. □ “The Tank Is Dead: But the
Cavalry Lives On”
(See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 50-53, November
1994; D. R. Watson, pp. 16-18, January 1995;
D. E. Campbell, pp. 18-19, February 1995
Proceedings)
Captain Todd Fredricks, West Virginia Army National Guard—Colonel Kennedy has done an outstanding job of illuminating the essential worthlessness of the main battle tank on the modem battlefield. The short history of the antitank missile has demonstrated that the long- cherished “shock-value” of armor can be quickly neutralized by antitank missiles fired by helicopters or well-disciplined light infantry. Like the mule, the tank has served the Army faithfully and well, but it is time to put it out to pasture.
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to heavy armor—e.g., mountains.
It is appealing, but highly impractical, to think that airmobile forces can replace airborne and armored forces. Infantry must have support from mounted weapons—as the British 1st Airborne Division discovered in 1944 during the Battle of Arnhem. The AGS—slated to replace the woefully inadequate M551A1 Sheridan tank—weighs about 20 tons and while helicopters can perform many marvelous feats, lifting 40,000 pounds isn’t one of them.
As an island nation, the United States must continue to develop highly mobile forces equipped with lightweight but powerful weapon systems that can be moved rapidly over great distances. As airborne forces receive more weapons that are specifically designed for paratroop operations, they will be seen as the ideal partners for heliborne units—the other component of the United States’s force- projection Army of the future. □
“We Can Build A Better ’Gator”
(See W. J. Marshall, pp. 40-42, January 1995 Proceedings)
“LPD-17 . . . ‘Arriving’”
{See S. Surko, pp. 43-44, January 1995 Proceedings)
“Be Careful with the LPD-17”
(See J. E. O’Neil, p. 45, January 1995
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Carl Douglas, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The three articles on the LPD-17 cover many conflicting concepts for the newest of proposed amphibious ships. Captain Marshall contributes innovative ideas, including the use of merchant ships in amphibious operations and multipurpose combatant concepts. It is noted that the Future Surface Combatant (SC-21) Program currently is examining a multimission well-deck ship.
However, Captain Marshall’s insistence that the right hull is that of the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class—because it is a “proved design” with a “proven hull, mechanical, and electrical design”—begs the question: Why not the Austin (LPD-4)-class hull instead of the LSD-41-class hull? The preliminary amphibious payload—troops, vehicles, cargo, aircraft, and landing craft—alone increases the size of the LSD-4l’s hull by an order of magnitude before any consideration is given to adding the new combatant systems with their attendant personnel and maintenance facilities.
There are larger questions that must addressed as well: How far is the Navy going with multipurpose, multimission ships for the future fleet? And, will these ships be affordable? There will be those in the Naval Service (the Navy and the Marine Corps) who will argue that such a multimission combatant will not be available for amphibious operations because its combatant capabilities will dictate the ship’s operations. If this is indeed the direction of future ship designs, a concept of one basic hull with multiple modules for various missions needs to be reexamined.
Then, there is the issue of keeping Marines embarked during nonamphibious missions. Does it make sense to expose a large number of such highly trained troops to the dangers inherent in antisubmarine warfare or a cruise-missile strike? Reportedly, the cost of the current LPD-17 design with its congressionally mandated cooperative-engagement capability comes in at more than $1 billion. Many veterans of the Washington budget battles could tell you that such a high price alone could be enough to kill the program. Captain O’Neil’s cautionary note about overloading the LPD-17 with “bells and whistles” is right on the money in terms of affordability. The Navy risks losing its future amphibious capability if the ship for all purposes and all missions is designed, but its price then is determined to be too high. □
“Where Air Power Fails”
{See S. T. Ganyard, pp. 36-39, January 1995;
M. A. Kirtland, pp. 12-14, February 1995
Proceedings)
Major John S. Clark, U.S. Air Force— Major Ganyard holds that the fielded force of the enemy is the true center of gravity and we attack this decisive point with all available resources. Adherents to this idea criticize the Persian Gulf War air campaign for targeting three centers of gravity that, according to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, were: Iraq’s national command authority; its chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities; and the Republican Guard. That analysis led to a campaign that targeted Iraqi strategic targets, gained complete air superiority, attacked the Iraqi Army, and aided coalition land forces by providing close air support. Therefore, I would argue that the air campaign had a decisive effect on Iraq’s ability to wage war. Every facet of the Iraqi Army’s organization—including its logistics, communications, and intelligence—was affected by the air campaign. Iraq’s chemical, nuclear, and
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(SAC) after the Cold War. The end of SAC was indicative of much more than a recognition of “budgetary reality”—as Major Ganyard asserts. Air Combat Command was created because there are people in the Air Force who recognize that other missions exist besides the nuclear one. Therefore, the creation of the command was a mark of maturity, not an adjustment to fiscal pressure. □
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biological weapons programs were set back a decade—without the use of ground troops. Undoubtedly, Major Ganyard is correct when he states that “possibly tens of thousands of civilian deaths were the indirect result of the bombing of strategic targets.” Those deaths are regrettable, but that is the nature of war.
The air campaign in the Persian Gulf War was appropriate for the conflict. It was congruent with the overall strategic objectives and resulted in an overwhelming victory with a minimum of coalition losses. □
Colonel H. Larry Elman, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Major Ganyard obviously understands the versatility of air power and is correct on many points. However, he only goes halfway. Instead of presenting some constructive ideas, he settles for a little Air Force bashing. Furthermore, his ignorance of intra-Air Force debates on strategic air power and the implications of post-Cold War air command arrangements degrade his position substantially.
An anecdote might enlighten my sea service brethren: In the mid-1960s, The Airman—the Air Force equivalent of All Hands—ran a special issue on helicopters. It included a commentary that stated that because helicopters were not very survivable in combat, they were an air-power dead-end. I wrote a letter to the editor—which was published—saying that, if this argument were taken to its natural conclusion, all airlift, reconnaissance, command-and-control, and other types of aircraft also were dead-ends. I pointed out that any career-minded airman could conclude from the editorial that helicopters were a career dead-end; therefore, commentary like that only perpetuated the “only fighter and bomber pilots should be generals” mentality which so damages the Air Force in managing the diverse needs of a modern service.
Soon after the letter was published, I received a personal letter from a senior officer. He told me that for breaking with
Air Force traditions, I would be punished. He would make sure that the next promotion board knew of my heresy and that I would never be promoted again. At first, I was upset. But, I eventually reached three conclusions:
► Regulations probably would frustrate his efforts. The services do keep promotion boards focused on performance, not trivia—at least below flag rank.
► Any senior officer that childish probably was an anachronism, and not to be feared greatly.
>• If I were wrong on the first two points, then I would be better off without the Air Force.
The incident stimulated me to scrutinize—and often criticize—Air Force doctrine during my 30-year career. I learned that most people in all the services are too busy to take doctrine and roles-and- missions seriously. Those who do—regardless of service—are either hidebound and unimaginative or true military intellectuals. On any issue, all three types— too busy, hidebound, and intellectual— are found on both sides of it. The trick is to discover which of the proffered “lessons” of history actually are valid.
About ten years ago, I reviewed a series of excellent books published by the Office of Air Force History for Air University Review. I observed that Air Force officers are raised in the Theology of Air Power—much like Navy officers are steeped in the Theology of Sea Power. I went on to degrade that religion to a sect, then to a cult, and, finally, to a myth. My point was that the misreading of air power history hurts the development of future doctrine—in much the same way as Major Ganyard states—and that these myths should no longer be taught by the Air Force. My article generated heated discussion and, I hope, did some good. The point here is that, contrary to Major Ganyard’s assertion, the Air Force has debated—and still debates—these doctrinal issues.
Related to this are the reasons behind the demise of Strategic Air Command
“Tailhook: What Happened, Why, & What’s to be Learned”
(See W. H. Parks, pp. 89-103, September 1994; N. Hogan, pp. 23-24, November 1994; J. Byron, D. Van der Schaaf, pp. 23-24, December 1994; W. H. Parks, p. 20, January 1995; D. Buss, p. 17, February 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Wynn Foster, U.S. Navy (Retired), Chairman of the Board, Tailhook Association—Colonel Parks highlighted more questions than answers, but he demonstrated the nature of the Tailhook beast—the failure of Navy leadership to properly deal with the matter and the incredibly tangled web of deceit, misapplication of principles, and disinformation woven around the term “Tailhook.” Hopefully, Colonel Parks’s article contributed to better understanding of the problem. The suggestion that the “Battle of Tailhook" be made a case study of failed leadership and violation of personal rights and due process has merit.
Colonel Parks criticized the Tailhook Association leadership for its relative silence in the wake of the Tailhook misconduct revelation, with the effect of “eliminating any possibility of rap- proachement with the Department of the Navy.” The criticism was based on incomplete information and was unfair. As Tailhook events unfolded, the actions of the Tailhook Association leadership were logical, supportable, and appropriate.
Media representations of Lieutenant Paula Coughlin as the “whistle blower” for the Tailhook misconduct are only partial truths. The Tailhook Association board first learned of the alleged misconduct at its meeting on 17 September 1991, shortly after the 1991 convention. Disgusted by the reported behavior and concerned, the board instructed the association’s president, an active-duty Navy officer, to communicate the matter to appropriate Navy officials. That action was taken because:
> There had been no in-depth investigation of the reported misconduct. Details were sketchy as to exactly what had happened, who was involved, and who might be responsible.
>• The third-floor party activity in the convention hotel, that resulted in the misconduct, was not an official part of the
Tailhook convention. None of it was sponsored, funded, hosted, or controlled by the Tailhook Association.
► All of the third-floor suites were independently rented and paid for by active- duty units of the Navy and Marine Corps. None was occupied, used, or controlled by the Tailhook Association.
► The Tailhook had no responsibility, authority, or obligation to provide hotel security, and it had assumed none.
^ There was a strong presumption (later validated by investigation) that most of the individuals involved in the reported misconduct were active-duty military personnel.
► The Tailhook Association, a private, non-profit civilian organization, had no jurisdiction or police power over such personnel. Follow-on action to any illegal activity was clearly a matter for civilian or military authority.
► Investigation of the Tailhook misconduct was not within the legal purview of the Tailhook Association. Except for possible termination of the association membership of anyone who might be shown to have been involved, the Tailhook Association possessed no punitive power in the matter.
► Clearly, the Tailhook misconduct was a Navy matter, and the Tailhook Association took action to ensure that Navy officials were informed of the matter, in writing.
The report of Tailhook misconduct came to the attention of Secretary of the Navy on 28 October 1991. On the next day, instead of treating the reported misconduct as a Navy problem, and before substantive inquiry had been made into the matter, the Secretary reacted in a letter to the Tailhook Association. He expressed his “absolute outrage” at the misconduct and ordered immediate termination of all Navy support of the Tailhook Association. The termination letter was harsh, clear, and unequivocal, openly inferring that the “personal abuses, behavioral excesses, and quite probably criminal conduct that took place” were the doing of the Tailhook Association. With the stroke of a pen, the association was accused, tried, and convicted without benefit of inquiry, opportunity for a hearing, or invitation to rebuttal.
The contention that the Tailhook Association thereafter “should have opened a dialogue with Secretary Garrett” was misleading. The association maintained informal communications with knowledgeable “friends in court” in the White House, in the Office of Navy Secretary, and in the staff of the senior active duty naval aviator (OP-05, now N-88). In addition, senior retired naval aviators in the Washington, D.C., area intervened on behalf of the Tailhook Association. Unofficial assurances by Navy insiders were not-to-worry, that maneuvering was going on, aimed at bringing the Tailhook Association “back in the fold.”
Colonel Parks’s statement that Secretary Garrett intended only to suspend, not to sever, Navy ties with and support for the Tailhook Association, if the organization met certain conditions, was also misleading. If such intent and conditions were valid, they were not communicated to the Tailhook Association,
The Tailhook Association considered a campaign to publicize its side of the Tailhook story. The idea was rejected because the Navy investigation was still in progress. In light of the Navy Secretary’s termination order and almost universally bad press about Tailhook, little was to be gained by a public relations campaign that, regardless of intent, would appear to pit the Tailhook Association against the Navy it existed to support.
Following the premature release of the Navy’s Tailhook report by Under Secretary Dan Howard, contrary to Secretary Garrett’s instructions, the Tailhook Association leadership issued an open letter to its members. The letter explained the association’s position in the Tailhook matter, explained the reasons for the earlier silence, and outlined corrective steps, within the jurisdiction of the Tailhook Association, that had already been taken.
The Tailhook flap continued to spin out of control at the Washington level and, in any case, the possibility of a Navy-Tailhook Association rapproach- ment was abruptly altered when Secretary Garrett resigned on 26 June 1992.
Immediately after Mr. Howard took office as Garrett’s replacement, the Tailhook Association attempted, in writing, to open a dialogue with him. The letter was ignored. Acting Secretary Howard’s 2 July 1992 “closed door” meeting with some 300 flag and general officers and other senior Pentagon officials resulted in a blustery, adversarial call (conveniently leaked to the media) for the abolition of the Tailhook Association. Concern over Mr. Howard’s apparent lack of knowledge or understanding of the Las Vegas incident prompted another attempt to open a dialogue. A second letter to Howard explained that the Tailhook Association portion of the 1991 convention- symposium had been well monitored and controlled, and pointed out that the third-floor activity, and the resultant misconduct, were not the doing of the association.
In response, Mr. Howard reenforced the already established myth that, by mere name association, the Tailhook scandal was somehow the fault of the Tailhook Association. He vented personal irritation at what he perceived as a lack of mea culpa by the association—a lack of public expression of regret and willingness to “stand up and accept responsibility for what happened. .. as the Navy has done.” Curiously, Mr. Howard seemed to ignore the then-completed report of the Navy’s Tailhook investigation. The report revealed no significant culpability on the part of the Tailhook Association. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Howard’s rhetoric, there had been no public acknowledge-
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merit by the Navy of responsibility in the Tailhook affair. The Howard response tasted strongly of political expediency or hidden agenda, and effectively barred the door to possible rapproachement. As one sympathetic Pentagon official phrased it, Mr. Howard had “declared war” on the Tailhook Association. The myth had been reinforced and the association’s options were severely limited.
Mr. Howard was replaced as acting secretary in mid-July by Sean O’Keefe. Shortly thereafter, there was a glimmer of hope. Mr. O’Keefe was quoted in a 23 July Los Angeles Times news article as acknowledging that responsibility for the Tailhook mess rested with “a handful of junior officers” and that too many people had been “tarred with a brush they really don’t deserve.”
For a third time, the Tailhook Association attempted to open a dialogue with the civilian leadership of the Navy in a 7 August letter to Mr. O’Keefe, much of what had been told to his predecessors was restated. As Colonel Parks noted, however, the effort fell on deaf ears. When queried by the press a few days later, a Navy spokesman acknowledged that the Tailhook Association letter had been received, but admitted it hadn’t yet been read by the acting secretary. Mr. O’Keefe didn’t bother to answer the mail.
It is difficult to envision how the Tailhook Association, black-listed and coldshouldered by the Navy and maligned and ridiculed by an almost universally unfriendly media, with no public counterpoint from Navy sources, might have scripted a “public diplomacy program,” established a “meaningful dialogue” with the Secretary of the Navy, or single-handedly contributed to the solution of the Navy’s Tailhook problem.
Neither the Navy’s nor the Department of Defense’s Tailhook investigation revealed any significant involvement or blameworthiness on the part of the Tailhook Association. The Defense Department report, in fact, divorced the role of the association from that of the Navy in the matter of culpability, and was laudatory of the association’s part in the convention.
It has been little understood by the general public that the Navy was a major beneficiary of its 23-year professional relationship with the Tailhook Association. Annual Tailhook conventions began in 1956. The Navy “came on board” in 1968 during the Vietnam War, recognizing the value of the annual, privately sponsored Tailhook conventions. Those conventions were opportunities to publicize naval aviation and tools to be used to counter a growing, war-generated aviator retention problem. Tailhook convention-symposia provided a professional forum of inter-action and communication. Active and retired, junior and senior military personnel, aerospace industry management and engineering executives, and interested civilians met and exchanged user-producer ideas and information. And the conventions provided a “bully pulpit” for morale-enhancing public recognition of individual achievements among members of the Navy tactical aviation community. The high regard in which Tailhook con- ventions-symposia were held in Navy circles was evidenced by favorable comments thereon by every CNO as far back as the late 1960s when Admiral Tom Moorer held that job.
No credible evidence or argument has been forthcoming to indicate that a renewal of a Navy-Tailhook Association relationship would somehow serve as a corrupting influence on naval aviation. The established purpose of the association remains unchanged in the wake of the Tailhook scandal. The Navy unilaterally slammed the door on the Tailhook Association and, presumably, the door can be reopened just as easily to a renewed dialogue. The unfortunate aspect of the breach is tensions and divided loyalties. The Tailhook Association, an organization of some 13,000 members, about 30% of whom are active-duty personnel, was unfairly maligned and hurt by the Navy’s arbitrary action. Obviously, the vast majority of those members were not even in Las Vegas at the time of the 1991 misconduct. In spite of wishful thinking on the part of some senior Navy leaders, the Tailhook Association has remained healthy and has refused to go away in the name of political expediency. No senior active-duty Navy leader has had the courage to publicly suggest that, just perhaps, the Tailhook Association was accused and treated unfairly, and that the matter deserves revisiting. Rather, the party line represents an absence of downward trust and confidence in the junior ranks through open discouragement of active-duty personnel involvement in Tailhook Association activities, and tacit implication that they should not even belong to their organization.
The Tailhook Association does not expect or encourage a miraculous restoration of the status quo, nor does it endorse a repeat of the sort of conduct that spawned “Tailhook.” It does, however, deserve the opportunity of the same degree of recognition, communication opportunity, and membership privileges for active-duty personnel as are accorded to other private professional organizations whose purposes are to support and serve the Navy. □
“Reopen the Kimmel Case”
(See M. Gannon, pp. 51-56, December 1994;
E. P. Caluro, p. 15, January 1995; R. H.
Spector, p. 25, February 1995 Proceedings)
Wyn R. Pauly—Dr. Gannon implied that the case of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel should be reopened because the admiral was unable to do an adequate job of reconnaissance with the available resources. The fact that Admiral Kimmel had inadequate resources is indisputable; however, it is not enough to reopen the case.
Historians have recorded fairly accurately the conditions on the morning of 7 December 1941 in the U.S. forces at sea in the Pacific and those at Pearl Harbor. The contrast could not be more stark. There were two carriers at sea—the USS Enterprise (CV-6) and the USS Lexington (CV-2). There was an atmosphere of war in them, even though the United States technically still was at peace. These ships and their escorts were alert and prepared. Everything was done with the resources available to safeguard these ships. At Pearl Harbor, it was just another Sunday. Guns were not loaded; ships were not ready for sea. Nor were any procedures to respond to emergencies in place.
Admiral Kimmel cannot be blamed for the attack on Pearl Harbor—that rests solely with Japan. However, he can blamed for his command’s overall complacency and lack of preparedness. □